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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Islamic financial assets and Islamic financial intermediaries have grown into 
relevant players in many countries in recent years. The global volume of Islamic 
(Shariah-compliant) financial assets1 has reached a value of USD 1.88 trillion at the 
end of 2015 (IFSB, 2016: 7), growing at an average compounded annual growth 
rate of 17.3% in the six years 2009-2014 (MIFC, 2014: 2; The Economist, 2014; 
Reuters, 2015: 3) and is forecasted to reach a value of USD 3.4 trillion by 2018 
(MIFC, 2014: 9). Islamic financial intermediaries have shown similar positive 
developments across all countries where Islamic banks operate with an average 
market share of 18% (see Appendix A.1) and with a relatively stable, slightly 
positive growth rate ranging from 0.06% to 3.08% average market share growth 
rate in the five years 2010-2014 (E&Y, 2017: 13). 
Islamic financial intermediaries are highly dependent on Islamic financial assets 
with funding of financial intermediaries typically being achieved through so-called 
Islamic investment accounts, which are profit-sharing-based contracts, and 
represent 67% of Islamic banks’ funding (based on own calculations for a sample 
of Islamic banks, see Appendix A.2). This reliance on profit-sharing-based 
contracts—that do not guarantee fixed interest payments—comes at a cost, 
namely, the risk that inadequate rates of return could lead to massive withdrawals 
that may reach systemic proportions and cause concern on the part of supervisory 
authorities as expressed in IFSB Guidance Note 3, Article 9. 
All these facts make the fair pricing and valuation of Islamic financial assets, i.e., 
the accurate determination of their adequate rates of return given their individual 
risk profiles, a prerequisite for the healthy development of the Islamic financial 
sector—healthy in the sense of avoiding contagion within the Islamic financial 
sector and among Islamic financial intermediaries.—From that perspective, there 
is a practical motivation to correctly value Islamic financial assets.  
                                                          
1 Islamic financial assets refer to the total of Islamic bank assets, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic 
insurance (Takaful) as well as Sukuk (MIFC, 2014A: 2). 
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In addition, valuing Islamic financial assets is also interesting from a theoretical 
perspective. A project under the name “An Islamic Pricing Benchmark”—further 
referred to as the Islamic Benchmark Project—by the International Shariah 
Research Academy was specifically founded in 2010 to address the problem of 
pricing Islamic financial assets (ISRA, 2010; Song/Oosthuizen, 2014: 28) but has 
not succeeded so far and, thus, until this moment no accepted valuation formula 
for Islamic financial assets exists (Azad/Ahsan/Azmat/Chazi, 2017: 2). 
Furthermore, any valuation formula for Islamic financial assets must have the 
ability to recognize that valuation is occurring on a segmented market where a 
group of investors cannot—due to Shariah-compliance restrictions—invest in non-
Islamic stocks or in riskless assets. Such a double segmentation with respect to 
both risky and riskless assets has not yet been considered in the asset pricing 
literature. 
The aim of this thesis is to address the problem of valuation on double segmented 
markets in general and Islamic financial assets in specific to solve the adequate 
returns benchmark problem. 
For the successful valuation of assets (i) a cash flow analysis of the relevant assets 
must be conducted (ii) the valuation formulas derived, and (iii) empirically applied. 
Regarding (i), in the available Islamic finance literature, Islamic financial assets are 
described from a rather legal perspective with the focus on the institutional 
description of contracts rather than financial assets (for examples see Ayub, 2007; 
Gait/Worthington, 2007; Ahmed/Islam/Alabdullah, 2014; Rahman, 2015; 
IRTI/GARP, 2016; as well as IFSB Standards 2 & 15). However, financial contracts 
cannot be observed on markets and, hence, cannot be purchased or sold by 
investors, and thus of little relevance for investment decision-making. Given the 
lack of literature dealing with Islamic financial assets, their cash flows, and risks, 
the second chapter of this thesis provides a thorough analysis into Islamic financial 
assets’ cash flows and risks beginning with their contractual cash flows and tracing 
through their applied forms as Islamic financial assets on financial markets. 
(ii) Building on the cash flow analysis of the second chapter, the third chapter 
derives a theoretical valuation formula that takes into consideration the different 
levels of market segmentation relevant for countries with Islamic banking 
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activities, especially the newly identified double segmentation. Moreover, it 
analyzes the practical relevance of the derived theoretical model compared to 
valuation formulas used for unsegmented markets in order to highlight the extent 
of valuation errors that occur due to overlooking market segmentation. 
(iii) The fourth chapter applies the segmented markets’ asset pricing to empirical 
data and reaches valuation statements that can be translated into investment 
recommendations for Islamic investment accounts. This was conducted in an 
analysis of 81 banks across 16 countries by empirically comparing the returns of 
their Islamic investment accounts with the computed benchmark based on the 
derived asset pricing formula. In a next step, these investment recommendations 
are refined into suitable communication forms for private and institutional 
investors. The chapter further illustrates how a traffic-lights-system can be 
prepared for private investors and suggest how regulators should best publish 
such a system to ensure transparency on the financial market. 
The thesis ends with an overall conclusion and ample formal and graphical 
appendices.
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CHAPTER II 
AN INSTITUTIONAL, CASH FLOW, AND RISK 
ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL ASSETS 
II.1 Introduction 
Absence of arbitrage on the market implies that the price of financial assets equals the 
present value of their cash flows (Dybvig/Ross, 2003: 10). To be able to compute present 
values, the cash flow distribution of the assets to be priced is required and can only be 
determined when the institutional characteristics of these assets are known. For 
Conventional financial assets such as stocks and bonds, these institutional characteristics 
as well as their value drivers and risks are clear. However, the same cannot be said with 
regards to Islamic financial assets. 
By looking at the institutional descriptions of Islamic assets in the literature (for examples 
see Ayub, 2007; Gait/Worthington, 2007; Ahmed et al, 2014; Rahman, 2015; IRTI/GARP, 
2016; as well as IFSB Standards 2 & 15) it becomes obvious that Islamic financial assets 
are described from a rather legal perspective. Moreover, the focus of the institutional 
description is on contracts rather than financial assets (IRTI/GARP, 2016: vii). However, 
financial contracts cannot be observed on markets and, hence, cannot be purchased or 
sold by investors, thus of little relevance for investment decision-making. Nevertheless, 
little or no effort has been undertaken to focus on Islamic financial assets from a cash flow 
perspective, mainly due to the fact that valuation of Islamic financial assets has—so far—
not played a major role in Conventional theories of asset pricing (IRTI/GARP, 2016: ix) nor 
has it been sufficiently and adequately addressed by the Islamic finance community (as is 
shown in the AAIOFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions) Standard 27 Clause 7, as well as decision number 76 (§7) of the 8th conference 
of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Saudi Arabia, which took place in Brunei 
1993, both of which highlight the absence of a suitable benchmark for Islamic assets 
(International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 489; ISRA, 2010)). 
The result is that no literature provides either a detailed cash flow analysis of Islamic 
financial assets or analyzes the risks involved in these assets even though they are the 
backbone of the Islamic banking industry contributing on average to 67% of Islamic banks’ 
financing in 2016 (see Appendix A.2).  
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Taking into consideration the growing importance of the Islamic finance industry on the 
one hand and the lack of available literature dealing with Islamic financial assets, their 
cash flows, and risks on the other hand, it is the objective of this chapter to provide a 
thorough analysis into Islamic financial assets’ cash flows and risks beginning with their 
contractual cash flows and tracing through their applied forms as Islamic financial assets 
on financial markets. 
First, we analyze the Islamic finance literature from the legal standards’ perspective in 
order to gain a thorough understanding of the available Islamic financial contracts. 
Second, an in-depth analysis is conducted using Islamic bank financial statements, product 
descriptions as well as recommendations by the standard setters as to how actual Islamic 
financial contracts are used to structure Islamic financial assets in practice. The cash flows 
of individual Islamic financial contracts are then extracted from their institutional 
descriptions upon which we base our specification of the risks in the different forms of 
applied Islamic financial assets on the market. This allows us to focus on risks that are 
caused by fluctuating cash flows which are of main relevance to meeting our objective of 
cash flow and risk analysis of Islamic financial assets, since these are the most relevant 
factors in the investment decision-making process. 
Through our cash flow analysis of Islamic financial assets that are observable on the 
market and are relevant for an investor’s decision making process, we find that Islamic 
stocks and current accounts are—from a cash flow perspective—identical to their 
Conventional counterparts, with two distinctions for Islamic stocks. First, Islamic stocks 
are a subset of all available stocks on the market, which therefore limits diversification 
possibilities for Islamic investors. Second, Islamic stocks are subject to a different source 
of risk compared to Conventional stocks, namely Shariah risk which stipulates that they 
should be sold—irrespective of their price potential—as soon as they are no longer 
regarded as Shariah-compliant. 
In the case of Islamic investment accounts and Sukuk we find that their cash flows and 
risks depend on a two-stage structure. On the one hand, their cash flows and risks hinge 
on their underlying contracts (first stage). Mark-up contracts are able to secure riskless 
cash flows while profit-sharing contracts are unable to do so. On the other hand, these 
cash flows are then subject to a number of transformations (second stage) such as 
smoothing, management fees, reserve creation, and pooling of different investments. 
These transformations may alter the stochasticity of the cash flows distributed to 
depositors/Sukuk-holders to an extent where individually riskless contracts may become 
CHAPTER II INSTITUTIONAL, CASH FLOW, AND RISK ANALYSIS 
6 
slightly risky while individually risky contracts become slightly less risky, i.e., an overall 
averaging effect of the risk occurs. 
Our first contribution is moving from the literature’s focus on institutional features of 
Islamic financial contracts to a focus on cash flows and risks of Islamic financial assets, 
thus addressing major concerns in IFSB Standard 15 as well as the IRTI/GARP Report. IFSB 
Standard 15 solely analyzes contracts and not cash flows or risks for investors wishing to 
invest in Islamic financial assets. Furthermore, when mentioning the relevant risks of each 
contract, it does not distinguish between risks for the different parties involved in the 
contract (i.e., “investor” and “issuer”), but rather lists all possible risks. This drawback of 
IFSB Standard 15 has been partially addressed by IRTI/GARP (2016: xvi), however, the 
latter focuses only on one mark-up based product, namely Murabahah, and conducts the 
analysis from the perspective of banks, while we expand to include all forms of Islamic 
financial assets and focus on the investor’s perspective. Second, we identify pooling risk 
as an important source of risk for Islamic financial assets. Pooling of funds is the most 
common form used as can be seen in numerous financial statements of Islamic banks. 
Pooling risk describes the unforeseeable change of the fund composition and implies that 
mark-up products are no longer riskless as is commonly understood from the literature 
and the standards of the IFSB. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section II.2, we give an overview 
and a classification of Islamic financial assets by introducing the Islamic principles upon 
which Islamic financial assets are based. In Section II.3, we conduct the cash flow and risk 
analysis of Islamic contracts and financial assets. Section II.4 concludes the chapter. 
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II.2 Principles, Overview, and Economic Role of Islamic Financial 
Assets 
In order to be able to analyze the cash flows of Islamic financial assets, we must—in a first 
step—go over what it means for a financial asset to be considered “Islamic” as opposed 
to Conventional (Section II.2.1), i.e., we must begin with an outline of the principles of 
Islamic finance. In a second step we provide a general overview of the different financial 
assets available in the Islamic financial system (Section II.2.2) as well as an understanding 
of their economic role within the global financial system (Section II.2.3). 
II.2.1 Principles of Islamic Finance 
The term “Islamic”, in the context of Islamic finance, implies that Islamic financial 
contracts adhere to the Shariah criteria governing all Islamic financial dealings. These 
include the following six principles based on standard-setters in the Islamic finance 
literature as well as global financial reports (Iqbal, 1997: 43; Ayub, 2007: 73; Ali, 2011: 5; 
IRTI/GARP, 2016: 1-8): 
(1) Prohibition of interest (Arabic: Riba): Where Riba is defined as any positive 
predetermined rate tied to a maturity and the amount of principal invested, and 
guaranteed regardless of performance. This includes investing in businesses that rely 
on interest-based loans for funding their operations. 
(2) Condition of risk-sharing: Where providers of funds and entrepreneurs must share in 
the risk of the business to be entitled to any of its returns. 
(3) Condition of money only as “real” capital: Profits are generated only from money, 
which is used to undertake a productive activity, i.e., production in the sense of 
activities in the real economy. Money as “potential” capital, i.e., stored or lent as a 
medium of exchange or as a derivative without any real production, cannot produce 
profits, but only interest (which is prohibited). 
(4) Prohibition of extreme speculative behavior/Gharar: Includes hoarding of money and 
prohibition of transactions featuring extreme uncertainty and ambiguity regarding 
contract terms or contract outcomes, such as speculation or gambling. The actual 
definition of what constitutes “extreme” uncertainty is determined by a Shariah board 
on a case-by-case basis. 
(5) Condition of sanctity and transparency of contracts: Dictates the obligation to disclose 
any information relevant to the contract in order to reduce asymmetric information. 
(6) Condition of Shariah-approved investments: All business activities must be Shariah-
compliant. Prohibited non-Shariah-compliant activities include investment in 
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businesses dealing with interest, alcohol, or gambling among others. 
This is a comprehensive list of the most well-known and acknowledged principles of 
Islamic finance. It might be worth noting that the number of principles differs across the 
literature due to clear overlapping. For example, the sixth principle can be used to 
encompass the first principle as well, given that dealing with prohibited interest is 
implicitly non-Shariah-compliant. However, the (cited) Islamic finance literature does not 
mention this overlap and tends to differentiate between these principles as done here. 
II.2.2 Overview of Islamic Financial Assets 
Islamic financial assets are actual products available for investment purposes and are 
based on one or more Islamic financial contracts. Islamic financial contracts are legal 
contracts that either act as a legal framework for Islamic financial assets or can be 
undertaken on a personal level without an investment motive, e.g., a personal car lease 
directly from an automobile agency can be conducted using an Islamic financial contract 
(no Islamic financial asset is needed in this case). 
Moreover, an Islamic financial asset does not, in itself, produce any cash flows, but rather 
relies on an underlying contract to produce the cash flows in the same way that, for 
example, owning a stock in a company does not in itself produce cash flows, but rather 
entitles the stockholder to a portion of the company’s profits through its (underlying) 
activities. Only a combination of both, contract and real asset are able to create Shariah-
compliant cash flows. 
Islamic financial assets are generally offered through the Islamic financial system, which 
consists of four main sectors: Islamic banks, Islamic funds, Sukuk, and Takaful (Islamic 
mutual insurance) providers. In sum, these sectors offer a total of five Islamic financial 
assets: Islamic stocks and Sukuk (made available through the capital market), current 
accounts as well as investment accounts (made available through Islamic banks), Takaful 
(made available through Takaful-providers).  
II.2.2.1 Islamic Stocks 
Islamic stocks are stocks of businesses that are simply filtered from Conventional stocks 
when deemed Shariah-compliant. From that perspective, they possess some resemblance 
to socially responsible or ethical stocks. This filtering is conducted according to set criteria 
determined by Shariah supervisory boards which focus on the Shariah-approved core 
activities of the companies as well as their financial position with regards to aspects such 
as “average of debt-to-equity over 3 years should not exceed 33%” as well as “average of 
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interest-bearing securities held-to-equity over 3 years should not exceed 33%” among 
others (S&P Dow Jones, 2016: 4-5). These filtered stocks are then published as indices for 
most stock markets. The indices are continuously revised to detect any non-Shariah-
compliant developments and remove the non-compliant stocks from the indices (S&P 
Dow Jones, 2016: 3 and 6). This poses a special risk namely Shariah risk, i.e., the risk of 
non-Shariah-compliance, which may force investors to modify their investment positions 
if a stock is deemed non-Shariah-compliant. In all other aspects, Islamic stocks are 
identical to Conventional stocks in terms of their cash flows and risks. 
II.2.2.2 Current Accounts 
Current accounts in Islamic banks are identical to those in Conventional banks from the 
perspective that depositors provide capital, which can be used by the bank for 
unrestricted purposes. In an Islamic bank these purposes must be Shariah-compliant. The 
capital remains available for the depositor upon demand and does not generate returns, 
i.e., offers a zero interest rate (IFSB15, §424). 
II.2.2.3 Investment Accounts 
Investment accounts are owned by depositors and placed in a financial institution 
responsible for investing depositors’ funds and sharing the returns with the depositors. 
The returns of investment accounts depend on the underlying investments, the 
diversification/pooling strategy of the financial institution as well as management fees to 
be deducted along with any practices of income smoothing using reserves or equity, 
before paying out the final returns to the depositors according to profit-sharing ratios pre-
determined at the time of depositing the funds (IFSB15, §271-§272). 
Investment accounts can be divided into restricted or unrestricted accounts, where an 
unrestricted investment account refers to the case where investment decisions, such as 
where, how, or for what purpose the funds are to be invested, are left freely to the bank, 
and thus the investment accounts are unrestricted from the bank’s perspective. 
Comingling of unrestricted investment accounts’ funds with shareholders’ funds is 
allowed. In the case of restricted investment accounts, depositors actively decide which 
project to invest the funds in, and thus the investment accounts are restricted from the 
bank’s perspective. Comingling of restricted investment accounts’ funds with 
shareholders’ funds is typically prohibited. It is important to note that in the case of 
restricted investment accounts, the depositor decides which project to invest the funds 
in, but does not manage the underlying project (IFSB15, §273-275, §414). 
CHAPTER II INSTITUTIONAL, CASH FLOW, AND RISK ANALYSIS 
10 
An additional aspect that distinguishes investment accounts from Conventional bank 
deposits is whether they are to be considered, from the bank’s perspective, as liabilities 
(like Conventional bank deposits) or equity. Unrestricted investment accounts appear in 
the liabilities section of a financial institution’s balance sheet while restricted investment 
accounts are considered off-balance-sheet. Both are treated as equity in the case of 
bankruptcy, i.e., the investor has shareholder-like residual claims over the assets of the 
financial institution (IFSB15, §275). 
II.2.2.4 Sukuk 
Sukuk is the plural of “Sak”, and refers to proportional undivided ownership rights in an 
identifiable, Shariah-compliant asset or a pool of assets. Sukuk are principally asset-
backed, i.e., provide the Sukuk-holders with legal ownership of the underlying asset along 
with its cash flows (true-sale securitization). This is considered the Shariah-compliant 
manner of securitization and insulates Sukuk-holders from exposure to the financial 
problems of the originator such as default. However, this does expose them to losses in 
the event of impairment of the securitized assets since they are now the owners of the 
asset through a true-sale transaction. As a result of the true sale, Sukuk are non-existent 
on the originator’s financial statements (due to securitization) while from the Sukuk 
holder perspective, they are considered as equity ownership in the special purpose entity, 
and treated as assets in the special purpose entity’s financial statements (IFSB15: §447 & 
p. 140). 
Only when legal impediments to the transfer of legal ownership exist—such as is the case 
with sovereign assets (e.g. government buildings or public roads2)—can the Sukuk be 
issued as asset-based (synthetic securitization). In that case, the Sak provides its holder 
only with beneficial ownership through a trust, which holds the assets for the benefit of 
the Sukuk-holders. The ownership of the underlying asset is not transferred, but only the 
generated cash flows are. In case of default of the originator, the Sukuk-holders own no 
assets and only have recourse to the originator. This characteristic deems asset-based 
Sukuk non-Shariah-compliant but are exceptionally allowed due to the presence of legal 
impediments to the transfer of ownership (IFSB 15, §448). Asset-based Sukuk are visible 
                                                          
2 A recent example is the Government of Pakistan using its M2 Motorway connecting Lahore to 
Rawalpindi as the underlying asset for an Ijarah Sak. The actual assets sold were certain parts 
of land comprising the M2 Motorway together with all constructions, superstructures, flyovers, 
and interchanges. It should be noted this sale is asset-based (beneficial ownership) 
sale.https://www.sukuk.com/article/pakistans-third-sukuk-used-m2-motorway-for-ijara-
structure-5032/ 
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on the financial statements of the originator and are treated by central banks and 
regulatory authorities as liabilities or “debentures” (Securities Commission, 2004: 2). 
The type of a Sak depends on its underlying investment, but always exhibits a 
securitization structure (for more information about the securitization process see 
Appendix B.1). A Sak contract is in itself nothing more than a profit-sharing contract (such 
as Mudharabah, Musharakah or Wakalah—will be explained in Section II.3.3.1.2.2) with 
the additional securitization process appended to it. The returns on Sukuk depend on the 
underlying contract, the diversification/pooling strategy of the issuer, management fees 
and income smoothing by the special purpose vehicle, before paying out the final returns 
to the Sukuk-holders according to the profit-sharing agreement of the Sak contract. 
It may be useful to note that “Sukuk” is the name shared by the contract as well as the 
actual financial asset available on the market. Sukuk are mistakenly labelled “Islamic 
Bonds” since their final cash flows are often similar to those of Conventional bonds 
(Alam/Hassan/Haque, 2013: 22). This labeling is, however, misleading: An important 
difference is that the structure of a Sak—for Shariah-compliance purposes—does not 
involve a principal amount, therefore the only way that Sukuk-holders can regain their 
initial investment at maturity is if the assets owned by the special purpose entity are sold 
and the receipts are paid out to the Sukuk-holders as redemption for their ownership 
certificates. Further differences depend on the type of Sukuk: For asset-backed Sukuk two 
differences to Conventional bonds exist: First, bonds’ cash flows are stable by design while 
in Sukuk the special purpose vehicle may need to smoothen the returns to reach stable 
cash flows if the cash flows of the underlying contract are themselves stochastic. Second, 
in the event of default of the originator, holders of asset-backed Sukuk still own the 
underlying assets which is not the case in Conventional bonds (IFSB15, §448). In the case 
of asset-based Sukuk the only difference to Conventional bonds is the practice of 
smoothing. This implies that in case the underlying contract's cash flows are non-
stochastic, i.e., no smoothing is needed, and the Sak is asset-based, then indeed the two 
contracts (Sukuk and Conventional bonds) are identical in every aspect except that the 
nature of activities must be Shariah compliant. 
II.2.2.5 Takaful 
Takaful is the Arabic word for “solidarity” and refers in this context to mutual protection 
and support against losses (Archer/Abdel Karim/Nienhaus, 2009: 2). Even though it is 
intuitively described as “Islamic insurance”, it is considered strictly distinct from 
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Conventional insurance especially with regards to its business model which revolves 
around participatory risk-sharing as opposed to Conventional risk-transfer. The closest 
Conventional model to Takaful would be mutual insurance where all members pay 
contributions into a fund which is used when one (or more) member faces damages. In 
this case, the insured is at the same time the insurer and the insurer only benefits from 
protection in case of damages (not from premiums as is the case in Conventional 
insurance) (Archer et al, 2009: 10). However, given the fact that Takaful does not 
constitute an investment in the strict sense, but rather a diversification of risks among the 
Takaful participants as well as its rather insignificant size constituting less than 2% of the 
Islamic financial industry in 2015, we decide to not include it further in our analysis. By 
focusing on the remaining assets we still capture approximately 99% of all Islamic financial 
assets that are relevant within the investor’s decision field as can be seen in Table 1. 
Assets billion USD Percent 
Islamic Banking Assets 1496.5 79.54 
Sukuk Outstanding 290.6 15.44 
Islamic Funds 71.3 3.79 
Takaful 23.2 1.23 
Total 1881.6 100 
Table 1: Islamic financial assets by value at the end of 2015 (IFSB, 2016:7). 
II.2.3 Economic Role of Islamic Financial Assets 
II.2.3.1 Islamic Financial Assets in General 
According to the Global Islamic Finance Report 2016, the actual size of Islamic financial 
assets at the end of 2015 was $1.88 trillion (IFSB, 2016: 7). This should be contrasted with 
the size of socially responsible investments at the end of 2014, which according to the 
Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014 is estimated at $21.4 trillion (GSIA, 2015). It 
is important to note that here the definition of socially responsible investments includes 
Islamic financial assets. Finally, these two figures should be compared to the stock of 
global financial assets3 at the end of 2014 estimated at $294 trillion (Ro, 2015), which puts 
the size of Islamic financial assets at exactly 10% of socially responsible investments and 
0.7% of global financial assets. 
                                                          
3 Stock of global financial assets includes stock market capitalization, public debt securities 
outstanding, financial and non-financial institutions’ bonds outstanding, and securitized and 
non-securitized loans outstanding (Ro, 2015). 
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Not only do Islamic financial assets not play a large role on the global scale, but also in 
terms of market share as Figure 1 shows across regions where Islamic banks operate. 
 
Figure 1: Share by total assets (in percent) of Conventional and Islamic banks by region. GCC: Gulf 
Cooperation Countries, ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (Source: EY, 2016). 
II.2.3.2 Islamic Stocks 
The market capitalization of Islamic stocks according to the FTSE Shariah Global Equity 
Index (2016: 3) is $15.83 trillion. This is slightly less than half of the FTSE Global Equity 
Index but is more than 8 times the size of total Islamic financial assets according to IFSB 
(2016). This contradiction can be explained by the fact that these $15.83 trillion show all 
stocks that meet Shariah requirements4 (Islamic stocks) in the market and not what is 
actually held by Islamic investors which is not practically quantifiable. The Islamic finance 
literature also uses another measurement to proxy for investment in Islamic stocks by 
quantifying the assets under management by Islamic mutual funds (indirect investment 
in Islamic stocks). According to IFSB (2016: 21) there were 1220 Islamic mutual funds at 
the end of 2015 managing a total of $71.3 billion, where 40% were domiciled in Saudi 
Arabia, 28% in Malaysia, 8% in Jersey, and 7% in the United States with the remaining 19% 
distributed among other countries with no country possessing a share larger than 5%. 
However, this proxy is subject to the same fault inherent in the previous measurement: 
Conventional investors can also invest in Islamic mutual funds. 
  
                                                          
4 FTSE Global Shariah Equity Index filters Conventional stocks for Shariah compliance according 
to their activities (total interest and income resulting from prohibited activities should not 
exceed 5% of total revenue) and financial ratios (debt < 33.3% of total assets, cash and interest 
bearing items < 33.3% of total assets, accounts receivable and cash < 50% of total assets). 
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II.2.3.3 Current and Investment Accounts 
The size of Islamic investment accounts represent on average 67% of total liabilities and 
equity for Islamic banks at 2Q2016 based on own calculations in a detailed sample of 
countries as can be seen in Table 2. 
Investment 
Accounts 
Arithmetic Average 
at 2016Q2 
Investment 
Accounts 
Arithmetic Average 
at 2016Q2 
Bahrain 68.49% Pakistan 57.40% 
Bangladesh 75.93% Philippines N/A 
Egypt 77.98% Qatar 56.55% 
Indonesia 58.29% Sri Lanka 78.92% 
Jordan 69.58% Syria 16.28% 
Kuwait 68.09% Thailand 108.10%* 
Malaysia 82.28% Turkey 45.02% 
Oman 53.74% UAE 80.05% 
Average: 66.45% 
Table 2: Investment accounts as a percentage of total assets of Islamic banks in a sample of 16 countries at 
2016Q2. * Thailand has only one Islamic bank “Islamic Bank of Thailand” which in 2016 had financial 
problems leading to a negative equity balance and thus an over 100% investment account ratio to 
total liabilities. 
Current accounts represent on average 13.23% of total liabilities and equity for the same 
sample of countries at 2016Q2 as can be seen in Table 3. 
Current 
Accounts 
Arithmetic Average 
at 2016Q2 
Current 
Accounts 
Arithmetic Average 
at 2016Q2 
Bahrain 13.78% Pakistan 24.16% 
Bangladesh 7.63% Philippines N/A 
Egypt 12.10% Qatar 10.61% 
Indonesia 10.56% Sri Lanka 7.64% 
Jordan 20.94% Syria 20.30% 
Kuwait N/A Thailand 0.36% 
Malaysia 12.47% Turkey 17.20% 
Oman 14.25% UAE N/A 
Average: 13.23% 
Table 3: Current accounts as a percentage of total assets of Islamic banks in a sample of 16 countries at 
2016Q2. 
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II.2.3.4 Sukuk 
According to IFSB (2016: 7), total Sukuk outstanding was $290.6 billion at the end of 2015. 
However, the majority of Sukuk issuance has been geographically limited to 6 countries 
(as can be seen in Figure 2) and dominated by Sovereign issuances (as can be seen in 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Sukuk issuance by country (1Q2015) (source: MIFC, 2015: 3). 
 
Figure 3: Sukuk issuance by issuer type (1Q2015) (source: MIFC, 2015: 3). 
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II.3 Detailed Cash Flow Analysis of Islamic Financial Assets 
In order to determine the degree of stochasticity of the cash flows of Islamic financial 
assets from an investor’s perspective (investors in stocks, depositors of current or 
investment accounts or Sukuk-holders), we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we 
describe each asset’s cash flows according to its institutional descriptions from Section 
II.2.2 as contractually planned, i.e., if cash flows continue until the planned maturity of 
the contract. In the second step, we analyze how these cash flows might be affected by 
extraordinary events, i.e., events that are not contractually planned and that lead to 
unplanned interruptions in cash flows or their complete suspension before maturity of 
the contract. 
II.3.1 Islamic Stocks 
II.3.1.1 Cash Flows as Contractually Planned 
The cash flows of stocks (Islamic or otherwise) depend on stochastic dividend payments 
and the stochastic market value of the stock when the investor decides to sell it 
(Berk/DeMarzo, 2011: 252). A tabular summary can be seen in Table 4, which shows the 
actions being taken by an investor at each point in time, the cash flows of the contract 
from the investor’s perspective as well as the overall wealth position of assets that are 
held as a result of the contract where “t” is the starting point and “T” is the planning 
horizon. 
Time Point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Purchasing the stock 
at market price at t 
Receiving dividend 
payouts 
Selling the stock at 
market price at T 
Investor’s 
wealth 
Stock Stock 0 
Investor’s 
cash flow 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Stochastic positive 
cash flows: 
dividends 
Positive cash flow: 
market price at T 
Table 4: Actions, cash flows and changes in wealth position of a stock—investor perspective. 
II.3.1.2 Cash Flows under Extraordinary Events 
Extraordinary events for Islamic stocks include financial distress of the company and 
Shariah risk as well as risks from smoothing practices. 
If a company is facing financial distress, it might cut its dividends or even declare 
bankruptcy with the consequence that cash flows are interrupted and market prices might 
fall to zero. This risk is identical to the risk for non-Islamic stocks. 
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Shariah risk describes that fact that changing company activity or debt-equity structure 
may make the company no longer Shariah-compliant. In such a case an Islamic investor is 
required to remove that stock from the investment portfolio as soon as it becomes non-
Shariah-compliant, otherwise the income obtained from the stock should not be 
recognized and should be written off/given away to charity (so called “purification”) 
negating any positive cash flows or market price changes from this asset (IFSB15, §264). 
Shariah risk does not apply in the case of non-Islamic stocks. 
Due to the presence of withdrawal risks (explained in Section II.3.3.2.3) it is possible that 
stockholders of an institution offering financial products may need to forgo a portion of 
their earnings as a result of commercial and/or supervisory pressure (IFSB GN-3: 3) in 
order to smoothen losses incurred in investment accounts if no sufficient reserves are 
available. This risk also applies to non-Islamic stocks if their business model includes 
offering Islamic financial products. 
II.3.2 Current Accounts 
II.3.2.1 Cash Flows as Contractually Planned 
The cash flows of current accounts are relatively straightforward: Deposited capital 
remains available to depositors upon demand and no returns are paid out until 
withdrawal. A simple depiction and example can be seen in Table 5. Thus, cash flows in a 
current account are non-stochastic if everything goes as contractually planned. 
Time Point t T 
Actions Deposit money into account Withdraw money from account 
Investor’s 
wealth 
Deposit 0 
Investor’s 
cash flows 
Negative cash flow: 
money deposited 
Positive cash flow: 
money withdrawn 
Table 5: Actions, wealth position and cash flows of a current account—depositor perspective. 
II.3.2.2 Cash Flows under Extraordinary Events 
If things do not go as planned and the bank defaults on repayment the depositor may not 
be able to recover the entire deposited amount (IFSB15, §427). 
II.3.3 Investment Accounts 
A straightforward analysis of the cash flows of investment accounts is impossible since a 
depositor in an investment account must first engage in a (profit-sharing) contract with 
the bank that allows investors to share in the profits of the underlying contract. The bank 
then uses the capital obtained from the depositors to invest in underlying contracts, which 
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must first generate cash flows that are then transferred to the investment account-
holders. However, the cash flows of the underlying contracts are not directly transferred 
to investment account holders; instead, cash flow transformations occur first: 
management fees are deducted and reserves are created or used, i.e., smoothing 
procedures applied. 
To determine the cash flows of investment accounts, we apply a three-step procedure 
(see Figure 4): First, the cash flows of the underlying contracts must be analyzed. Second, 
cash flow transformations must be clarified. Third, by combining the first and the second 
step, the cash flows being paid out to investment account holders can be determined. 
 
Figure 4: Procedure of determining the cash flows of investment account-holders. 
II.3.3.1 Cash Flow Analysis of the Underlying Contracts 
II.3.3.1.1 Classification of Underlying Contracts 
According to IFSB15 (§15), there exist seven contracts that are available as underlying 
contracts for Islamic investment accounts. An entire listing of the contracts and their 
descriptions are available in IFSB15. The IFSB classifies underlying Islamic financial 
contracts based on their nature of return where a (Shariah-compliant) return can be 
achieved by one of two methods: 
(1) Mark-up: a contract, which generates returns through the sale or lease of an asset, 
where the return is the mark-up levied upon the transaction. Mark-up contracts include 
Murabahah, Salam, Istisna and Ijarah (IFSB15, §12).The returns of these mark-up 
contracts are thus based on the sale of (—in case of Ijarah—the benefits of) assets or 
commodities and their returns are the spread between cost of asset acquisition and the 
amount recovered from selling it (—in case of Ijarah—leasing) with the agreed upon mark-
up. The cash flows of these contracts are therefore “real cash flows”, i.e., produced 
directly from a real asset, which taps into the real economy. 
(2) Profit-sharing: a contract, which generates returns by sharing the returns of an 
underlying investment. Profit-sharing-based contracts include Musharakah, Mudharabah 
and Wakalah (IFSB15, §12). The returns of these profit-sharing contracts are thus based 
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on the ownership of the underlying asset and their returns are the shares of profits or 
losses achieved by the underlying investment. The cash flows of these contracts are 
therefore “financial cash flows”, i.e., are at least one level away from the real asset that 
taps into the real economy (a real cash flow generating asset need not exist at this stage 
but must eventually exist in later stages). 
The nature of the cash flows of the underlying contracts (real or financial) is, in our 
opinion, crucial and deserves much more attention than it has so far had in the Islamic 
finance literature since it identifies an important “loophole”, namely that no explicit limit 
on the levels of underlying contracts exists. For example, consider an investment account 
(generating a financial cash flow) where the funds are invested in another investment 
account whose funds are also invested in a third investment account and eventually 
invested in the real cash flow generating asset. Would such an asset be deemed better or 
worse—from a Shariah-compliance perspective especially with regards to sanctity and 
transparency of contracts—than another investment account whose real cash flow 
generating asset is only one level away? This loophole will constitute a problem for 
Shariah-compliance in the long run since a buyer may not be able to determine what the 
underlying contract actually is. This situation is as problematic as multiple level 
securitization and re-securitization of assets in Conventional finance. 
II.3.3.1.2 Cash Flows as Contractually Planned 
II.3.3.1.2.1 Mark-Up-Based Contracts 
II.3.3.1.2.1.1 Murabahah Contracts 
Murabahah contracts are agreements whereby one party sells a specified asset at 
acquisition cost plus an agreed upon profit margin (or mark-up). This asset may be already 
in possession of the seller, or it must be acquired at the request of the customer, who 
then purchases it. In case the asset must be acquired, parties can engage in a binding 
promise to purchase before the asset is acquired. In both cases, acquisition cost includes 
purchase price plus direct costs such as transportation or customs. The agreed upon 
selling price is usually paid in installments which are fixed at the outset. The mark-up profit 
margin is based on the bank’s running costs as well as the credit worthiness of the 
customer (IFSB2, §20). Within one contract, returns are equal to the installment amounts 
(IFSB15, §293) and are therefore non-stochastic (see Table 6). 
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Time Point t t+1…T 
Actions Acquires asset then sells it to 
customer 
Receives installments 
Investor’s 
wealth 
0 (Asset acquisition then immediate 
sale) 
0 
Investor’s cash flows 
of a Murabahah 
contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t; no cash flows from 
sales because installments are paid 
Positive cash flows: 
installments received 
Table 6: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Murabahah contract—investor (seller) perspective. 
II.3.3.1.2.1.2 Salam and Parallel Salam Contracts 
Salam 
Salam is an agreement whereby one party buys a commodity 5  at a specified pre-
determined price paid upfront and to be delivered on a specified future date in a specified 
quantity and quality (IFSB15, §325). Cash flows of a Salam contract are non-stochastic 
since the price is pre-determined at the outset. 
However, the purpose of purchasing the commodity is usually to sell and not actually to 
use the asset nor keep in possession (IRTI/GARP, 2016: 18) since no profits can be made 
if the asset is not sold. Given that the market value of selling the commodity after the 
Salam contract has ended cannot be determined beforehand, it is common practice to 
consider the final cash flows stochastic (see Table 7). 
Time point t T 
Actions Transfer of purchase 
price of commodity 
Transfer of commodity (and selling 
at market value—purpose is usually 
to sell and not actually to use the 
commodity (IRTI/GARP, 2016: 18)) 
Investor’s wealth 0 Asset (0) 
Investor’s cash flows 
of a Salam contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
0 (Positive cash flow: 
market price at T) 
Table 7: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Salam contract—investor (buyer) perspective. 
Parallel Salam 
Parallel Salam refers to an additional Salam to sell the commodity with the same 
specifications as the purchased commodity under the original Salam contract to a party 
other than the original seller. Parallel Salam has the objective of locking in profits through 
the difference between buying and selling prices of the same asset at time t, due possibly 
                                                          
5 Commodity is defined as a tangible physical product that is or can be traded on a secondary 
market, excluding gold and silver which are strictly prohibited by Shariah since they are treated 
as a form of “money”—Which is a medium of exchange and cannot be traded (IFSB15, §325). 
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to different price offers (due to bulk purchasing) or different maturities (IFSB15, §326). 
Cash flows of a Parallel Salam contract are non-stochastic since the market value of selling 
the asset at the end of the contract is determined at the outset of each Parallel Salam 
contract and no negative cash flow should exist (see Table 8) 
Time point t T 
Actions Transfer of purchase price of 
commodity 
Transfer of same 
commodity 
Investor’s wealth 0 0 (Commodity 
acquisition then 
immediate transfer) 
Investor’s cash flows of a 
Salam contract 
and a 
 
Parallel Salam contract 
 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
 
Positive cash flow: 
market price at t 
(the net of these cash flows 
should be positive by taking 
advantage of different 
maturities or discounts in order 
to lock in a profit) 
 
0 
 
 
0 
Table 8: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Parallel Salam contract—investor (buyer Salam/ seller 
Parallel Salam) perspective. 
II.3.3.1.2.1.3 Istisna and Parallel Istisna Contracts 
Istisna 
Istisna is an agreement whereby one party (Al-Sani) manufactures or constructs an asset 
(e.g., ship, aircraft, building, infrastructure, installation of machinery, heating etc.) 
according to the buyer’s (Al-Mustasni) specifications to be delivered on a specified future 
date. Payments by the buyer may be made in advance, in installments during 
construction, or as a lump sum at a future date and can be revised upon mutual consent 
(IFSB15, §340). Cash flows of an Istisna contract are stochastic: the positive cash flows 
being received are pre-determined but are subject to revision and the negative cash flows 
for the construction cannot be determined before being incurred, but only estimated. 
Since the purpose of constructing the asset is usually to actually use and not sell the asset 
(IRTI/GARP, 2016: 23) no profits can be made. Nevertheless, the possibility of making a 
profit for the buyer exists through selling the constructed asset at market value after the 
Istisna contract has ended; this price however cannot be determined beforehand and 
would also render the final cash flows stochastic for the buyer (see Table 9). 
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Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Construction of 
asset begins 
Payments for 
construction and 
received installments 
Transfer of 
constructed asset 
(Manufacturing) 
investor’s wealth 
0 Work in Progress 0 (Asset 
constructed then 
immediate 
transfer) 
(Manufacturing) 
investor’s cash 
flows of an 
Istisna contract 
0 
 
Negative cash flows: 
construction costs 
and 
Positive cash flows: 
installments received 
0 
Table 9: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of an Istisna contract—manufacturing investor (Al-Sani) 
perspective. 
Parallel Istisna 
Parallel Istisna is an additional Istisna to manufacture or construct a project with the same 
specifications under the original Istisna contract by engaging the services of a contractor 
(independent of the original client). Parallel Istisna has the objective of locking in profits 
through the difference between buying and selling prices of the asset to be constructed 
(IFSB15, §343). Similar to Istisna contracts, cash flows of a Parallel Istisna contract are 
stochastic since the price of the asset (to be paid in installments), although pre-
determined at the outset of each Parallel Istisna contract is subject to revision upon 
mutual consent of both parties. The negative cash flows for construction are no longer 
directly relevant since they are outsourced (see Table 10). 
Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Construction 
contracted then 
outsourced 
Payment for construction Transfer of 
constructed asset 
Manufacturing 
and selling 
investor’s wealth 
position 
0 0 0 (Asset 
acquisition then 
immediate 
transfer) 
Manufacturing 
and selling 
investor’s cash 
flows of an  
Istisna Contract 
and a 
Parallel Istisna 
contract 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
Positive cash flows: 
installments received 
 
Negative cash flows: 
outsourced construction 
costs 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
Table 10: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Parallel Istisna contract—manufacturing and selling 
investor (Al-Sani Istisna/Al-Mustasni Parallel Istisna) perspective. 
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II.3.3.1.2.1.4 Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik Contracts 
Ijarah 
Ijarah is a (spot) leasing agreement whereby one party as lessor transfers the right to use 
the asset (usufruct) to a customer as the lessee for an agreed period in exchange for an 
agreed consideration. Ijarah can be seen as equivalent to a Conventional operating lease. 
The lessor maintains the ownership of the leased asset. The leased asset must be owned 
by the lessor at the time of the leasing contract. This asset may be already in possession 
of the lessor, or it must be acquired at the request of the customer, who then leases it. In 
case the asset must be acquired, parties can engage in a binding promise to lease or a 
non-binding promise to lease before the asset is acquired (IFSB15, §382 & 384). Cash flows 
of an Ijarah contract are non-stochastic since the Ijarah structure relies on leasing, i.e., 
periodic installments known in advance and fixed at the outset depending on the relevant 
costs of the bank as well as on the credit worthiness of the lessee (IFSB2, §20) (see Table 
11). 
Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Acquisition and 
transfer of asset to 
lessee 
Lease payments Receipt of 
asset from 
lessee 
Investor’s 
wealth 
Asset Asset (lessor remains 
owner, but is not 
possessor) 
Asset 
Investor’s cash 
flows of an Ijarah 
contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
lease payments received 
0 
Table 11: Actions, wealth position and cash flows of an Ijarah contract—investor (lessor) perspective. 
Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik 
Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik is identical to “normal” Ijarah with the addition that the lessor 
promises to transfer the ownership of the leased asset at the end of the contract in 
exchange for a pre-determined price (equivalent to a Conventional finance lease) (IFSB15, 
§382). Cash flows are identical to those of an Ijarah contract, i.e., are non-stochastic since 
the structure relies on leasing which includes periodic installments pre-determined in 
advance. The difference to Ijarah is the additional cash flow that is generated when the 
asset is sold to the customer at T instead of being returned to the lessor (see Table 12). 
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Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Acquisition and 
transfer of asset to 
lessee 
Lease payments Sale of asset to 
lessee 
Investor’s 
wealth 
Asset Asset 0 
Investor’s cash 
flows of an Ijarah 
Muntahia 
Bittamlik contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
lease payments 
received 
Positive cash flow: 
pre-determined 
price at t 
Table 12: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of an Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik contract—investor (lessor) 
perspective. 
II.3.3.1.2.2 Profit-Sharing-Based Contracts 
II.3.3.1.2.2.1 Musharakah and Diminishing Musharakah Contracts 
Musharakah 
Musharakah is an agreement whereby parties contribute capital to a new or existing 
enterprise on a permanent basis. Profits generated by the enterprise are shared in 
accordance with pre-determined ratios in the Musharakah agreement while losses are 
shared in proportion to the respective contributor’s share of capital. All partners’ shares 
remain constant throughout the contract period (IFSB15, §404). The cash flows of 
Musharakah contracts are stochastic since they depend on the underlying projects 
undertaken by the founded business. The cash flow at time T is stochastic as well because 
of the unknown selling price of the partnership shares at the end of the business (IFSB15, 
§404) (see Table 13). 
Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Acquires shares in 
business 
Profits or losses 
achieved from 
business activities 
Liquidates shares in 
business 
(Non-managing 
partner) 
Investor’s wealth 
Shares Shares 0 
(Non-managing 
partner) 
Investor’s cash 
flows of a 
Musharakah 
contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
profits 
or 
Negative cash flows: 
losses  
Positive cash flow: 
market price at T 
Table 13: Actions, wealth position and cash flows of a Musharakah contract—financial investor (non-
managing partner) perspective. 
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Diminishing Musharakah 
Diminishing Musharakah is identical to a Musharakah contract without the condition that 
all partners’ shares remain constant, but rather that shares of one or more partners will 
be transferred to the other partner(s) across time until they completely exit the 
partnership. The cash flows of diminishing Musharakah contracts are, like “normal” 
Musharakah, stochastic since they depend on the underlying projects undertaken by the 
founded business and the cash flow at time T is stochastic as well because of the unknown 
selling price of the partnership shares at the end of the business (IFSB15, §404). In 
Diminishing Musharakah, the diminishing nature poses additional stochasticity since the 
diminishing partner may end up incurring more losses/earning more profits than the 
other partner as the sharing-ratios change until maturity. Furthermore, the diminishing 
nature is contracted at specific points of time which might not be optimal for selling the 
shares of the business (IFSB15, §404) (see Table 14). 
Time point t t+1…T  T+1… 
Actions Acquires shares in 
business 
Profits or losses 
achieved from 
business activities + 
Selling Shares to 
expanding partner 
No action – 
diminishing 
partner no 
longer 
involved in 
business. 
(Non-managing 
diminishing partner) 
Investor’s wealth 
Shares Diminishing portion of 
shares 
0 
(Non-managing 
diminishing partner) 
Investor’s cash flows 
of a Diminishing 
Musharakah 
contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
profits 
or 
Negative cash flows: 
losses 
and in both cases 
Positive cash flows: 
market price at  t+1…T 
0 
Table 14: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Diminishing Musharakah Contract— financial investor 
(non-managing diminishing partner) perspective. 
II.3.3.1.2.2.2 Mudharabah Contracts 
Mudharabah is an agreement whereby one party (Rabb Al Maal—capital provider) 
contributes capital to an enterprise which will be managed by the other party (Mudharib). 
Profits generated by the enterprise are shared in accordance with pre-determined ratios 
in the Mudharabah agreement while losses are to be borne solely by the capital provider 
(Rabb Al Maal) unless they are due to negligence on the side of the manager.—Negligence 
belongs, however, to the class of extraordinary events (see Section II.3.3.1.3). The cash 
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flows of a Mudharabah contract are stochastic since they depend on the underlying 
projects (IFSB15, §415 & §419) and the manager receives a managing (Mudharib) fee only 
if profits are achieved (IFSB15, §413). Finally, the cash flow at time T is stochastic because 
of the unknown selling price of the partnership shares at the end of the business (see 
Table 15). 
Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Acquires shares in 
business 
Profits or losses 
achieved from 
business activities 
Liquidates shares 
in business 
(Financial) 
Investor’s 
wealth  
Shares Shares 0 
(Financial) 
Investor’s cash 
flows of a  
Mudharabah 
contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
profits 
and 
Negative cash flow: 
Mudharib fee for 
manager, only in 
case profits are 
achieved 
or 
Negative cash flows: 
losses 
Positive cash flow: 
market price at T 
Table 15: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Mudharabah contract—financial investor (Rabb Al 
Maal) perspective. 
II.3.3.1.2.2.3 Wakalah Contracts 
Wakalah is an agreement whereby one party (Muwakkil) contributes capital and appoints 
another party (Wakil) to act on its behalf to accomplish specified services or activities. 
Profits generated by these services or activities are distributed entirely to the capital 
provider (Muwakkil) less the Wakil fee (pre-determined in the Wakalah agreement). The 
Wakil fee unlike the Mudharib fee must always be collected regardless whether profits 
are achieved or losses are incurred. The Wakil fee can additionally include a performance-
related remuneration, which can be a specific percentage of the profits or excess over an 
expected rate of return. Losses are to be borne solely by the Muwakkil unless they are 
due to negligence on the side of the manager (IFSB15, §434).—Negligence belongs, 
however, to the class of extraordinary events (see Section II.3.3.1.3). The cash flows of a 
Wakalah contract are stochastic since they depend on the underlying projects (IFSB15, 
§437). The cash flow at time T is stochastic as well because of the unknown selling price 
of the partnership shares at the end of the business (see Table 16). 
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Time point t t+1…T-1 T 
Actions Acquires shares in 
business 
Profits or losses 
achieved from 
business activities 
Liquidates shares in 
business 
(Financial) 
Investor’s wealth 
Shares Shares 0 
(Financial) 
Investor’s cash 
flows of a 
Wakalah contract 
Negative cash flow: 
market price at t 
Positive cash flows: 
profits 
or 
Negative cash 
flows: losses 
and in both cases 
Negative cash flow: 
Wakil fee for 
managing, even if 
no profits are 
achieved 
Positive cash flow: 
market price at T 
Table 16: Actions, wealth position, and cash flows of a Wakalah contract—financial investor (Muwakkil) 
perspective. 
II.3.3.1.3 Cash Flows under Extraordinary Events 
II.3.3.1.3.1 Extraordinary Events common to all Contracts 
 If a Shariah audit deems any portion of income received by the activities of a founded 
business or from the sale of an asset non-Shariah-compliant, the income obtained will 
not be recognized and should be written off/given away to charity through 
purification negating any positive cash flows (IFSB15, §264). 
II.3.3.1.3.2 Extraordinary Events common to Mark-Up Contracts 
 The contractual counterpart may face financial distress, which may lead to a 
reduction, interruption, or complete discontinuation of the cash flows. In the case of 
Murabahah, the losses may be reduced if the acquired asset has not yet been 
transferred to the customer; in this case it can be re-sold through another Murabahah 
or otherwise (IFSB15, §290). In the case of Istisna, the investor may end up with a 
partially constructed project that can still be completed and sold if another buyer can 
be found (IFSB15, §346). 
 If the acquired asset does not meet the characteristics required by the contractual 
counterpart of the mark-up contract, this may lead to refusal of receipt of the asset 
although acquisition costs (and possibly other direct costs) have been incurred 
(IFSB15, §265) and may force the bank to acquire another asset (negative cash flow) 
or forego the payments from the contract (loss of positive cash flows). The same may 
occur if the asset is lost or destroyed after acquisition but before transfer to the 
customer (or sale on the market in case of Salam). 
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 Under Shariah guidelines, no two contracts can be conditionally contracted on one 
another. Thus a risk exists that after signing one “leg” of a parallel contract (Parallel 
Salam or Parallel Istisna) the other contract does not materialize or a buyer cannot be 
found for the specific asset within the same time frame or matching the same 
specifications required by the ultimate buyer (IFSB15, §328 & §353). This will result in 
only one part of the parallel contract being realized, i.e., a Parallel Salam will turn into 
a normal Salam, or a Parallel Istisna will turn into a normal Istisna, with all their 
respective cash flows, and the locking-in of profits of parallel contracts will not take 
effect. 
II.3.3.1.3.3 Extraordinary Events specific to Profit-Sharing Contracts 
 Since a manager is not required to bear any losses in the absence of negligence on its 
part, it is the responsibility of the capital provider to prove negligence on the part of 
the manager. Whether this is successfully proven or not will alter the bearing of losses 
(negative cash flows) by the involved parties (IFSB15, §270). 
II.3.3.1.3.4 Extraordinary Events specific to particular Contracts 
Parallel Salam Contracts 
 Although the selling price is hedged in the Parallel Salam contract, in case of default 
of the original Salam contract, the obligation to sell the specified asset to the Parallel 
Salam partner still exists and the asset must then be bought at market price (IFSB15, 
§334). 
Istisna Contracts 
 If the price is revised upon mutual consent, it can change the size or frequency of 
future cash flows (IFSB15, §342). 
 If the construction costs rise significantly it may lead to an overall loss (IFSB15, §351). 
Ijarah Contracts 
 All liabilities and risks pertaining to the leased asset are borne by the lessor as long as 
these are not proven to be caused by the lessee’s misconduct or negligence. This may 
force the lessee to repair or otherwise replace the asset or compensate the lessee for 
inability to replace the asset which could lead to negative cash flows (IFSB15, §399). 
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Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik Contracts 
 If the customer backs down from purchasing the asset at the end of the lease, the 
lessor must then re-lease the asset or sell it at market value leading to increased 
stochasticity of cash flows (IFSB15, §385). 
II.3.3.1.4 Summary of Underlying Contracts, their Classification, and Nature of their 
Cash Flows 
Table 17 summarizes this sub-section regarding underlying contracts, their classification 
as well as their cash flow nature and stochasticity when everything goes as contractually 
planned as well as under extraordinary events. 
Contract 
Classification 
Contract 
Name 
Nature of Underlying 
Cash Flows 
Contractually 
Planned 
Under 
Extraordinary Events 
Mark-up-
based 
(real cash 
flow) 
1. Murabahah Non-Stochastic 
Stochastic 
2. Salam 
Non-Stochastic 
(if purpose is to use 
the asset or in case 
of Parallel Salam) 
 
Stochastic 
(if purpose is to sell 
the asset) 
3. Istisna Stochastic 
4. Ijarah Non-stochastic 
Profit-
sharing-
based 
(financial 
cash flow) 
5. Musharakah 
Stochastic 6. Mudharabah 
7. Wakalah 
Table 17: Classification of underlying contracts and the nature of their cash flows as contractually planned 
and under extraordinary events. 
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II.3.3.2 Cash Flow Transformations 
We use the term cash flow transformation to describe transformations of contracts’ 
original cash flows done at the hands of the managing institution before the final cash 
flows are transferred to investment account-holders. We divide cash flow transformations 
into three different techniques, namely (1) Pooling, (2) Management Fees, and (3) 
Smoothing & Reserves. The extent to which these techniques are practiced is not 
publicized and therefore it is unclear how transformed/distorted the final cash flows 
received by the investment account-holders are compared to their original sources. All 
cash flow transformations are either voluntary or, in the strictest case, recommended by 
supervisory authorities, but never obligatory. Cash flow transformations aim at 
maintaining as-steady-as-possible cash flow streams to investors (IFSB, GN-3: 15). This is 
rather obvious with (1) pooling and (3) smoothing & reserves, however how this is 
conducted using (2) management fees will be explained in a coming section. Another aim 
of cash flow transformations is mitigating withdrawal risk by matching the returns of 
competitors (IFSB, GN-3: 4). The presence of both of these aims in the same IFSB Guidance 
Note introduces a degree of vagueness—if not a contradiction. Even if the original cash 
flows of the contracts are non-stochastic and as-steady-as-possible (see Table 17), cash 
flow transformations may end up introducing stochastic components into contracts’ cash 
flows in order to match the returns of competitors (if these are stochastic as well). IFSB 
Guidance Note 3 seems to be working under the assumption that the returns of 
competitors are already as-steady-as-possible since this is the only way maintaining as-
steady-as-possible cash flows while matching the returns of competitors can coincide. 
II.3.3.2.1 Pooling 
Pooling occurs when the bank pools numerous underlying contracts together into one 
fund (IFSB15: 93; BNM, 2014: 42, 43). This results in pooling of different cash flows of 
different contracts each possibly with its own conditions. Even if the pooling occurs only 
with one type of contracts, these contracts may have different maturities, mark-ups, 
profit- and loss-sharing conditions etc. whose combinations are not ex-ante known to the 
investor. In sum, though the original cash flows of the contracts might not be stochastic 
(see Table 17); the pooled cash flows will fluctuate across the lifetime of the investment. 
II.3.3.2.2 Management Fees 
Management fees exist in different forms depending on the nature of the contract: 
Management fees in Musharakah, Mudharib fees in Mudharabah, Wakil fees in Wakalah 
(see Table 18). These fees are deducted from the cash flows before any profit-
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sharing/payout is conducted (IFSB, GN-3: 21). Although fees are contractually fixed within 
each contract, pooling of different contract types may imply different management fee 
structures. Furthermore, cash flow transformation using management fees occurs when 
management forgoes a portion or the entirety of the management fee in attempts to 
smoothen the returns to investors (IFSB, GN-3: 11). Management fees can be summarized 
as follows: 
Contract Fees Form Condition under which fees 
become due 
Musharakah Managing-
Partner Fee 
Free to determine. Received regardless of 
performance. However, fees 
are not necessarily present in 
Musharakah since it is 
common that the managing 
partner contributes less capital 
and therefore no fees are paid. 
Mudharabah Mudharib Fee Pre-determined 
share of profits. 
Only when profits are 
received. 
Wakalah Wakil Fee Fixed/flat sum and 
in some cases an 
additional fee 
determined as a 
percentage of 
profits. 
Fixed fee received regardless 
of performance while 
additional fee only when 
profits are received. 
Table 18: Structure of management fees in different profit-sharing-based underlying contracts. 
In sum, since the exact amount of fees that is foregone by management is not ex-ante 
known, even if the original cash flows of the contracts are non-stochastic (see Table 17), 
the transformed cash flows will fluctuate across the lifetime of the investment. 
II.3.3.2.3 Smoothing & Reserves 
Another method of cash flow transformation is the generation and management of 
reserves to smoothen the long-term returns of an investment account. IFSB (GN-3: 3) 
mentions that the motivation behind smoothing is mainly the limited supply of money-
market instruments to manage liquidity as well as the absence of a lender-of-last-resort 
for Islamic banks. This exposes Islamic banks to withdrawal risk: The risk that depositors 
would withdraw their funds if the returns distributed to them were lower than those 
offered by competing Islamic (and Conventional) banks. “If unmitigated, withdrawals can 
reach systemic proportions and become a cause for concern on the part of supervisory 
authorities” (IFSB, GN-3: 3). Consequently, smoothing techniques are widely practiced 
and recommended (IFSB15, §279 & §280), but are not ex-ante predictable. Smoothing 
returns at the expense of reserves is conditional on the availability of such reserves; 
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otherwise, returns are smoothed at the expense of the shareholders of the bank. This 
gives rise to a risk specific to Islamic banks’ shareholders, namely displaced commercial 
risk which is “the risk arising from assets managed on behalf of IAH (investment account 
holders) which is effectively transferred to the (bank’s) own capital because the (bank) 
follows the practice of (smoothing) when it considers this necessary as a result of 
commercial and/or supervisory pressure” (IFSB GN-3: 3). 
Applications of smoothing include: 
a) Bank shareholders forgoing a portion of their share of profits in order to offer 
investment account-holders a rate of return competitive with that of Conventional 
deposits (IFSB15, §279 &§280; IFSB GN-3: 6). 
b) The creation of profit equalization and investment risk reserves. Profit equalization 
reserves aim at evening out positive fluctuations in returns to ensure relatively stable 
cash flows (IFSB, GN-3: 6, 22). Investment risk reserves aim at compensating negative 
fluctuations in returns to avoid transferring losses to investment account-holders 
(IFSB, GN-3: 7, 23). 
It is important to note that profit equalization and investment risk reserves are created 
before cash flow distribution to account-holders and are therefore hidden from the 
account-holders’ perspective. This creates an important problem concerning the 
ownership of the reserves at any given time during the life of the fund that generates cash 
flows for the investment account. Whether this reserve is paid out at the end of the 
investment account back to the depositor or not, is highly debatable in the Islamic finance 
literature (IFSB, GN-3: 7). It is clear that these reserves are owned by the investment 
account-holders and not the bank or its shareholders. Therefore, in case of bank 
liquidation, these reserves will go to the investment account-holders (IFSB GN-3: 13). 
However, since investment accounts have—by design—an infinite maturity the problem 
remains unsolved: to which investment account-holders should reserves be paid out to? 
If the answer is: Only those present when the bank is liquidated, then earlier depositors 
that have already withdrawn their money will lose the contributions they have made to 
the reserve. This “inter-generational” problem is not only relevant upon liquidation of the 
bank, but rather whenever the bank decides to use the reserves to smoothen returns 
since the reserves may benefit a group of investment account-holders that are completely 
different than the ones who actually contributed to the creation of the reserves in the 
first place. In practice, Islamic banks solve this problem by requiring investment account-
holders to sign a waiver of their ownership rights in the reserves upon withdrawal of their 
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funds, or as early as when they first deposit their funds in the investment account. This 
may solve the legal component of the inter-generational problem, but does not solve the 
financial aspects. 
In sum, the exact extent of smoothing is not known ex-ante and even if the original cash 
flows of the contracts are non-stochastic (see Table 17) the smoothed cash flows will 
fluctuate across the lifetime of the investment. Furthermore the inter-generational 
problem will usually lead to a situation where the reserves are not (fully) paid out to the 
original contributors. 
II.3.3.3 Final Cash Flows of Investment Accounts 
Combining the effects of cash flow transformations (Section II.3.3.2) with the cash flows 
of the underlying contract as contractually planned (Section II.3.3.1.2) we obtain the final 
cash flows of the investment account that are transferred to the account-holders. 
Given that numerous combinations of underlying contracts as well as cash flow 
transformations exist, we find it appropriate at this stage to provide an illustrative 
example of how cash flow transformations might lead to stochastic final cash flows even 
though the original cash flows of each contract are non-stochastic. 
We consider a five-year investment account based on Mudharabah where the depositor 
(Rabb Al Maal) provides capital equal to 9006, which is used by the bank (Mudharib) to 
acquire two assets. Each asset is then sold to a different bank customer on Murabahah 
basis in exchange for an agreed-upon sum (equal to acquisition cost plus a mark-up). Each 
contract has three years to maturity but the contracts are contracted at different times: 
Murabahah Asset 1 to be acquired at 𝑡 for 600 and sold with a profit margin of 10%. 
Murabahah Asset 2 to be acquired at 𝑡 + 2 for 300 and sold with a profit margin of 20% 
(the second asset is sold at a higher mark-up due to, for example, different credit 
worthiness of the second customer). Both contracts are to be settled in equal 
installments. Furthermore, we do not consider any extraordinary events during the 
lifetime of the investment account. 
The individual cash flows of each contract are as can be seen in Table 19, Stage 1. At the 
end of Stage 1 at each time period the cash flows of the underlying contracts are 
determined and cash flow transformations can be undertaken. The bank receives a 
Mudharib fee equal to 10% of profits (Table 19, Stage 2). The bank attempts to smoothen 
                                                          
6 We do not use any currency units in this example since the goal is to illustrate cash flows and not values. 
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the returns to 100 per time period, thus sets aside 98 from 𝑡 + 1. In 𝑡 + 2, the bank is 
approached by a second customer who signs Murabahah Contract 2 as shown above. It is 
important to note that the signing of this contract is not known beforehand at time 𝑡 . The 
bank then pools the cash flows resulting from both of these assets together to obtain the 
net cash flows of the investment fund upon which the transformations will be applied as 
before. The final net cash flows after reserves are the transformed cash flows and are 
what the depositor receives at each point in time. Note that (as explained in Section 
II.3.3.2.3) reserves are held separately and are excluded from the net cash flow. 
Illustrative Example: Investment Account  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Depositor’s Funds (Start of period) +900 +300 +400 +420 +520 +620 
Stage 1 
Underlying 
Individual 
contracts 
Murabahah 1 -600 +220 +220 +220   
Murabahah 2   -300 +120 +120 +120 
Stage 2 
Transformat
ion 
Pooling 
Net Cash 
Flows 
-600 +220 -80 +340 +120 +120 
Fees 
Management 
Fees 
0 -20 0 -34 -12 -12 
Net Cash Flows after Fees -600 +200 -80 +306 +108 +108 
Smoothing Reserves 0 -100 +100 -206 -8 -8 
Net Cash Flows after 
Reserves 
-600 +100 +20 +100 +100 +100 
Depositor’s Funds (Net Remaining at end 
of period) 
+300 +400 +420 +520 +620 +720 
Reserves Balance 0 +100 0 +206 +214 +222 
Table 19: Example of an investment account containing two Murabahah contracts—financial investor (Rabb 
Al Mal) perspective. 
As can be seen in this example, a few aspects require emphasis such as: 
1. At the start (time  𝑡 ) the investment in one Murabahah contract results in non-
stochastic cash flows. However, as soon as another contract with its own specific 
conditions is signed at a future point in time not foreseeable at 𝑡 (in this case at 𝑡 + 2), 
the cash flows of both contracts are pooled and the net cash flows for the depositor 
become stochastic. 
2. Even with cash flow transformations (smoothing) the manager cannot guarantee that 
the final cash flows will not be stochastic. As was seen in this example the bank did 
manage to maintain the required returns of 100 per time period in 4 out of 5 years. 
3. Management did not cash in the full management fees (10% of profits) at time 𝑡 + 1 
as, but only 9.09% or profits to ensure that at least 100 (enough cash for one period of 
returns) flows into the reserve for the next periods. However, as can be seen at time 
𝑡 + 2, this was not sufficient to maintain the intended cash flow of 100 at time 𝑡 + 2, 
but were sufficient to avoid negative cash flows. 
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4. The depositor seems to have incurred an overall loss of 180 given the initial investment 
of 900. Nevertheless, this is due to the fact that a reserve of 222 still exists at the end 
of the investment account. If the depositor decides to withdraw from the investment 
account at 𝑡 + 5, a loss of 180 will indeed be incurred due to the inter-generational 
problem of reserves, i.e., the reserves remain for the next depositor. 
II.3.4 Sukuk 
A straightforward analysis of the final cash flows of Sukuk is impossible since an investor 
must first buy ownership shares from the issuer (special purpose entity) in the form of 
profit-sharing contracts that allow the investor to share in the profits of the underlying 
contract. The issuer then uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to invest in 
underlying contracts, which generate cash flows. These cash flows are transferred 
periodically to the Sukuk-holders during the lifetime of the Sak. The cash flows of the of a 
Sak therefore depend on its underlying contracts as well as any cash flow transformations 
conducted by the special purpose entity to deduct management fees and create or use 
reserves before paying out the final cash flows to Sukuk-holders (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Procedure of determining the cash flows of Sukuk. 
The analysis of the cash flows of Sukuk follows a four-step procedure: First, the cash flows 
of the underlying contracts must be analyzed since assets themselves do not generate 
cash flows, but only their underlying contracts do. Second, cash flow transformations, i.e., 
management fees, smoothing procedures etc. must be clarified. Third, by combining the 
first and the second step, the cash flows being paid out to Sukuk-holders can be 
determined. Fourth, the tradability of Sukuk is discussed to highlight how this institutional 
characteristic may affect the cash flows of Sukuk-holders. This analysis step was not 
relevant in the case of investment accounts since these, by design, cannot be traded. 
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II.3.4.1 Cash Flow Analysis of the Underlying Contracts 
II.3.4.1.1 Cash Flows as Contractually Planned 
In order to analyze the cash flows of a Sak an examination of the cash flows of the 
underlying contracts is required; the underlying contracts are identical to those available 
for investment accounts and their contractual cash flows can be seen in Section II.3.3.1. 
However, Sukuk have an additional contractual level between the special purpose entity 
and the Sukuk-holders, namely the securitization. This defines how the funds received by 
the special purpose entity should be invested in the underlying contracts as well as how 
the funds earned by the special purpose entity should be divided among the Sukuk-
holders after any transformations are conducted. 
II.3.4.1.2 Cash Flows under Extraordinary Events 
II.3.4.1.2.1 Extraordinary Events common to all Sukuk 
In the case of extraordinary events, Sukuk contracts tend to have less sources of risk when 
compared to non-securitized contracts (such as investment accounts) since many 
extraordinary events are controlled by the institutional framework of the Sak. First, a 
Shariah audit is conducted before a Sak can be issued to ensure Shariah-compliance from 
the outset. Second, the risk of cash flow interruptions due to financial distress of the 
originator can be somewhat mitigated if the Sak is asset-backed but not in the case of 
asset-based Sukuk (see Section II.2.2.4) (IFSB15, §522-§524). Third, since Sukuk’s 
securitization is based on a profit-sharing contract between the Sukuk-holders and the 
special purpose entity (which acts as a manager of the funds), the risk that negligence on 
the part of the manager cannot be proven by the Sukuk-holders will alter the bearing of 
losses (negative cash flows) between the involved parties (IFSB15, §270). 
II.3.4.1.2.2 Extraordinary Events common to Mark-Up-Based Sukuk 
In the case of mark-up-based Sukuk, extraordinary events are to a great extent mitigated 
by the institutional framework inherent in the Sak. For example, the asset to be 
constructed or delivered will always meet the characteristics required by the originator 
since it is selected by the originator in the first place before the Sak can be issued (in some 
cases already present in the originator’s possession, but only the titles are sold).  
II.3.4.1.2.3 Extraordinary Events common to Profit-Sharing-Based Sukuk 
In the case of profit-sharing-based Sukuk some extraordinary events can be mitigated by 
the institutional framework inherent in the Sak. For example, since each partner has 
already contributed capital based on the profit-sharing contract, even if one partner, e.g., 
the originator goes bankrupt it should not affect the running of the underlying business 
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founded through the profit-sharing contract, but rather another partner can be found to 
buy the shares of the originator in the underlying business. If the originator was also a 
managing partner, then another manager must be found (IFSB15, §509-§521). 
II.3.4.2 Cash Flow Transformations 
The cash flows produced by each underlying contract are not directly transferred to the 
Sukuk-holders, but rather undergo a number of transformations at the hands of the 
managing special purpose entity before the final cash flows are paid out through the 
agreed upon profit-sharing contract between the Sukuk-holders and the special purpose 
entity. Since Sukuk include a securitization of underlying contracts, transformations 
through pooling, management fees, and smoothing and reserves are conducted before 
the cash flows are finally transferred to Sukuk-holders. We therefore first address cash 
flow transformations and then explain how each Sak’s final cash flow transfer through 
securitization works. 
II.3.4.2.1 Cash Flow Transformations through Pooling, Management Fees, and 
Smoothing & Reserves 
The three cash flow transformations (1) Pooling, (2) Management Fees, and (3) Smoothing 
& Reserves as well as their justification are the same as with investment accounts and can 
be found in Section II.3.3.2. The aim of the cash flow transformations in the case of Sukuk 
is to maintain an “as-steady-as-possible” cash flow stream to Sukuk-holders and attempt 
to mimic the returns on Conventional bonds (Alam et al, 2013: 23). However a distinction 
exists, namely that the decision whether to apply pooling or not, depends not only on the 
manager, but also on the number of assets held in the pool during the lifetime of the Sak. 
This can have implications for the stochasticity of Sukuk cash flows: If the Sak involves 
only one acquired asset (or many assets with identical maturities), the cash flows are 
expected to be non-stochastic similar to a single Murabahah or Ijarah contract. As soon 
as the Sak involves pooling of more than one asset with different maturities, then 
stochastic returns are to be expected unless practices of smoothing are conducted. Both 
forms of Sukuk can be found in practice (Ayub, 2007: 398). Third, in the case of Sukuk the 
reserves are always payable back to the Sukuk-holders at the Sukuk’s maturity since Sukuk 
usually have a pre-specified maturity (except in the case of perpetual Sukuk); most 
commonly traded Sukuk have a maturity of five to ten years (IFSB, 2016: 105). The fact 
that reserves are paid back at a Sak’s maturity solves the inter-generational problem of 
reserves except in the case of tradable Sukuk since the reserves will then be paid out to 
the “last” owners remaining at maturity.  
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II.3.4.2.2 Cash Flow Transfer through the Securitization Structure 
The general steps for issuing Sukuk (securitizing underlying contracts) are explained in 
Appendix B.1. The additional steps that depend on and are specific to the type of 
underlying contract being securitized as well as how the transfer of the final cash flows is 
conducted will be summarized here. 
II.3.4.2.2.1 Murabahah Sukuk 
In case of a Murabahah Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders 
to acquire assets. The assets are sold to the originator under a Murabahah contract, i.e., 
in exchange for an agreed-upon sum equal to acquisition cost plus a mark-up. The 
installments then undergo cash flow transformations and are then transferred 
periodically to the Sukuk-holders during the lifetime of the Sak (Dubai International 
Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 46-50). 
II.3.4.2.2.2 Salam Sukuk 
In case of a Salam Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to 
acquire assets from the originator on a Salam basis, i.e., payment is immediate for all the 
assets, but the delivery is in the future and at periodic intervals. Upon receipt of the 
assets, they are then sold back to the originator in exchange for their market price7. The 
assets are sold periodically and at equal intervals that match the return payout periods 
on the Sak. These periodic proceeds of selling the assets are then transferred to Sukuk-
holders as returns during the lifetime of the Sak after they undergo cash flow 
transformations (Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 34-39). 
II.3.4.2.2.3 Istisna Sukuk 
In case of an Istisna Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to 
demand the construction of specific assets from the originator on an Istisna basis, i.e., 
payment of construction costs in installments and receipt of asset at delivery date. The 
originator then enters into an agreement to forward lease the assets under construction 
across the term of maturity of the Sak paying installments that are equal in amount to the 
agreed upon return on the Sak. The forward lease may continue even after construction 
of the asset is complete, thus allowing the maturity of the Istisna Sak to be longer than 
the time required for construction of the asset. These periodic proceeds of leasing the 
                                                          
7 In practice this is not used, but rather the originator does not buy back the Salam assets under 
the purchase undertaking but instead is appointed by the trustee as its agent to sell the Salam 
assets at the time of delivery through its distribution channels to a third party in the open 
market for a price at least equal to the amounts due under the Sak (Dubai International Financial 
Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 39). 
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asset during construction as well as after delivery are transferred to the Sukuk-holders as 
returns during the lifetime of the Sak after they undergo cash flow transformations (Dubai 
International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 40-45). 
II.3.4.2.2.4 Ijarah Sukuk 
In case of an Ijarah Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to 
acquire assets to purchase a specific asset from the originator. The originator then enters 
into a lease agreement for the same asset for the entire maturity of the Sak paying 
installments that are equal in amount to the agreed upon return on the Sak. At the end 
of the lease/maturity of the Sukuk the originator buys back the asset. These periodic 
proceeds of leasing the asset during the lifetime of the Sak are transferred to the Sukuk-
holders after they undergo cash flow transformations (Dubai International Financial 
Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: p.13-19). 
II.3.4.2.2.5 Musharakah Sukuk 
In case of a Musharakah Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders 
to found a Musharakah arrangement with the originator. The originator then manages 
the Musharakah and transfers to the Sukuk-holders a pre-agreed percentage share of the 
profits generated by the assets of the Musharakah equal to the return on the Sukuk after 
they undergo cash flow transformations. At the maturity of the Sak both partners sell the 
assets of the business and receive their market value (Dubai International Financial Centre 
Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 20-27). 
II.3.4.2.2.6 Mudharabah Sukuk 
In case of a Mudharabah Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders 
to found a Mudharabah arrangement with the originator. The originator then manages 
the Mudharabah and transfers to the Sukuk-holders a pre-agreed percentage share of the 
profits generated by the assets of the business equal to the return on the Sukuk after 
deducting the Mudharib fee. At the maturity of the Sak, the Mudharabah assets are sold 
and the partners receive the market value of these shares after cash flow transformations 
are conducted (Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 28-33). 
II.3.4.2.2.7 Wakalah Sukuk 
In case of a Wakalah Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to 
found a Wakalah arrangement with the originator. The originator then manages the 
Wakalah and transfers to the Sukuk-holders the share of the profits generated by the 
assets of the business equal to the return on the Sukuk after deducting the Wakil fee. At 
the maturity of the Sak the assets of the Wakalah are sold and their market values are 
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divided among the Sukuk-holders after cash flow transformations are conducted (Dubai 
International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 57-63). 
II.3.4.2.2.8 Istithmar Sukuk 
The term “Istithmar” is broadly understood to mean an “investment”. In case of an 
Istithmar Sak, the issuer uses the capital obtained from the Sukuk-holders to buy a 
package of Ijarah, Murabahah, and/or Istisna (each generated by the originator), as well 
as shares and/or other Sukuk certificates. These underlying contracts are packaged by the 
originator and sold to the issuer. The income generated by such an investment can then 
transferred to the investors under the Sukuk Istithmar contract after they undergo cash 
flow transformations. Istithmar Sukuk are, from a Shariah-perspective, a widely debatable 
hybrid form of Sukuk since it is usually not allowed to use Sukuk as an underlying of 
another Sak. Furthermore, Istithmar Sukuk may involve “sale of debt” if the package 
includes Murabahah Sukuk (Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 
51-56). 
II.3.4.3 Final Cash Flows of Sukuk 
The final cash flows of any Sak that are transferred to the Sukuk-holders can only be 
realized after combining the effects of cash flow transformations (Section II.3.4.2) and the 
cash flows of the underlying contracts (Section II.3.4.1.1). However, there exist numerous 
combinations of underlying contracts as well as cash flow transformations. For this 
reason, we provide here an exemplary illustration for just one case. This example allows 
us to illustrate how cash flow transformations might lead to stochastic cash flows even 
though the original cash flows are riskless. Furthermore, we do not consider any 
extraordinary events during the lifetime of the Sak. 
We consider a five-year Ijarah Sak—on Wakalah basis (contract between Sukuk-holders 
and the Special Purpose Entity)—where the Sukuk-holders provide a capital sum of 1,000 
which is used by the special purpose entity to acquire two assets from the originator for 
the value of 600 at 𝑡 and 400 at 𝑡 + 1. The assets are then leased to the originator for an 
annual lease of 60 and 50 respectively for 3 years. These details are known to the investor 
at time 𝑡 as it is arranged with the originator at the outset and does not involve leasing to 
an unknown third party to be found later. The special purpose entity deducts a fixed Wakil 
fee of 10 at the end of each year. One period after the end of each lease the special 
purpose entity sells the assets back to the originator for 600 and 400 respectively. 
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The cash flows can be seen in Table 20. Sukuk have a “Stage 0” which refers to the 
securitization stage when an asset is—being acquired or sold in general or in this case—
transferred to or from the originator. Time 𝑡  begins with the originator founding the 
special purpose entity, which would then issue the Sak certificates of ownership that are 
then sold to the Sukuk-holders. This stage is reversed as the special purpose entity 
redeems the certificates from the Sukuk-holders at maturity T or across the life of the 
asset until all Sukuk are redeemed and the special purpose entity can be dissolved by the 
originator. This is the only possibility for Sukuk-holders to regain their initial investment 
at maturity since the structure of a Sak—for Shariah-compliance purposes—does not 
involve a redeemable principal amount (unlike the case with Conventional bonds). At the 
end of each stage, the pooled cash flows of the underlying contracts are determined at 
each time period and transformations can be undertaken. The special purpose entity 
receives a Wakil fee and can then choose to conduct smoothing techniques if necessary. 
In this example the Ijarah payments are received from two assets so the two cash flows 
are pooled together with the aim to stabilize cash flows at 75 per year after purchasing 
both assets and redeeming the Sak at 𝑡 + 5. Reserves are set up accordingly. At the end 
of each lease (Ijarah) the assets are returned to the special purpose entity which sells 
them back to the originator at prices contracted. 
Illustrative Example: Ijarah Sukuk  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 T 
Sukuk-holders’ Funds (Start of period) +1,000 +400 +60 +135 +210 +285 
Stage 0 
Securitization 
Originator transfer 
to/from SPE 
-600 -400 0 0 +600 +400 
Stage 1 
Underlying 
Individual 
contracts 
Ijarah 1 - +60 +60 +60 - - 
Ijarah 2 - - +50 +50 +50 - 
Stage 2 
Transformation 
Pooling 
Net Cash 
Flows 
-600 -340 +110 +110 +650 +400 
Management Fees 0 - -10 -10 -10 -10 
Net Cash Flows after 
Fees 
-600 -340 +100 +100 +640 +390 
Smoothing Reserves 0 0 -25 -25 -565 +615 
Net Cash Flows after 
Reserves 
-600 -340 +75 +75 +75 +1,005 
Sukuk-holders’ Funds  
(Net Remaining at end of Period) 
+400 +60 +135 +210 +285 +1,290 
Remaining Reserve 0 0 +25 +50 +615 0 
Table 20: Example of an Ijarah Sukuk—investor (Sukuk-holder) perspective. 
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As can be seen in this example, a few aspects require emphasis such as: 
1 Non-stochastic cash flows could be achieved using pooling and reserves, but this was 
only possible at times 𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 4. At all other times final cash flows for the Sukuk-
holders are stochastic due to the differing contracting time for the second Ijarah 
contract. 
2 Even with reserves, it was not possible to guarantee a net cash flow of only 1,000 at 
time 𝑡 + 5 without adversely affecting the remaining cash flows and not meeting the 
aim of stabilizing cash flows at 75 per year. 
3 Although Wakil fees should be paid out regardless of performance, management did 
not cash in the Wakil fees at time t + 2, in an attempt to decrease the amount of losses 
that would be transferred to the Sukuk-holders especially in the absence of other 
reserves to help compensate the negative cash flows. In practice, negative cash flows 
are compensated directly by the originator so that Sukuk-holders are not required to 
add more capital to cover the losses. 
4 With Sukuk the reserves are always payable back at maturity and thus affect the final 
cash flows at maturity for the Sukuk-holders. Liquidating the reserve at time T results 
in a slightly larger payout (1,005) than the original principal invested (1,000). 
II.3.4.4 Tradability of Sukuk 
The ability to trade a Sak is the critical factor in determining the ability of investors to 
liquidate their positions in the Sak at any given time at the available market prices. This 
implies that, additional to the above mentioned factors (stochasticity of underlying 
contracts and cash flow transformations) influencing the final cash flows of Sukuk, 
tradable Sukuk can provide Sukuk-holders with the ability to liquidate their position 
before the maturity of the Sak if a better investment opportunity presents itself or in order 
to mitigate (expected) losses. This in turn adds a major source of stochasticity to the cash 
flows since sale of a Sak forces the interruption of the cash flows to the Sak-holder before 
maturity and results in an ex-ante unknown positive cash flow depending on the market 
value of the Sak at the time of sale. 
De jure tradability of any Islamic financial asset depends on the nature of its underlying 
being either debt or equity according to IFSB15 and the AAOIFI (2007) “Standard on 
Sukuk” to ensure that the third and fourth Shariah principles of real capital and prohibition 
of speculation are not violated: 
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1 Sale of debt-based underlying implies the sale of cash flows to be received in return 
for an asset or service already delivered, i.e., only the future cash flows of the asset 
will change ownership but the asset will not (real asset does not change hands as a 
consequence of the sale—synthetic sale). 
2 Sale of equity-based underlying implies the sale of cash flows to be received in return 
for equity ownership in an asset or in return for an asset or service that is still a work-
in-progress, i.e., the future cash flows of the asset as well as the asset itself will change 
ownership as a consequence of the sale (real asset changes hands as a consequence 
of the sale—true sale). 
Trading of any Islamic financial contract whose underlying is debt-based is prohibited (not 
Shariah-compliant) since it would involve a “sale of debt”. On the other hand, trading of 
an Islamic financial contract that would involve a “sale of equity” is Shariah-compliant, 
i.e., is tradable (AAOIFI Standard on Sukuk, 2007: 1-3; IFSB7, §27 §28). Based on this 
criterion, the de jure tradability of Sukuk depends on the nature of the underlying 
contracts and is summarized in Table 21. 
  
CHAPTER II INSTITUTIONAL, CASH FLOW, AND RISK ANALYSIS 
44 
Sukuk 
Underlying 
Contract 
Underlying Tradability 
1. Murabahah  Considered Sale of Debt (receivables) — 
Asset has been sold, and payment/installments 
to be received in the future (debt) 
Non-Tradable 8 
(IFSB15, §522)  
2. Salam Considered Sale of Debt (receivables)— 
Asset has been sold, and payment to be 
received in the future (debt) 
Non-Tradable 
(IFSB15, §497) 
3. Istisna Considered work-in-progress— 
Asset is under construction; payments are 
received for service being offered. Sale of the 
asset under construction is permissible (equity) 
Tradable 
(IFSB15, §501) 
4. Ijarah Considered equity— 
Asset is being leased; payments are received 
for service being offered. Sale of the leased 
asset is permissible (equity) 
Tradable 
(IFSB15, §506) 
5. Musharakah 
 
Investment is a share of ownership, i.e., future 
profits (Mudharabah) as well as losses 
(Musharakah) of a running 
investment/business/venture or fees for a 
service being offered (Wakalah). Tradability of 
any running investment/business/venture 
depends on the nature of its underlying9.  
The underlying 
of these 
investments/bus
inesses/ventures 
will determine 
their tradability. 
(Musharakah:  
IFSB15, §510)  
(Mudharabah: 
IFSB15, §513) 
(Wakalah:  
IFSB15, §519) 
6. Mudharabah 
7. Wakalah 
Table 21: Classification of underlying contracts according to their tradability for Sukuk (IFSB15). 
However, aspects such as the inter-generational problem of reserves can also explain why 
Sukuk are rather liquid (and even over-subscribed) at the primary market, but illiquid with 
low turnover rates at the secondary market as mentioned by the IFSB (2016: 124). This 
de-facto non-tradability due to the inter-generational problem would significantly 
discourage Sukuk-holders from selling their holdings since remaining reserves will only be 
paid out to the remaining owners at maturity. 
An exception seems to be the tradability of Sukuk in Malaysia where, according to the 
Bond Pricing Agency of Malaysia (2017), out of the RM 637 billion outstanding Sukuk in 
Malaysia, RM 468 billion were traded during 2016, a turnover rate of 73% up from 64% in 
2015. A possible explanation behind the exceptionally liquid secondary market in 
                                                          
8 Some debatable exceptions exist to the trading of Murabahah Sukuk, see Appendix B.2 
9 Since these contracts are financial, they are at least one level away from the real asset 
producing the cash flows; therefore, we cannot determine the type of underlying transactions 
without knowing more information about the type of transactions (equity or debt) of the 
ultimate underlying real investment. 
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Malaysia could be the fact that Murabahah Sukuk are tradable in Malaysia and the fact 
that mark-up-based Sukuk in general rely on non-stochastic cash flows and thus do not 
require significant reserves, thus do not suffer from the inter-generational problem in the 
same way profit-sharing-based Sukuk would. 
II.3.4.5 Economic Role of different Types of Sukuk  
The most common type of Sukuk as at 2015 were by far mark-up-based Sukuk with 
Murabahah and Ijarah constituting over 50% of outstanding and newly issued Sukuk as 
can be seen in Table 22. This is mainly attributed to their non-stochastic returns and 
simple structure in terms of management, their relatively insignificant inter-generational 
problem for reserves, and the realization that investors prefer cash flows that are 
“similar” to Conventional bonds. Furthermore Murabahah Sukuk are more common in 
Malaysia where Shariah rulings allow their trading (see Appendix B.2), while the 
prohibition of trading Murabahah Sukuk encourages other countries to focus more on 
tradable Sukuk such as Wakalah and Istithmar Sukuk (IFSB 2016: 107). 
Sukuk Type Outstanding (2015) Newly issued (2015) 
Salam 0.1% 0.8% 
Istisna & Parallel Istisna 0.8% 0.0% 
Ijarah 27.3% 22.8% 
Musharakah  16.9% 5.6% 
Mudharabah  2.4% 4.8% 
Murabahah  24.0% 29.0% 
Wakalah and Istithmar 18.1% 30.9% 
Other Sukuk and Combinations 
(Sukuk Bai Istijrar, Bai al-Inah, Bai 
Bithaman Ajil) 
10.4% 6.1% 
Table 22: Types of Sukuk with volumes of outstanding and newly issued in 2015 (IFSB 2016: 107). 
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II.4 Conclusion 
Absence of arbitrage on the market implies that pricing of financial assets equals the 
present value of their cash flows. Cash flows of Islamic financial assets, however, are not 
really well known since the Islamic finance literature only describes Islamic financial assets 
from a legal perspective but does not address their value drivers and risks. For that reason, 
it was the objective of this chapter to provide a thorough analysis into all Islamic financial 
assets’ cash flows and risks beginning from contractual cash flows and tracing through the 
applied forms of Islamic financial assets: Islamic stocks, current accounts, investment 
accounts, and Sukuk. 
We find that Islamic stocks and current accounts are—from a cash flow perspective—
identical to their Conventional counterparts with two distinctions for Islamic stocks: First, 
Islamic stocks are a subset of the available stocks on the market, which implies limited 
diversification possibilities for Islamic investors compared to their Conventional 
counterparts. Second, Islamic stocks are subject to a different source of risk compared to 
Conventional stocks, namely Shariah risk, which means that stocks must be sold 
irrespective of their price potential as soon as they are no longer regarded as Islamic. 
Current accounts—as an alternative to savings deposits and other riskless return 
investments, which are prohibited by Shariah—were found to have non-stochastic cash 
flows. 
In the case of Islamic investment accounts and Sukuk we find that their cash flows and 
risks depend on a two-stage structure. On the one hand, their cash flows and risks hinge 
on their underlying contracts (first stage). Mark-up-based contracts are able to secure 
non-stochastic cash flows while profit-sharing-based contracts are unable to do so. On 
the other hand, these cash flows are then subject to a number of transformations (second 
stage) such as smoothing, management fees, reserve creation, and pooling of different 
investments. These transformations may alter the stochasticity of the cash flows 
distributed to investment account-holders/Sukuk-holders in a sense that contracts with 
non-stochastic cash flows may become stochastic and vice versa. 
Given the growing importance of Islamic financial assets constituting the backbone of the 
Islamic banking industry and the lack of available literature dealing with Islamic financial 
assets, our institutional, cash flow and risk analysis provides thorough insights into the 
stochasticity of the cash flows of Islamic financial assets which is critical for addressing 
their pricing in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS: A 
SYNTHESIS, AN EXTENSION AND AN APPLICATION 
TO ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKETS 
III.1 Introduction 
The global volume of Islamic (Shariah-compliant) financial assets has reached a value of 
USD 1.88 trillion at the end of 2015 (IFSB, 2016: 7), growing at an average annual growth 
rate of 17.3% (MIFC, 2014: 2; The Economist, 2014; Reuters, 2015: 3) and is forecasted to 
reach a value of USD 3.4 trillion by 2018 (MIFC, 2014: 9). Islamic financial intermediaries 
have shown similar positive developments across all countries where Islamic banks 
operate with an average market share of 18% (see Appendix A.1) with a relatively stable, 
slightly positive growth rate ranging from 0.06% to 3.08% average market share growth 
rate in the five years 2010-2014 (E&Y, 2017: 13). It is therefore obvious that both Islamic 
financial assets and Islamic financial intermediaries have grown into relevant players in 
many countries in the recent years. 
However, Islamic financial assets and Islamic financial intermediaries cannot and should 
not be considered independent of one another since Islamic financial intermediaries 
must, by definition, invest in Islamic financial assets: 73% of all Islamic financial assets 
held for investment purposes are owned by Islamic banks, 3% by Islamic mutual funds, 
and 2% by Islamic insurance companies (The Economist, 2014; Reuters, 2015: 3). 
Not all Islamic financial assets have witnessed equally high demand. From a financial 
intermediary perspective, funding has typically been achieved through profit-sharing-
based contracts with the funding of Islamic banks resting heavily on Islamic investment 
accounts, which represent on average 67% of Islamic banks’ funding (see Appendix A.2). 
On the other hand, investments by financial intermediaries have tended to avoid Islamic 
financial assets that are profit-sharing-based—rendering their market share negligible 
(Azmat/Jalil/Skully/Brown, 2016)—and instead have focused on assets that are mark-up-
based since these can easily mimic the returns on Conventional assets while still adhering 
Shariah principles. 
The high demand on profit-sharing-based contracts (which are characterized by stochastic 
returns—see Table 17, Section II.3.3.1.4) as a source of funding by Islamic banks comes at 
a cost, namely, the risk that inadequate rates of return could lead to massive withdrawals 
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that may reach systemic proportions and cause concern on the part of supervisory 
authorities as expressed in IFSB Guidance Note 3, Article 9. All these facts make the fair 
pricing and valuation of Islamic financial assets, i.e., the accurate determination of their 
adequate rates of return, a prerequisite for the healthy development of the Islamic 
financial sector—healthy in the sense of avoiding contagion within the Islamic financial 
sector and among Islamic financial intermediaries. A project under the name “An Islamic 
Pricing Benchmark”—further referred to as the Islamic Benchmark Project—by the 
International Shariah Research Academy was specifically founded in 2010 to address the 
problem of pricing Islamic financial assets (ISRA, 2010; Song/Oosthuizen, 2014: 28) but 
has not succeeded so far and, thus, until this moment no accepted valuation formula for 
Islamic financial assets exists (Azad et al., 2017: 2).—From that perspective, there is a 
practical motivation to correctly value Islamic financial assets.  
In addition, valuing Islamic financial assets is also interesting from a theoretical 
perspective. Any valuation formula for Islamic financial assets must have the ability to 
recognize that in the majority of countries where Islamic financial assets exist (see 
Appendix A.1) valuation is occurring on a segmented market where a group of investors 
cannot—due to Shariah-compliance restrictions—invest in non-Islamic stocks or in 
riskless assets. Such a segmentation with respect to risky and riskless assets has not yet 
been considered in the asset pricing literature. 
Given both theoretical and practical gaps in the literature, we formulate one overall 
objective, namely to develop a valuation formula for Islamic financial assets. To be more 
precise, this overall objective can be decomposed into two sub-goals. First, to develop a 
theoretical valuation formula that takes into consideration the different levels of market 
segmentation relevant for countries with Islamic banking activities. Second, we aim at 
analyzing the practical relevance of the developed theoretical model compared to 
valuation formulas used for unsegmented markets in order to highlight the extent of 
valuation errors from overlooking market segmentation. 
To achieve the first sub-goal, we use the Lintner (1977)/Rubinstein (1973) segmented 
markets CAPM as a starting point and derive analytically the valuation formulas for Islamic 
financial assets. The second sub-goal is addressed with the help of tests for statistical and 
economic significance. To be more precise, empirically observed data are augmented with 
simulations in order to determine statistical significance, while economic significance is 
implemented by contrasting statistically significant data with the country-specific 
economic benchmarks of transaction costs (bonds and stocks), T-Bills and rate on 
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Conventional saving deposits, as well as the inflation rate. 
We obtain the following results: First, we successfully derive valuation formulas for all 
assets available (including Islamic financial assets) on different levels of market 
segmentation. The required expected return on common assets (Islamic financial assets 
and Islamic stocks) is computed in an identical way to the classical CAPM with the 
exception that rather than taking a single riskless rate as the return on riskless assets, a 
mixture (weighted by the aggregated risk preference parameters of both investor groups) 
of the riskless rates available to Conventional investors and Islamic investors (assumed to 
be an interest rate of zero in our model) should be used. The required expected return on 
the restricted asset class (non-Islamic stocks) consists of a single riskless rate, namely that 
of the unrestricted group (Conventional investors) plus a risk correction that is based on 
the risk preferences of the unrestricted group and an additional term that reflects demand 
frictions caused by the fact that Islamic investors cannot invest in non-Islamic stocks (a 
substitution effect term). 
Second, since valuation formulas that contain unobservable quantities (in this context 
unobservable quantities refer to risk preference parameters) and an explicit reference to 
the riskless rate cannot be used in practice to price Islamic financial assets, we reformulate 
the valuation formulas in market-observable quantities only, independent of the riskless 
rate. In this form, it becomes obvious that the valuation formulas for common assets are 
no longer a linear function of the expected return of the market portfolio as is the case in 
the classical CAPM; instead, we observe a linear two-market factor valuation model for 
Islamic assets and Islamic stocks. For the restricted assets (non-Islamic stocks), the linear 
market portfolio structure breaks down completely resulting in a non-linear two-market 
factor model for valuation. 
Third, we test the statistical significance of the valuation models by comparing each 
valuation model’s security market line since these are most appropriate to capture all 
assets with all possible risk levels. Using the statistical significance analysis, we show that 
none of the security market lines of the valuation models that overlook the segmented 
market framework are identical to those of the theoretically correct valuation model. For 
the valuation of specific assets, however, there is an exception: Assets whose 
covariance/risk lies exactly at the intersection point of the security market lines for 
segmented (correct) and unsegmented (incorrect) markets have the same required 
expected return. We call this accidental correct valuation with a wrong valuation formula 
the “double error compensation effect”. Having shown that the theoretically correct 
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model is statistically significant, we then test for its economic significance, i.e., whether 
valuation errors are large enough to induce economic consequences, using a sample of 
sub-market portfolios as representatives for specific asset classes. We find that the 
differences in the required expected returns between the theoretically exact segmented 
model and the alternative unsegmented market model are economically significant in 
most cases when transaction costs are used as a benchmark. With other benchmarks 
mixed results are obtained. 
We make the following contributions to the literature: First, we contribute to the theory 
of asset pricing under (mildly) segmented markets by identifying a new form of market 
segmentation: Market segmentation with respect to the riskless asset in combination 
with market segmentation with respect to risky assets. The literature has focused so far 
only on market segmentation with respect to risky assets: Generally, asset pricing models 
for segmented markets have been introduced as early as in Rubinstein (1973), Black 
(1974), and Lintner (1977). In the subsequent years, the literature developed several 
specific forms of segmented market pricing models: Internationally segmented markets 
where investors cannot invest as good in foreign stocks as in domestic stocks (see, e.g., 
the overview of the literature in Arouri/Nguyen/Pukthuanthong (2012)), double 
segmentation for risky assets (restricted ownership in international stocks and short sale 
constraints (Errunza/Tal, 2010)), markets that are segmented with respect to “green” 
investment where some investors do not want to invest in “unethical” assets 
(Heinkel/Kraus/Zechner, 2001), and, finally, markets that are segmented with respect to 
information, i.e., some investors do not know enough about some assets and, hence 
refrain from investing in them (see Merton, 1987). A market segmentation with respect 
to the riskless asset has an interesting consequence that is absent on segmented markets 
with respect to risky assets: Prices of common assets are no longer identical to prices on 
unsegmented markets (for an example, see Errunza/Losq (1985)’s internationally 
segmented markets) because a weighted riskless rate is used. On markets that are 
segmented with respect to risky assets, common assets have the same prices as on 
unsegmented markets since they both use the same—unsegmented and therefore 
unweighted—riskless rate. 
Second, we contribute to empirical asset pricing: Valuation formulas on segmented 
markets that consist of observable quantities only, comprise at least two linear market 
factors. Therefore, required expected returns cannot be determined using regressions 
that contain just one market factor (even when combined with Fama/French and Carhart 
CHAPTER III ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS 
51 
factors); instead, at least a second market factor must be integrated into the analysis. 
Even then, the factor loadings of segmented markets’ asset pricing models are not 
identical to regression coefficients in general. Only if a specific model of asset returns is 
used, namely asset returns that are a linear function of the return of the market portfolio 
and another factor that is uncorrelated with the market portfolio’s return, will regression 
coefficients result (see Errunza/Losq (1985) for such a model). Furthermore, the literature 
on segmented markets has not yet discovered the valuation mistakes that occur when 
market segmentation is overlooked. Instead, the empirical literature on the international 
segmented markets CAPM analyzes either the change in the degree of market 
segmentation over time (see, e.g., Adler/Qi (2003), Arouri etl al. (2012), 
Errunza/Losq/Padmanabhan (1992), and Wheatley (1988)) or whether liberalization, i.e., 
decreasing the degree of market segmentation, reduces the cost of capital (e.g., 
Chari/Henry (2004)). The empirical literature on green investment is concerned with 
identifying the performance disadvantages of green compared to Conventional 
investments (e.g., Hong/Kacperczyk (2009)).—The fact that the literature on green 
investment does not use such a second market factor even though market segmentation 
is clearly present, might explain why these papers find that green investments do not 
seem to suffer from a performance disadvantage compared to Conventional investments. 
Third, we contribute to institution-based asset pricing: We derive an asset pricing formula 
for Islamic financial assets that is able to take into consideration their individual risk 
profiles and is, in addition, Shariah-compliant since it does not depend on the riskless rate 
for Conventional investors. The literature on the pricing of Islamic financial assets has 
failed to develop such a pricing formula so far (Azad et al., 2017: 2), though trials have 
attempted to value Islamic financial assets along two approaches. The first strand of 
literature chooses a duplication approach in that the return of Islamic financial assets is 
compared to an exogenous benchmark. Benchmarks used in the literature have either 
been rates of return on assets or indicators from the real economy. Rates of return on 
assets included the rate of return on Sukuk (ISRA, 2010), the average mark-up used by 
Islamic banks on their mark-up-based products such as Murabahah (Bacha, 2008; ISRA, 
2010), the Islamic Zakat “Alms-Giving” rate of 2.5% (Hanif, 2010) or LIBOR (Al-Ajmi/Al-
Saleh/Abo Hussain, 2011). Indicators of the real economy included the rate of inflation 
(return on goods) (Bacha, 2008; ISRA, 2010; Hanif, 2010), the rate of economic growth 
(GDP), and the growth rate of money supply (M2) (Smolo, 2009). The problems of this 
duplication approach are obvious: They do not adequately address the individual risk 
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profiles of individual Islamic financial assets being valued. For example, Islamic investment 
accounts are offered by different banks and, thus, possess different cash flows resulting 
from the profit and loss outcomes of different real investment projects. For that reason, 
it is not possible that one general benchmark can capture all available risk profiles of 
individual Islamic investment accounts. This is particularly obvious when a riskless rate of 
return is used as a benchmark (see Section IV.3.1.2 and Section IV.3.2.3). Moreover, there 
is another special problem with the riskless rate as a benchmark: The recent AAIOFI 
(Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) Standard 27 on 
Indices, Clause 7 as well as the 8th conference of the Fiqh Academy in Saudi Arabia have 
highlighted that Conventional interest rates should not be used as a benchmark for Islamic 
financial assets as this would contradict the notions of Islamic banking (ISRA, 2010). Azad 
et al. (2017: 2) also highlight that a global Islamic pricing benchmark is unrealistic since 
Islamic financial assets have unique risk profiles that are not generalizable on a global 
scale. As an alternative, they suggest that a benchmark for Islamic assets in each country 
should be found. However, if Islamic financial assets do indeed have unique risk profiles, 
then even a country-level benchmark would still be a generalization, and only a bank-
specific (or even a product-specific) valuation would be able to capture this unique risk 
profile.—The second strand of literature tries to adapt the classical CAPM to Islamic 
financial assets by finding a proxy for the risk-free asset of the CAPM. Selim (2008) 
suggests using an interest rate of zero as a proxy for the riskless-rate. He later suggests 
that an improvement would be the creation of an exogenous rate of return benchmark 
for Islamic financial assets without clearly describing such a benchmark or its origins. 
Smolo (2009) and the ISRA (2010) suggest that Islamic financial institutions can value their 
products using the Conventional CAPM with an “Islamic Profit Rate” composed of the 
return on government Sukuk (considered in the literature an equivalent of Treasury Bills), 
plus a mark-up reflecting the unique risk of the asset being valued, just as the 
Conventional interest rate is composed of LIBOR plus a mark-up. An advantage of this 
suggestion is that it does take into consideration the unique risk of each asset being 
valued, but once again, the actual description of the profit rate or its origin are not 
explained. The problems of these valuation approaches are again obvious: First, they use 
a “guessed” and not theoretically derived proxy for the riskless rate as an input of a 
valuation model. Consequently, the valuation becomes somewhat arbitrary 
counterfeiting its original goal of transparency in the valuation of Islamic financial assets. 
Second, naïvely using the classical CAPM does not address the fact that the market 
portfolio in Islamic markets differs from the market portfolio in Conventional markets due 
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to the presence of non-Shariah complaint stocks. Third, using the classical CAPM ignores 
the fact that Islamic banks operate in a mixed financial market. For that reason, the 
valuation of Islamic financial assets is influenced by the valuation that both investors in 
the market perceive: Islamic investors who compare Islamic investment accounts with 
Shariah-compliant stocks and cash holdings and non-Islamic investors who use all stocks 
as well as the riskless asset as standards of comparison. Only Smolo (2009) mentions the 
mixed market aspect and the role that the Conventional riskless rate plays on Islamic 
investors and the valuation of Islamic financial assets, however, he does not translate this 
into his valuation model. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section III.2 develops the asset 
pricing formulas for segmented markets. Section III.3 empirically evaluates the practical 
relevance of the segmented market formulas. Section III.4 concludes the chapter. 
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III.2 Valuation on Segmented Markets 
III.2.1 Forms of Market Segmentation 
The forms of market segmentation will only be identifiable if, in a first step, the asset 
classes that are available for investment purposes are analyzed. 
III.2.1.1 Asset Classes 
In any market with Islamic and Conventional investors, three main asset classes can exist: 
Riskless assets, Islamic assets, and stocks. 
III.2.1.1.1 Riskless Assets 
The class of riskless assets comprises interest-bearing riskless assets and Islamic current 
accounts, which offer riskless cash flows if no extraordinary events in the sense of Section 
II.3.3.1.3 or Section II.3.4.1.2 are considered: 
 First, an interest-bearing riskless asset with identical borrowing and lending rates. 
Such an asset could either be a traded asset like a T-bill (no-arbitrage guarantees a 
net present values of zero on all traded riskless assets) or an interest-bearing 
savings deposit of Conventional banks (no-arbitrage guarantees, at least in theory, 
identical net present values on all savings deposits). The supply of the riskless asset 
equals an exogenously specified amount namely the issuance volume, if we assume 
the riskless asset is a T-Bill, or the volume of all savings deposits of Conventional 
banks, if these are taken to represent the riskless assets—The special case of a 
riskless asset in zero net supply can easily be obtained by setting its amount equal 
to zero. 
 Second, non-interest-bearing non-traded (riskless) Islamic current accounts are 
available from Islamic banks, i.e., cash alternatives. It is always possible to invest in 
these current accounts and they can theoretically be sold short, i.e., obtaining a 
loan at zero interest rate (Islamic Qard contract, see IFSB-15, Article 423) is possible. 
Nevertheless, according to Izadyar/Ragnath (2014), providing a zero-interest 
(benevolent) loan (Islamic Qard) has not gained popularity in the financial sector 
due to its zero return and high administrative fees and has rather been used by 
NGOs and charities to support start-up projects. For this reason, the assumption 
that current accounts are readily available for short-selling is debatable. Current 
accounts are available for Conventional as well as Islamic investors, however it is 
unlikely that Conventional investors would demand current accounts since they are 
dominated by the riskless interest-bearing asset, i.e., they are in zero demand 
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unless the riskless interest rate is negative. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
positive demand from Islamic investors who invest money in current accounts can 
be exactly offset by the negative demand from investors who sell current accounts 
short. For that reason, current accounts are not assumed to be in zero net supply. 
Instead, the supply for current accounts can be interpreted as the total volume of 
funds invested in Islamic current accounts in the economy of the respective 
country. 
III.2.1.1.2 Islamic Financial Assets 
The class of Islamic financial assets comprises: 
 First, Sukuk, which may be tradable depending on their institutional characteristics: 
Equity-based Sukuk are generally tradable while debt-based are not (see Section 
II.3.4.4); 
 Second, non-tradable Islamic investment accounts. 
The returns on Sukuk and Islamic investment accounts are (moderately) stochastic due to 
cash flow transformation practices (see Section II.3.3.2 and Section II.3.4.2). Supply for 
Sukuk equals their total issuance volume. Supply in the case of Islamic investment 
accounts is less easily specified. By definition, opening an Islamic investment account at 
an Islamic bank brings funds into the financial market (as soon as the investor and 
institution agree to set up the account); however, Islamic investment accounts are not 
explicitly limited to a certain volume. Furthermore, funds flowing into Islamic financial 
assets must, due to Shariah-compliance, be invested in the real economy (Ali, 2011: 30; 
Song/Oosthuizen, 2014: 19), and consequently leave the financial market. From that 
perspective, determining the volume of Islamic investment accounts is similar to 
determining that of issued stocks and bonds where proceeds from the issuance are 
invested in real investment projects and leave the financial market as well. Additionally, 
Islamic financial assets cannot be sold short. Therefore, we can conclude that Islamic 
investment accounts cannot be in zero net supply even though they do not possess an 
explicit issuance volume. For that reason, the supply for an (arbitrary) Islamic investment 
account can be interpreted as the total volume of funds invested in this specific asset at 
the bank that offers it. Note that we do not aggregate supply over all Islamic investment 
accounts in the economy due to the fact that each Islamic investment account has its own 
risk profile stemming from the pooled underlying contracts chosen by the managers of 
the investment account and hence is unique (ISRA, 2010: 20). 
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III.2.1.1.3 Stocks 
The class of (tradable) stocks can be grouped into two categories. 
 First, stocks whose business is Shariah-compliant (we call them Islamic stocks), 
 Second, stocks whose business is not Shariah-compliant (we call them non-Islamic 
stocks). 
Whether stocks are Shariah-compliant or not, is determined by Shariah supervisory 
boards. These stocks are then published as (Islamic) indices for most internationally 
traded world markets (S&P Dow Jones, 2011: 4). Supply for Islamic and non-Islamic stocks 
equals their total issuance volume. 
III.2.1.2 Market Segmentation 
It is important to highlight that the asset classes of Section III.2.1.1 are not available for 
investment by all investors in a segmented market as Table 23 points out: 
Asset Class Segmentation Conventional Investor Islamic Investor 
Interest-bearing 
riskless assets 
Restricted Available 
Not Available 
(include the element of 
interest/Riba and are thus not 
Shariah-compliant) 
Islamic current 
accounts 
Common 
Available 
(but dominated by the 
riskless interest rate 
bearing assets, i.e., in 
zero demand unless 
riskless interest rate is 
negative) 
Available 
(but no short sales offered10) 
Islamic assets Common 
Available 
(but no short sales 
offered) 
Available 
(but no short sales offered) 
Islamic stocks Common Available 
Available 
(but no short sales allowed) 
Non-Islamic 
stocks 
Restricted Available 
Not Available 
(by definition not Shariah-
compliant) 
Table 23: Available assets for Islamic and Conventional investors showing common and restricted asset 
classes. 
As Table 23 shows, Conventional investors are free to invest in all asset classes (regardless 
of Shariah-compliance) and thus have full market access with virtually no restrictions. On 
the other hand, Islamic investors are legally bound (by Shariah law) not to invest in non-
Shariah-compliant assets (in this case non-Islamic stocks and interest-bearing riskless 
                                                          
10 Short selling is prohibited by Shariah (see Usmani, 2002: 11), for this reason Islamic assets which 
are by definition adhering to Shariah law are not allowed to be sold short regardless of investor 
type. 
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assets) and thus are restricted in terms of the assets they can invest in. In other words, 
unequal access of investors to risky and riskless assets exists and, hence, mild market 
segmentation in the sense of Errunza/Losq (1985: 107) and Lintner (1977: 8) exists. Thus, 
we neither consider a partially segmented market where the set of available assets for 
Conventional and Islamic investors are disjoint (see Rubinstein (1973: 746) and Lintner 
(1977: 8)) nor markets where all assets are open to all investors, but with different costs 
in the form of taxes (Black (1974)). 
To be more precise, this mild market segmentation can be further categorized into 
different forms of mild market segmentation depending on the institutional 
characteristics that are associated with the operation of Islamic financial institutions in 
the respective financial market: 
 First, it is possible to observe a double segmented market where Islamic investors 
can neither invest in non-Islamic stocks (first segmentation) nor in interest-bearing 
riskless assets (second segmentation). This necessitates that Islamic stocks are 
identifiable on the market (through the publication of an Islamic stock index) and 
Islamic banks exist and offer non-interest-bearing current accounts. 
 Second, a single segmented market with respect to the riskless asset will be 
observed if Islamic banks exist but investors cannot differentiate between Islamic 
and non-Islamic stocks, i.e., no Islamic stocks index is published to allow 
differentiation of stocks. 
 Third, a single segmented market with respect to risky assets will be observed if an 
Islamic stocks index is published but no Islamic banks are available that offer non-
interest-bearing current accounts, i.e., Islamic and non-Islamic stocks are 
identifiable, but there are no Islamic banks in the country which is why investors, 
in theory, cannot avoid riskless interest-bearing assets (Islamic investors may 
choose to use current accounts of Conventional banks—thus the market will revert 
to a double segmentation—but given that the money will be deposited in a 
Conventional bank anyway, they may decide to use interest-bearing riskless assets 
instead of current accounts leading to a single segmented market with respect to 
risky assets). 
 Fourth, a pure Islamic (unsegmented) market will be observed if no riskless interest-
bearing asset exists and all stocks are deemed Shariah-compliant. 
 A fifth and final case can exist, namely a pure Conventional (unsegmented) market, 
which will be observed if no Islamic banks exist and no distinction between Islamic 
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and non-Islamic stocks is provided. This is however, the classical CAPM case and is 
not the focus of this work. 
The overview of Islamic financial markets in Appendix A.1 illustrates that only in Iran and 
Sudan purely Islamic markets exist, and that for all other 25 markets a degree of market 
segmentation is observed: 14 countries have a double segmented market, eight countries 
have a single segmented market with respect to the riskless asset, and one country, India, 
has a single segmented market with respect to risky assets only. Exceptional cases exist in 
two countries, Brunei and Yemen, which do not publish any stock indices, i.e., no stock 
market seems to exist. In theory these two countries would fall under a single segmented 
market with respect to the riskless asset (common assets are the Islamic assets, while 
riskless assets are segmented in the presence of Islamic banks offering Islamic current 
accounts). We do not merge them with the other eight countries of the group single 
segmented with respect to the riskless asset due to the different investment environment 
constituted by the absence of stocks. 
III.2.2 CAPM on Segmented Markets 
III.2.2.1 Framework of the Models 
We follow the overwhelming majority of the literature on segmented markets and 
conduct our analysis in a one-period risk-return (µ-framework (the only exceptions are 
Chaieb/Errunza (2007) and Stulz (1981) who both use a geometric Brownian motion). A 
dynamic framework will only be needed if additional sources of risk are to be integrated 
in the analysis, e.g., stochastic opportunity sets for stocks (like the transition from Merton 
(1969) to Merton (1973)) or liquidity risk (like in Cetin/Rogers (2007) or Jarrow (2015)). 
Since we are currently only interested in isolating the effects of a segmented market, we 
wish to guarantee that the effects caused by additional sources of risk do not interfere. 
This can best be achieved by presenting our arguments in a one-period framework. 
Moreover, a dynamic framework does not fit the institutional framework of Islamic 
investment accounts: They are non-tradable (least of all in continuous time) and 
withdrawals are only possible on a limited basis (see Hamdi/Zarai, 2013: 23; IFSB GN-3, 
Article 9). 
Nevertheless using a one-period framework comes at a cost: First, note that a one-period 
model will only be correct if preferences and future investment opportunity sets are not 
state-dependent as has been shown by Fama (1970). Put differently, state-independent 
preferences and a constant opportunity set in a dynamic framework yield identical results 
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as a static framework. For example, Merton (1969) obtains portfolio selection results that 
are—apart from the fact that everything is expressed on a per unit time basis—
indistinguishable from portfolio selection results in a static µ--framework. Second, a 
one-period model assumes that all assets either possess a market price at time  𝑡 +  1 
that condenses all future cash flows, or that they mature at time  𝑡 +  1. Traded stocks 
and tradable Sukuk clearly fall into the first category while Islamic investment accounts 
belong to the second category since the decision to withdraw, hold, or deposit more funds 
must be made at each point in time, making them—from a decision-theoretical 
perspective—indistinguishable from traded stocks even though their institutional 
characteristics are different. Furthermore, a penalty for withdrawal is sometimes imposed 
on Islamic investment accounts (Hamdi/Zarai, 2013: 23; IFSB GN-3, Article 9). This 
institutional feature can be easily integrated into our framework: Instead of offering 1 +
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1 as a cash flow at time 𝑡 + 1, Islamic investment accounts would deliver a cash flow 
of (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1) ∙ (1 − 𝑝) where 𝑝 captures the effect of the penalty on withdrawal. 
Non-tradable Sukuk pose a problem for the framework of our analysis since their future 
cash flow stream cannot be summarized by a price at time 𝑡 + 1, but a present value. This 
means they cannot be adequately modeled within a one-period model and, consequently, 
their valuation will not be possible using our valuation model. However, it is worth noting 
that non-tradable Sukuk account for a relatively small percentage of all Sukuk on the 
market (see Table 21, Section II.3.4.4 and Table 22, Section II.3.4.5). 
III.2.2.2 Double Segmented Markets: Segmentation with Respect to Risky and 
Riskless Assets 
On a double segmented market with respect to risky and riskless assets Islamic investors 
can neither invest in non-Islamic stocks (first segmentation) nor in interest-bearing 
riskless assets (second segmentation). An asset pricing model for double segmented 
markets is relevant for 14 out of the 27 countries that possess an active Islamic financial 
market, namely the financial markets of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
III.2.2.2.1 Decision Problems 
There are a total of 𝐾𝐶  Conventional and a total of 𝐾𝐼 Islamic investors in the economy. 
Both have 𝜇-𝜎-preferences, however with different risk preference parameters for each 
investor in each investor group. 
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III.2.2.2.1.1 Decision Problem of Conventional Investor 𝒌𝑪 
Individual Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  maximizes his 𝜇-𝜎-preference functional on “1 + his 
portfolio return 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1” by choosing the portfolio weights of his investments at time 𝑡 
in the available assets: Islamic stocks (𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ), non-Islamic stocks (𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ), Islamic 
assets (𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡), and the riskless asset (𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡): 
(1) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡,𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡
{𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝐸𝑘𝐶 +𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑟) −
𝑎𝑘𝐶
2
⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡} 
subject to the short selling constraints on Islamic assets and the budget constraint 
expressed as all portfolio weights adding up to 1, with 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐶 = (
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛺𝑘𝐶 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 𝛺𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
) 
where 𝑡 denotes the point in time at which the decision is made, 𝑡 +  1 the planning 
horizon, T the transposition of vectors and matrices, 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑗,𝑖,𝑡  the portfolio weight that 
Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  invests in asset 𝑖  of asset class 𝑗 , 𝐸{. }  the expected value 
operator, 𝛺𝑘𝐶  the variance/covariance matrix of all assets available to Conventional 
investor 𝑘𝐶 , 𝛺𝑖,𝑘𝐶 the variance/covariance matrix of asset class 𝑖 ’s asset, 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑗,𝑖,𝑘𝐶 the 
covariance matrix between asset class 𝑗’s and 𝑖’s assets, 𝐼𝑠 the asset class of Islamic stocks 
(with 𝑛𝐼𝑠 different stocks), 𝑛𝐼𝑠 the asset class of non-Islamic stocks (with 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 different 
stocks), 𝐼𝐴 the asset class of Islamic assets (with 𝑛𝐼𝐴 different assets); the subscript 𝑘𝐶  
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indicates that all expectations rest upon the individual forecasts of Conventional investor 
𝑘𝐶; moreover  𝑘𝐶  contrasts the investment universe of Conventional investors to those of 
Islamic investors (for example, the asset class non-Islamic stocks is only available to 
Conventional investors); 𝑎𝑘𝐶 represents the risk preference parameter of Conventional 
investor 𝑘𝐶  where we assume a risk averse decision maker, i.e., 𝑎𝑘𝐶 > 0. 
Note in this connection that 𝑎𝑘𝐶 could be interpreted as the constant relative risk aversion 
in the sense 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ≡
𝑎𝑘𝐶,𝑟𝑒𝑙
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
 or constant absolute risk aversion in the sense 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ≡ 𝑎𝑘𝐶,𝑎𝑏𝑠. 
Our model is flexible enough to encompass both specifications. 
III.2.2.2.1.2 Decision Problem of Islamic Investor 𝒌𝑰 
Similar to Conventional investor  𝑘𝐶 , individual Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼  maximizes his 𝜇 -𝜎 -
preference functional on “1 + his portfolio return” by choosing the portfolio weights of 
his investments at time 𝑡 in the available assets: Islamic stocks, Islamic assets, and current 
accounts: 
(2) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡,𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
{𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝐸𝑘𝐼 +𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 1 −
𝑎𝑘𝐼
2
⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡} 
subject to short selling constraints on all asset classes: Islamic stocks, Islamic assets, and 
current accounts and the budget constraint expressed as all portfolio weights adding up 
to 1, with 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) =
(
 
 
 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡)
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐼 = (
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) =
(
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1})
 
 
 
 
 
𝛺𝑘𝐼 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼 𝛺𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼
) 
where 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 is Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼’s portfolio weight invested in current accounts; the 
subscript 𝑘𝐼 indicates that all expectations rest upon the individual forecasts of Islamic 
investor 𝑘𝐼; moreover 𝑘𝐼 contrasts the investment universe of Islamic investors to those 
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of Conventional investors; 𝑎𝑘𝐼  represents the risk preference parameter of Islamic 
investor 𝑘𝐼 where we assume a risk averse decision maker, i.e., 𝑎𝑘𝐼 > 0. Again, 𝑎𝑘𝐼 could 
be interpreted as the relative or absolute risk aversion. 
III.2.2.2.2 Market Equilibrium 
We assume homogeneous expectations, which signify that both investor groups—
Conventional and Islamic investors—use identical estimates for expected values, 
variances, and covariances. Therefore, not only investors within each group have identical 
expectations, but also between both investor groups. This assumption means that we can 
drop the subscripts 𝑘𝐶  and 𝑘𝐼  when forming expectations. Note, however, that the 
investment universe of Conventional and Islamic investors is still different. For that 
reason, even under homogenous expectations, the components of the 
variance/covariance matrices will still be different which is why we keep a subscript to 
distinguish between the variance/covariance matrix of Conventional and Islamic 
investors. 
We assume that the financial market is always in equilibrium, i.e., no trading or investing 
at non-equilibrium prices occurs. When equating total demand and supply, the double 
market segmentation outlined in Table 23 is important and therefore is highlighted here 
once more: Conventional investors can invest in Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, Islamic 
assets, and the riskless asset, while Islamic investors can only invest in Islamic stocks, 
Islamic assets, and current accounts but neither in non-Islamic stocks (first market 
segmentation) nor the riskless asset (second market segmentation). Hence, the demand 
in market equilibrium, i.e., the total demand in the market by all investors, can be 
formulated as the amount invested into by Conventional investors in each of the common 
assets (Islamic stocks and Islamic assets) plus the amount invested into each of the 
respective common assets by Islamic investors. For restricted assets such as non-Islamic 
stocks and interest-bearing riskless assets, the demand of Conventional investors is the 
total demand for that asset in the market. Similarly, the demand of Islamic investors for 
Islamic current accounts is the total demand for that asset in the market—since, for 
Conventional investors current accounts are dominated by the riskless interest-bearing 
asset. In equilibrium, these demand volumes equal the total supply available in the market 
for the respective asset (see Appendix C.1.2 for an algebraic formulation of the 
equilibrium conditions). 
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Note that we are only interested in interior solutions since they rest upon a positive 
demand and contain a fully-fledged risk-return trade-off as opposed to binding non-
negativity constraints that lead to a demand of zero and, hence, a degenerated risk-return 
trade-off. However, focusing solely on interior solutions comes at a cost: Equilibrium 
interior solutions are in nearly all, but not all cases, identical to optimal individual 
solutions. Since exogenous supply for all assets is positive, optimal aggregate demand 
must be positive as well. Although a positive aggregate demand does not necessitate that 
the demand of an investor group remain positive—homogenous expectations at least 
guarantee that individual demand has the same sign as the demand of the respective 
investor group. However, the demand of one investor group can be negative as long as it 
is overcompensated by the positive demand of the other investor group. The riskless asset 
is unconstrained meaning that the focus on interior solutions is not critical. Current 
accounts are subject to a non-negativity constraint, which might create problems when 
analyzing interior solutions only because the optimal unconstrained demand of the 
investor group Islamic investors might be less than zero. This problem can be mitigated 
by using an endogenous riskless rate that leads to expected returns of risky assets that 
keep the demand for current accounts positive (see Appendix C.1.4.3.2 for the derivation 
of the endogenous riskless rate). 
III.2.2.2.3 First Valuation Formula for Double Segmented Markets: Unspecified Risk 
Preference Parameters 
Given market equilibrium, we can solve for the valuation formulas and obtain (see 
Appendix C.1.3 for a formal derivation): 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
(3a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(3b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
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For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(3c) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
where 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
)
+𝑤𝑀,0,𝑡 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 0 
and 
(4) 
1
𝑎𝐶
≡
1
∑
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐶
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
 
1
𝑎𝐼
≡
1
∑
𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐼
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
 
According to Equations (3a) and (3b), the required expected return on Islamic assets and 
Islamic stocks—the common assets—equals a risk-independent term plus a risk 
correction that consists of the risk of the asset (covariance of returns of the asset with the 
market portfolio return) multiplied by the market price of risk (aggregated risk preference 
parameter). 
The risk independent term is a mixture (weighted by the aggregated risk preference 
parameters of both investor groups) of the riskless rates available to Conventional 
investors and the zero interest rate of Islamic investors, and is responsible that Equations 
(3a) and (3b) do not coincide with their unsegmented market counterparts even though 
common assets are considered. The first term in Equations (3a) and (3b) can be written 
as 
(5) 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝑟
𝑎𝐶
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
+
0
𝑎𝐼
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
=
1
𝑎𝐶
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑟 +
1
𝑎𝐼
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
∙ 0 
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In other words, it is a weighted average of the riskless rate 𝑟 and the 0 interest rate of 
current accounts. The weights are based on the risk preference parameters of both 
investors groups. 
The risk correction term 
𝑎𝐶∙𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) or 
𝑎𝐶∙𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
is identical to the one on an unsegmented market, a result that is typical for common 
assets when there is just a segmentation with respect to risky assets (see early papers on 
internationally segmented markets Errunza/Losq (1985), Proposition 1, p. 109, and 
Eun/Janakiramanan (1986), p. 906 or for green markets Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 
(2001), p. 437). The risk is weighted by the market price of risk that primarily consists of 
the risk preference parameters of all investors that are allowed to invest in the common 
assets; these risk preference parameters are proportional to the harmonic mean of 
individual risk preference parameters, i.e., 
𝑎𝐶
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
1
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
.  
The required expected return of non-Islamic stocks—the restricted asset class for an 
Islamic investor—displays a different structure. It equals the riskless rate plus a 
compensation for risk (covariance with the market portfolio). Remarkably, only the 
riskless rate for the investor group that is allowed to invest in non-Islamic shares as well 
as their risk preferences (and not the risk preferences of the other group) enter this part 
of the equation. The second row of Equation (3c) is less intuitive. To understand this 
component of the asset pricing formula, we use the formulation based on (A-27) 
(6) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖) ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
(𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖) ∙ (
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
)  describes the demand-effect of the 
absence of Islamic investors on non-Islamic stocks, i.e., the effect on demand that occurs 
due to the fact that Islamic investors are not allowed to invest in non-Islamic stocks. 
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Islamic investors hence contemplate how much to invest in Islamic stocks and Islamic 
assets instead. From that perspective, 𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}  will be lower, the higher the 
covariance between non-Islamic stock 𝑖  and Islamic stocks/assets (given that Islamic 
investors cannot sell Islamic stocks or Islamic assets short), i.e., the more Islamic 
stocks/assets could be regarded as substitutes for non-Islamic stock 𝑖.—A low expected 
return clearly induces a low demand for non-Islamic stocks. 
III.2.2.2.4 Final Asset Pricing Formula on a Double Segmented Market: Only Observable 
Quantities 
The required expected return Equations (3a), (3b), and (3c) and their ensuing 
interpretations give a good overview of the drivers of the required expected return. 
Nevertheless, these valuation equations do not constitute a practically implementable 
asset pricing formula since they contain two unobservable parameters 𝑎𝐶  and  𝑎𝐼 . 
Moreover, they cannot be applied to the valuation of Islamic financial assets since they 
contain an explicit reference to the riskless rate (Shariah-compliance problem). 
To (potentially) solve these problems, the unobservable terms 
𝑟
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
 as well as 
𝑎𝐶∙𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
 in 
(3a) and (3b) and terms involving 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 and 𝑎𝐼 in (3c) must be expressed with the help 
of observable quantities only. In the language of the classical CAPM, the market portfolio 
is used to express the unknown risk preference parameters. 
However, on a double segmented market, such an unambiguous approach does not exist 
for the following reasons: First, two terms containing the risk preference parameters must 
be determined, which is why at least two return equations for asset classes, i.e., so-called 
sub-market portfolios, are needed. Second, several sub-market portfolios exist for 
countries with double segmented markets as Appendix D.1.1 illustrates: (i) an All-stocks 
index as well as (ii) an Islamic stocks index are published. This in turn means that the 
difference between the All-stocks and the Islamic stocks index, i.e., an index of (iii) non-
Islamic stocks, exists as well. (iv), no index on Islamic assets is published, but it can be 
computed using the available data on Islamic assets from Islamic banks. (v) the market 
portfolio itself can be computed from (i) and (iv). In sum, there are five sub-market 
portfolio-based valuation equations to determine the two unknowns 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡  and 𝑎𝐼 . 
Consistency of the valuation model requires that the (
5
2
) = 10 possibilities to compute 
both unknowns coincide. In addition, (vi) the riskless return must be consistent with the 
five valuation equations of the sub-market portfolios. 
If the All-stocks index is constructed correctly, its return must be a weighted average of 
CHAPTER III ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS 
67 
the returns of its components. A similar reasoning holds for the market portfolio. In other 
words, the asset class All-stocks sub-market portfolio and the market portfolio itself are 
linearly dependent on the returns of their components. For that reason, they cannot offer 
additional information regarding the determination of the two unknowns (see Appendix 
C.1.4.2.2 for details) beyond the information that the sub-market portfolios of the asset 
class Islamic stocks (ii), asset class non-Islamic stocks (iii), asset class Islamic assets (iv), 
and the riskless rate (vi) provide. Moreover, Appendix C.1.4.3.2 proves that an 
endogenous riskless rate in general equilibrium meets requirement (vi) and makes the 
valuation model consistent, i.e., it does not matter whether the unknowns are computed 
with the help of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes Islamic assets and Islamic 
stocks, or Islamic assets and non-Islamic stocks, or Islamic stocks and non-Islamic stocks. 
Based on these insights into the consistent determination of 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼, Appendix C.1.4.3 
shows that the asset pricing formulas that consists of only observable quantities can be 
expressed as: 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 (re-expression of (3a)) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1}
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
(7a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 (re-expression of (3b)) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
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(7b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} 
For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 (re-expression of (3c)) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}
=
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1})
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖)
∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
or 
(7c) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}
= 𝑟
+ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
(
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
(
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
− (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
∙ 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 
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with 
𝑟 =
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≡ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙
(
 
 
 
 
1
⋮
1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1
⋮
1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝐴.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
 
 
 
∙ (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
Three insights are remarkable when analyzing Equations (7a) to (7c), remarkable in the 
sense that they were not directly visible from Equations (3a), (3b), and (3c). 
First, the required return of Islamic assets, Islamic stocks, and non-Islamic stocks are no 
longer a linear function of the expected return of the market portfolio as is the case in the 
classical CAPM. Instead, a linear two-market portfolio structure is observed for Islamic 
assets and Islamic stocks. This has major implications for empirical research in connection 
with asset pricing models in general and segmented markets in particular: The classical 
CAPM, the Fama/French model, and the Carhart model all use one market factor and, 
hence, cannot adequately address pricing relations on a double segmented market given 
that these follow a linear two-market factor model. We do not claim to provide an answer 
to the question “how many factors are relevant for empirical asset pricing?”, but rather 
we argue that (at least) two market factors must be used with segmented markets to 
capture market risk correctly. Moreover, even if these two market factors are used in the 
context of regression-based empirical asset pricing, deviations between the theoretically 
exact and empirical asset pricing will emerge since factor loadings from (7a) and (7b) are 
different than two factor regression coefficients: 
(
𝛽1
𝛽2
) = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆(𝑥1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆(𝑥1; 𝑥2)
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆(𝑥1; 𝑥2) 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆(𝑥2)
)
−1
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆(𝑦; 𝑥1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆(𝑦; 𝑥2)
) 
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where “𝑆” refers to the sample estimation of variances or covariances, 𝑦 denotes the 
dependent variable, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 the two explanatory variables. This can be explained by the 
fact that valuation can no longer be conducted for an overall market portfolio that is 
common to all investors (although it contains all sub-market portfolios, it is not relevant 
for the restricted group due to the presence of the restricted asset classes’ sub-market 
portfolio in the overall market portfolio). Instead, we can only value sub-market portfolios 
of asset classes that are relevant to each investor group. Regression coefficients on the 
other hand do not make this distinction and work with the assumption that the overall 
market portfolio, whose risk is a component of the covariances in the theoretically correct 
factor models, can itself be valued using this same model as well. 
The valuation of non-Islamic stocks cannot even be implemented correctly using a linear 
multi factor regression since market factors appear both in the numerator and the 
denominator of valuation formula (7c), i.e., a non-linear structure exists. 
Second, note that valuation Equations (7a) and (7b) do not contain any reference to the 
riskless interest rate 𝑟, thus, are indeed Shariah-compliant. In other words, Equation (7b) 
is the asset pricing formula for Islamic assets that has been missing in the literature so far. 
Third, using an explicit riskless rate is not only problematic against an Islamic background, 
but also creates practical problems: None of the countries in our sample where Islamic 
banks actively operate (according to Table 30) possess a “AAA”-Rating making T-Bills risky. 
Moreover, savings deposit rates are not equal over all banks and, in addition, deviate from 
the T-Bill rates. From that perspective, it is not clear what interest rate should be taken as 
a proxy for the “true” riskless rate. Using observable sub-market portfolios of asset classes 
circumvents this problem. 
III.2.2.3 Single Segmented Markets with Respect to the Riskless Asset: No 
Distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic Stocks 
This segmented market is obtained if markets are only segmented with respect to the 
riskless asset but not with respect to risky assets. In other words, the single segmented 
market no longer differentiates between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. Such a single 
segmented market is of practical relevance to the eight countries Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Philippines, and Syria since they do not publish an Islamic stocks 
index and, hence, investors cannot differentiate between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
However, these markets possess an Islamic banking sector and, thus, investors are still 
able to distinguish between riskless assets. This can be easily reverted to a double 
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segmented market if all investors are able to conduct Shariah-criteria filtering themselves 
for the stocks available on the market. 
III.2.2.3.1 First Valuation Formula: Unspecified Risk Preference Parameters 
The valuation formulas on segmented markets with respect to the riskless asset with no 
distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks read (see Appendix C.2.1 for a formal 
derivation): 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
(8a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For All-stocks 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 + 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(8b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
According to Equations (8a) and (8b), the required expected return on Islamic assets and 
All-stocks—the common assets—equals a risk-independent term plus a risk correction 
that consists of the risk of the asset (covariance with the market portfolio) multiplied by 
the market price of risk (aggregated risk preference parameter). In this sense, they are 
identical to the valuation formulas for common assets on double segmented markets. The 
difference is that no (identifiable) restricted risky assets exist anymore. All investors have 
demand for all-stocks and, thus, the special treatment of non-Islamic stocks is no longer 
required. 
III.2.2.3.2 Final Asset Pricing Formula on a Single Segmented Market with Respect to 
the Riskless Asset: Only Observable Quantities 
Re-expressing (8a) and (8b) with the help of only observable quantities delivers (see 
Appendix C.2.2 for a formal derivation): 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1}
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
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(9a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} 
For All-stocks 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 + 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1}
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
(9b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} 
(9a) and (9b) offer two remarkable insights, remarkable in the sense that they were not 
directly visible from Equations (8a) and (8b). First, since there are two unknowns (𝑎𝐶  and 
𝑎𝐼) and just two sub-market portfolios (of the asset classes Islamic assets and All-stocks), 
no endogenous riskless rate is required to keep the model consistent. Second, a two 
market factor structure is observed for Islamic assets and All-stocks, but no longer a non-
linear structure as was the case with non-Islamic stocks in the double segmented market 
model (see Equation (7c)). 
III.2.2.4 Single Segmented Markets with Respect to Risky Assets: No Distinction 
between Riskless Interest-Bearing Assets and Current Accounts 
In a segmented market with respect to risky assets, no distinction between riskless 
interest-bearing assets and Islamic current accounts can be made. This occurs in practice 
if markets are only segmented with respect to Islamic and non-Islamic stocks—possible 
due to the presence of a published Islamic stocks index—but no segmentation with 
respect to riskless assets is possible—due to the absence of an Islamic banking sector. 
Hence, there are no Islamic assets and no Islamic current accounts available in the market. 
Such a single segmented market is only relevant for India. It is important to note that it 
might be more realistic to assume that Islamic investors (in India) will simply use 
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Conventional banks (in the absence of Islamic banks), but selectively opt out of investing 
in interest-bearing riskless assets, and rather use current accounts as the closest 
alternative to Islamic current accounts. In this case, we would be dealing once more with 
a double segmented market with respect to risky and riskless assets. The same result 
would occur if Islamic investors simply opt out completely from the riskless asset class 
and keep their excess funds as cash. However, we base our derivations here on the 
assumption that since Islamic investors cannot differentiate between riskless assets, they 
will deposit their money in Conventional banks and use interest-bearing riskless assets in 
the absence of a Shariah-compliant alternative (similar to the case where Islamic investors 
could not distinguish between stocks, they invested in All-stocks), and therefore we 
remain by a single segmented market with respect to risky assets only for the case of 
India. 
By the way, formally, this single segmented market is identical to the segmented market 
CAPMs developed by the literature so far: Internationally segmented markets where 
investors cannot invest as good in foreign stocks as in domestic stocks (see, e.g., the 
overview of the literature in Arouri et al. (2012))), markets that are segmented with 
respect to “green” investment where some investors do not want to invest in “unethical” 
assets (Heinkel/Kraus/Zechner (2001)), and markets that are segmented with respect to 
information, i.e., some investors do not know enough about some assets and, hence 
refrain from investing in them (see Merton (1987)). In all of these models, the interest-
bearing riskless asset was available to all investor groups. 
III.2.2.4.1 First Valuation Formula: Unspecified Risk Preference Parameters 
The valuation formulas on a segmented market with respect to risky assets, i.e., where no 
distinction between riskless assets read (see Appendix C.3.1 for a formal derivation): 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(10a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
with 
𝑎𝐶
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
1
1
𝑎𝐶
+
1
𝑎𝐼
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For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(10b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅
𝑎𝐶
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
The common assets—Islamic stocks—are priced (Equation (10a)) as if the market was 
unsegmented, while the restricted assets exhibit an adjustment due to market 
segmentation (Equation (10b)). This adjustment can—similar to Equation (3c)—be 
interpreted as the demand-effect for non-Islamic stocks because Islamic investors are not 
allowed to invest in them. 
III.2.2.4.2 Final Asset Pricing Formula on a Single Segmented Market with Respect to 
Risky Assets: Only Observable Quantities 
Re-expressing (10a) and (10b) with the help of observable variables delivers (see Appendix 
C.3.2 for a formal derivation): 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 +
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
(11a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} − 𝑟 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) 
For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}
= 𝑟 +
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
or 
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(11b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
= [
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
−
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
]
∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟)
− [
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
+
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
]
∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) 
with 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Equations (11a) and (11b) offer three insights beyond Equations (10a) and (10b). First, 
since there are two unknowns (𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 ), just two sub-market portfolios and no 
endogenous riskless rate is required to keep the model consistent. Second, risk premia of 
Islamic stocks are a linear function of the risk premium of the sub-market portfolios of the 
asset classes Islamic and non-Islamic stocks respectively. Third, this result goes beyond 
what the literature on segmented market has found so far—even though a standard 
market segmentation environment is used—two sub-market portfolios are needed to 
explain the required expected returns for the asset classes of common assets (Islamic 
stocks), which can then be expressed as a one-market factor model. For the asset classes 
of restricted assets (non-Islamic stocks) a two-market portfolio structure is observed 
although the weights of the factors are more complex. However, the factor loadings for 
the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes are not identical to regression coefficients. 
Only if a specific model of asset returns is used, namely asset returns that are a linear 
function of the return of the market portfolio and another factor that is uncorrelated with 
the market portfolio’s return, will regression coefficients result (see Errunza/Losq (1985) 
for such a model). 
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The fact that the literature on green investing does not use such a second factor might 
explain why empirical testing of the green CAPM does not often detect performance 
disadvantages of green compared to conventional investments (e.g., Hong/Kacperczyk 
(2009)). 
III.2.2.5 Purely Islamic Markets 
Purely Islamic markets can be observed only in Iran and Sudan, i.e., two out of the 27 
countries in Appendix A.1. In a purely Islamic market, there is neither an interest-bearing 
riskless asset nor non-Islamic stocks. In other words, neither market segmentation nor 
two groups of investors (Conventional and Islamic) can be observed. From that 
perspective, an Islamic CAPM analogue to the classical CAPM is obtained: 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
(12a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1}
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(12b) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1}
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
with 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 0 
Note that Equations (12a) and (12b) seem to be identical to the naïve adaptation of the 
classical CAPM, namely in the use of on interest rate of zero and a market portfolio that 
consists of Islamic stocks, as Selim (2008) proposed. Yet the composition of the market 
portfolio differs due to the presence of current accounts; the portfolio weights of Islamic 
stocks and Islamic assets do not sum up to one, thus, changing the return distribution of 
the market portfolio’s return compared to the case where current accounts are ignored. 
III.2.2.6 Comparison of Required Expected Returns of Islamic Assets on 
Differently Segmented Markets 
The fair valuation of Islamic financial assets, i.e., a determination of adequate rates of 
return, is a prerequisite for the healthy development of both the Islamic financial sector 
and Islamic financial intermediaries—healthy in the sense of avoiding contagion in the 
CHAPTER III ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS 
77 
Islamic financial sector and among Islamic financial intermediaries. In particular, since 
inadequate rates of return on Islamic assets may lead to withdrawals that can reach 
systemic proportions and become a cause for concern on the part of supervisory 
authorities (see IFSB GN-3, Article 9).—Given this practical motivation, we would like to 
draw special attention to the valuation formulas of Islamic assets. 
As was shown in the previous sections, different levels of market segmentation deliver 
different valuation formulas for Islamic assets on those respective markets. This implies 
that calculating the required expected return for Islamic assets is, strictly, market-
segmentation-dependent. Thus, in this section we attempt to highlight the differences 
between the valuation formulas across different market segmentation in the case of 
Islamic assets. 
On double segmented markets the required expected return of Islamic asset 𝑖 reads 
(3a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
On single segmented markets with respect to the riskless asset the required expected 
return of Islamic assets 𝑖 reads 
(8a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
On purely Islamic (non-segmented) markets the required expected return of Islamic assets 
𝑖 reads 
(12a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
On single segmented markets with respect to risky assets there are no Islamic assets. 
III.2.2.6.1 Unsegmented versus Segmented 
With a quick glance, it becomes clear that a significant valuation difference exists between 
segmented markets (3a) and (8a) on the one hand and the pure Islamic market (12a) on 
the other hand: Namely (i) no riskless return is taken into consideration in a purely Islamic 
market, (ii) only the risk preference parameters of Islamic investors matter, and (iii) the 
covariance, although identical in form to those on segmented markets, is different in 
substance since the market portfolio in a pure Islamic market does not consider non-
Islamic stocks or the volume of interest-bearing riskless assets. 
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Under the assumption that the riskless rate 𝑟 is positive and investors are risk averse 
(𝑎𝐶 > 0 and 𝑎𝐼 > 0), 
𝑟
1+
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
 is greater than zero and the required expected return in a 
purely Islamic market will tend to be lower than on segmented markets. However, in case 
of negative interest rates, it is more likely that Conventional investors will revert to a zero-
return cash alternative and the valuation of segmented and unsegmented markets may 
coincide since both investor groups will be using zero-return cash alternatives or current 
accounts. Furthermore, in case one investor group is risk seeking the above claims would 
no longer hold because then the risk correction will be deducted from the riskless rate. 
III.2.2.6.2 Single Segmented versus Double Segmented 
By looking at the valuation formulas (3a) and (8a), one cannot recognize any differences 
in the valuation in single segmented with respect to the riskless asset versus double 
segmented markets. However, this impression is misleading as the valuation formulas 
with the intercept and market price of risk components expressed as observable 
quantities demonstrate: 
(A-38) 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and 
(A-37) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
versus 
(A-53) 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and 
(A-52) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
The returns on Islamic stocks in the case of a double segmented market are in no way 
identical to the returns on All-stocks in the case of a single segmented market since the 
latter includes non-Islamic stocks as well. Furthermore, it cannot be determined whether 
required expected returns on double segmented markets exceed the ones on single 
segmented markets since differences materialize in the expected values of the sub-
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market portfolios of the asset classes and the covariances between sub-market portfolios 
of the asset classes and market portfolio that then both enter into the numerator and 
denominator of the intercept and the market price of risk. 
III.2.2.6.3 Implications for the Valuation of Islamic Assets 
 First Implication: Reflecting each asset’s individual risk profile 
The valuation formula for Islamic assets, even within each country’s financial market, 
strictly depends on the risk profile of each individual Islamic asset 𝑖, resulting in a unique 
required expected return for each Islamic asset. This is of utmost importance since it 
implies that no global benchmark for determining the cost of capital or returns on Islamic 
assets, as aimed for in the Islamic finance literature (ISRA, 2010: 2; Azad et al., 2017: 3), 
can be applied using only one valuation formula. 
 Second Implication: Alternative to mimicking Conventional rates of return 
As a consequence of the individual risk profiles, it becomes clear that mimicking the 
returns on Conventional deposits is highly problematic from an institutional as well as an 
asset pricing perspective. 
Institutionally, mimicking Conventional returns does not take into consideration the 
criticism of the recent AAIOFI Standard 27 on Indices, Clause 7 as well as decision number 
76 (§7) of the 8th conference of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Saudi Arabia, 
which took place in Brunei 1993 that Conventional interest rates should not be used as a 
benchmark for Islamic assets (International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 
489; Azad et al., 2017: 12). Transforming returns to match Conventional deposit rates or 
overnight rates is heavily criticized as a threat to the long-run development of the Islamic 
financial system (see Usmani, 2002: 82; ISRA, 2010: 24-31). Consequently, the Islamic 
Pricing Benchmark Project was specifically founded in 2010 to address the problem of 
valuing Islamic assets (ISRA, 2010; Ahmed et al., 2014; Song/Oosthuizen, 2014: 28). 
From an asset pricing perspective, matching Conventional banks’ deposit rates (for Islamic 
deposits)/overnight rates (for Sukuk) by using reserves is a problem in itself. Islamic 
deposits/Sukuk earn their returns by investing money into real (not financial) investment 
projects, which are usually located in the region (ISRA, 2010: 42) and whose risk structures 
are not at all related to Conventional banks’ deposit rates/overnight rates. Hence, using 
reserves to match Conventional rates implies that: (i) Given the individual risk of Islamic 
deposits/Sukuk, Conventional banks’ deposit rates/overnight rates are too high, and the 
fallback on reserves is unnecessary, and will only result in making Islamic deposits/Sukuk 
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a source of funding that possesses a negative net present value on a risk-adjusted basis. 
(ii) Conversely, given the individual risk of Islamic deposits/Sukuk, Conventional banks’ 
deposit rates/overnight rates might not be enough to compensate for the true risk of real 
investment projects, an observation that is also recognized by IFSB Guidance Note 3, 
Article 48. Hence, another reason why Islamic assets might be a negative net present 
value investment on a risk-adjusted basis. (iii) Profit equalization reserves/reserve 
accounts may stem from past profits and not from profits generated from the current 
project, i.e., the reserves used for smoothing the returns on current Islamic 
deposits/Sukuk may belong to the previous holders of Islamic deposits/Sukuk owners 
who, in most cases, are forced to sign agreements voiding their claim on these reserves 
(see IFSB GN-3, Section 2.3; Dubai International Financial Centre, 2009: 51-56). This 
practice of exploiting previous owners of Islamic assets is considered a major obstacle in 
maintaining the transparency of returns for Islamic assets (IFSB GN-3 Section 4.2). Thus 
our valuation formula offers an alternative that addresses the institutional and asset 
pricing criticisms of using mimicking Conventional rates of return. 
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III.3 Practical Relevance of the Asset Pricing Models on Segmented 
Markets: Statistical and Economic Significance 
We have shown that the theoretically correct valuation on segmented markets differs 
from valuation on unsegmented markets: A linear one market factor model does not hold 
any longer; instead, a linear two factor model must be applied for the valuation of 
common assets (Islamic financial assets and Islamic stocks) and a non-linear two factor 
model for the valuation of restricted assets (non-Islamic stocks). 
Nevertheless, the question arises whether these theoretical differences are of practical 
relevance as well. The question of practical relevance is answered in two steps: First, are 
the valuation differences between segmented and unsegmented market models 
statistically significant when applied to historical data? Second, if these differences are 
statistically significant, are they also of economic significance or just statistical artifacts? 
III.3.1 Design of the Analysis 
Before we can implement the empirical analysis, we must outline its framework, i.e., 
clarify, which valuation models are compared and how statistically and economically 
significant differences in valuation models are identified. 
It is important to highlight that our analysis is conducted using a time series for each 
country and not for a cross-section across countries for two reasons: First, we aim to test 
the presence of differences between valuation models and not to fit the empirical data as 
a validity test for the theoretically correct model. Second, cross country analysis would be 
highly biased and inaccurate given that AAOIFI publishing standards for Islamic bank 
financial statements are not yet implemented on a global scale (IRTI/GARP, 2016: xiv), 
thus each country has its own financial statement publishing standards for Islamic banks. 
Consequently, accounting standards are only assumed to be uniform and comparable 
within each country, but not across countries. 
III.3.1.1 Models for Valuation on Unsegmented Markets 
The candidates for comparison with our theoretically correct valuation formula are the 
valuation models for unsegmented markets, namely the naïve Islamic and the classical 
CAPM. 
The motivation behind comparing our valuation model to that of the naïve Islamic CAPM 
is that it is the model recommended for valuation in the Islamic finance literature and 
assumed to be used by Islamic investors in practice (see Selim, 2008; Smolo, 2009; ISRA, 
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2010: 46). Thus, it is important to test whether a practically relevant difference to our 
segmented market formula exists. The motivation behind comparing our valuation model 
to the classical CAPM is that the classical CAPM can be regarded as the standard valuation 
model of Conventional investors in practice. Table 24 gives on overview of the models 
whose required expected returns will be compared. 
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Type of Market Segmentation Theoretically Exact Model Naïve Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
Double Segmented  Riskless component and composition of the market portfolio 
 
Endogenous riskless rate and a market portfolio that consists of All-stocks, 
Islamic assets, current accounts, and the riskless asset. 
 
 Valuation formulas 
For common asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For restricted asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖 ∙ 𝛺𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
−1 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑡+1} 
where unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼  are computed as shown in Section III.2.2.2.4 
 Riskless 
component and 
composition of the 
market portfolio 
Riskless rate of zero 
and a market 
portfolio that consists 
only of Islamic stocks, 
Islamic assets, and 
current accounts. 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the 
market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 0 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 
 Riskless component 
and composition of 
the market portfolio 
 
Riskless rate of 𝑟, and a 
market portfolio that 
consists of All-stocks, 
Islamic assets, current 
accounts 11 , and the 
riskless asset. 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the 
market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 𝑟 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 
  
                                                          
11 Current accounts are included in the classical CAPM model in order to use an identical market portfolio to that used in the theoretically exact model. The reason for this is 
that we are not interested in whether the differences are caused by using a different market portfolio, but rather whether the valuation components themselves cause 
the differences, thus we hold the components of the market portfolio constant across both models where conventional investors exist. We cannot do this with the naïve 
Islamic CAPM since including non-Shariah-compliant components in the market portfolio would go against the principles of Islamic investors. 
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Type of Market 
Segmentation 
Theoretically Exact Model Naïve Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
Single Segmented with 
respect to the Riskless 
Asset 
 Riskless component and composition of the market portfolio 
 
 
Riskless rate of  𝑟, and a market portfolio that consists of All-stocks, 
Islamic assets, current accounts, and the riskless asset. 
 
 
 
 Valuation formulas 
For all assets on the market: 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼  are computed as shown in Section 
III.2.2.3.2. 
 Riskless component and 
composition of the market 
portfolio 
Riskless rate of zero, and a 
market portfolio that consists of 
All-stocks, Islamic assets, and 
current accounts. 
 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 0 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 
 Riskless component and 
composition of the market 
portfolio 
Riskless rate of 𝑟, and a market 
portfolio that consists of All-
stocks, Islamic assets, current 
accounts, and the riskless 
asset. 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 𝑟 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
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Type of Market 
Segmentation 
Theoretically Exact Model Naïve Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
Single Segmented with 
respect to Risky Assets 
 Riskless component and composition of the market portfolio 
 
 
 
Riskless rate of 𝑟, and a market portfolio that consists of All-stocks 
and the riskless asset. 
 
 Valuation formulas 
For common asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For restricted asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1}
= 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖
⋅ 𝛺𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼  are computed as shown in Section 
III.2.2.4.2. 
 Riskless component and 
composition of the market 
portfolio 
 
Riskless rate of 𝑟, and a market 
portfolio that consists of Islamic 
stocks and the riskless asset. 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 𝑟 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 
 Riskless component and 
composition of the market 
portfolio 
 
Riskless rate of 𝑟, and a market 
portfolio that consists of All-
stocks and the riskless asset. 
 Valuation formula 
For all assets on the market: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1)
= 𝑟 +
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 
Table 24: Comparison of valuation models across different levels of market segmentation used in the empirical analysis to determine statistical and economic significance.
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III.3.1.2 Statistically Significant Differences across Valuation Models 
In order to test whether the results of the different valuation models deliver different 
valuation results, it is best to compare their security market lines. Security market lines 
cover all risk levels, and therefore all possible assets, instead of picking specific risk levels 
as would be the case if specific assets were analyzed. 
Security market lines are characterized by an intercept term (riskless component) and a 
slope parameter (market price of risk). Different security market lines will hence result if 
the resulting values of the intercepts and/or slopes are different across valuation models. 
Only if both intercept and slope are identical will identical security market lines be 
obtained. Table 25 gives a summary of these relations. 
Combination 
Differences in 
Intercepts 
Differences in 
Slopes 
Resulting Security Market 
Lines (Identical or Different) 
1 No No Identical 
2 Yes No Different 
3 No Yes Different 
4 Yes Yes Different 
Table 25: Implications regarding the difference in valuation models based on differences in intercept and 
slope of security market lines. 
If the security market lines were different, they nevertheless might be close to one 
another and even intersect because of their different intercepts and slopes. We attempt 
to characterize these regions of similar valuation results and call them proximity regions. 
To identify differences in intercepts and slopes we take the values of the theoretically 
exact model as a benchmark and examine whether the values of either the naïve or the 
classical CAPM are different. 
III.3.1.2.1 Statistically Significant Differences in the Intercepts (Riskless Component) 
across Valuation Models 
Since the intercepts in both the naïve and the classical CAPM are directly observable on 
the market, they do not involve any statistical estimation. For this reason, a statement 
under certainty can be made by comparing the values for the riskless components across 
all valuation models as calculated in Table 26. 
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Type of 
Market 
Segmentation 
Intercept in Theoretically Exact Model 
Intercept in the 
Naïve Islamic 
CAPM 
Intercept in the 
Classical CAPM 
Double 
Segmented 
For common assets: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
For restricted assets: 
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
The intercept captures all terms that are not a function of the risk of the specific asset being valued with the 
market portfolio (covariance term 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)), and where 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is defined as shown in 
Section III.2.2.2.4. 
0 𝑟 
Single 
Segmented 
with respect 
to the 
Riskless Asset 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 0 𝑟 
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Single 
Segmented 
with respect 
to Risky Assets 
For common assets: 
𝑟 
For restricted assets: 
𝑟 −
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
The intercept captures all terms that are not a function of the risk of the specific asset being valued with the 
market portfolio (covariance term 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)), and where 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is defined as shown in 
Section III.2.2.4.2. 
𝑟 
In the absence of 
Islamic banks on this 
market 
segmentation, we 
assume that all 
investors will be 
forced to use 
interest-bearing 
riskless assets. This 
is then no longer a 
naïve Islamic CAPM, 
but rather simply a 
model for the 
valuation of 
common assets from 
the perspective of 
the restricted group. 
𝑟 
Table 26: Overview of intercepts (riskless components) across market segmentation levels and valuation models. 
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III.3.1.2.2 Statistically Significant Differences in the Slopes (Market Price of Risk) across 
Valuation Models 
The slopes in both the naïve and the classical CAPM contain the expected value 𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
and the variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) (see Table 27). Both values are not simply observable on 
the market, but must be statistically estimated before they can be compared with the 
benchmark slope of the theoretically exact model. From the empirical time series, 
however, only one value for the market price of risk can be obtained per model, which 
can only offer anecdotal evidence as to whether the slopes are different. In particular, 
neither statistical tests nor robustness checks can be employed to test the differences in 
slopes if only one value is available for each model. For this reason, we decide to generate 
a larger observation pool by using simulations. 
The simulations are conducted using the following steps: In a first step, we generate a 
sample of length 𝑥  of random returns for the market portfolio 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1  using a normal 
distribution with its parameters equal to the empirically determined expected values and 
standard deviations. The sample length 𝑥  equals the number of the empirical 
observations for the respective country. We keep the sample length equal to the 
empirically available size to maintain comparability with the theoretically exact model 
because its slope is based on an empirical sample length exactly equal to 𝑥  for each 
country. Our choice of a normal distribution stems from the fact that it is one of the 
simplest candidates for quarterly returns distribution. Even though the literature 
mentions that daily and weekly stock returns are not normally distributed (e.g., Fama, 
1965: 80 for an early reference), the assumption of normal distribution might work with 
quarterly returns since stock returns tend to become more normal as the holding period 
increases (Fan/Yao, 2015: 10). In a second step, we use these simulated market returns 
to compute the inputs necessary for determining the slopes of both the naïve and the 
classical CAPM (see Table 27). 
These two steps are then repeated for one million iterations. Consequently, one million 
different slopes (that can be used to compute one million different security market lines) 
are obtained and used to check for differences across models. 
When comparing one millions slopes to the slope of the theoretically exact model, it is 
quite likely that at least one slope will be found identical to the theoretically correct slope, 
i.e., a parallel security market line, however the remaining “one million minus one” slopes 
are not. We therefore use a one-sample t-test to analyze whether the mean of the one 
million simulated slopes is different from the slope of the theoretically exact model. We 
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are therefore not relying on one single slope being identical, but the mean of all simulated 
slopes. Given that we use one million observations for the t-test, using a significance level 
of 1% or 5% would allow the tested value to lie within the tail’s 10,000 or 50,000 
observations in order to reject the null-hypothesis. Thus, we modify our significance level 
accordingly to two-sided 0.000001% = 10−8 which implies that the tested value only 
has 0.01 observations at both tails to reject the null-hypothesis, i.e., rejection region and 
chance for type 1 error are smaller. We report statistically significant differences in mean 
if the p-value lies below this significance level. 
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Market 
Segmentation 
Slopes in Theoretically Exact Model 
Slope in the Naïve Islamic 
CAPM 
Slope in the Classical 
CAPM 
Double 
Segmented 
For common asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
For restricted asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑: 
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1})
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is defined as shown in Section III.2.2.2.4, and the market portfolio consists of All-
stocks, Islamic assets, current accounts, and the riskless asset. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market portfolio 
consists only of Islamic 
stocks, Islamic assets, and 
current accounts. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market 
portfolio consists of 
All-stocks, Islamic 
assets, current 
accounts, and the 
riskless asset. 
Single Segmented 
with respect to 
the Riskless Asset 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market portfolio consists of All-stocks, Islamic assets, current accounts, and the riskless 
asset. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market portfolio 
consists of All-stocks, Islamic 
assets, and current accounts. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market 
portfolio consists of 
All-stocks, Islamic 
assets, current 
accounts, and the 
riskless asset. 
Single Segmented 
with respect to 
Risky Assets 
For common asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛: 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
For restricted asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑: 
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is defined as shown in Section III.2.2.4.2, and the market portfolio consists of All-stocks and 
the riskless asset. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market portfolio 
consists of Islamic stocks and 
the riskless asset, based on 
the assumption of a valuation 
model for the restricted 
group (see Table 25). 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
where the market 
portfolio consists of 
All-stocks and the 
riskless asset. 
Table 27: Overview of slopes (market price of risk) across market segmentation levels and valuation models.  
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III.3.1.3 Economic Significance of the Differences across Valuation Models 
If statistically significant differences between segmented and unsegmented market 
models exist, it becomes important to analyze whether these differences across the 
models are “large enough” to induce economic consequences. Judging the economic 
significance of the riskless component is relatively straightforward since it is the return of 
a real-world product (expressed as percentage of invested capital). Yet, there is a problem 
with the slope of the security market line. The slope is not a real-world product, and, 
hence, its economic significance cannot be evaluated. In other words, we cannot assess 
the economic significance of security market lines; instead, real-world products must be 
considered. 
For this purpose, and as proxies for real-world products, we use the sub-market portfolios 
of each asset class available on the respective market for each country. Sub-market 
portfolios are ideal since they represent a whole asset class. Moreover, using portfolios is 
the standard approach methodology of papers in empirical asset pricing (e.g., the 
pioneering paper of Fama/MacBeth (1973)). Focusing on specific assets, however, comes 
at a cost: We automatically must accept a specific covariance/risk. In other words, 
economic significance cannot be evaluated for all risk levels—as would be the case if one 
could evaluate the economic significance of security market lines—but rather the analysis 
is reduced to evaluating only specific risk levels. Although using the sub-market portfolios 
for each asset class does not cover all risk levels, it does give us an idea where an index of 
the respective asset class will lie. Therefore, we are not simply selecting two or three 
random risk levels to check for economic significance, but actually testing the index of the 
asset classes available on the market. 
The analysis for economic significance is conducted in two steps: First, we define a test 
statistic, namely the absolute value of the differences between the required expected 
returns of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes obtained by the theoretically 
exact valuation formulas and those of the unsegmented markets’ CAPMs. We use 
absolute values since we are not interested in the direction of measurement error, i.e., 
not interested in finding out whether the wrong model leads to over- or undervaluation, 
but rather care about the (economic) size of the error. Second, we compare the test 
statistic to a country-specific benchmark in order to determine its economic significance. 
Since our test statistic is expressed in the form of a (percentage) return rather than an 
absolute value, the economic benchmarks must also be expressed as returns or growth 
rates in order to be comparable. 
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Our test criterion is expressed as a quotient of the country-specific economic benchmark 
as follows: 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛
=
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
(𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘
⁄
 
Whenever the test criterion exceeds one, we regard the absolute value of valuation 
differences as economically significant, i.e., difference in valuation is as large as what the 
country considers economically significant. 
We use a variety of country-specific economic benchmarks that span a range of indicators 
that are relevant to the financial markets. First, we compare the test statistic with the 
transaction costs for exchange-traded assets in each country. We believe that using 
trading-based benchmarks in the form of transactions costs is a good measure of 
economic significance. From the theory of portfolio selection with transaction costs (see, 
e.g., Dumas/Luciano, 1991) it is known that trading will only occur if stock price 
movements exceed a certain threshold. Transferring this idea to economic significance, 
we argue: Only if valuation difference between models are large enough to compensate 
for transaction costs, will trading be observed. We do however differentiate between 
transaction costs for trading of debt securities/T-bills and transaction costs for trading of 
equity/stocks whenever a stock exchange charges different rates. The reason for 
differentiating between the two is that the transaction costs for trading of debt securities 
are always lower than those for trading equity/stocks (see Appendix D.2). Therefore, the 
lower transaction costs for debt securities and T-Bills act as a “lenient” benchmark, while 
the transaction costs for equity/stocks acts as a “strict” benchmark. We refer to leniency 
in the sense that it is easier for our test criterion to exceed one when the respective 
benchmark is used. 
In addition to trading-based benchmarks, we also use benchmarks that represent returns 
on alternative investment opportunities. From that perspective, they are more suited to 
compare the returns on assets rather than differences in valuation models. Our 
motivation behind including returns on alternative investment opportunities is to be able 
to benchmark larger differences in valuation models. Returns on alternative investment 
opportunities include, on the one hand, the quarterly return on T-Bills since T-Bills are 
commonly considered “riskless” and easy-to-invest-in in terms of not needing 
sophisticated or time-consuming portfolio analysis. In a similar vein and as a robustness 
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check, the quarterly return on Conventional savings deposits can be taken. However, 
these two benchmarks are only of indirect relevance for Islamic investors since they are 
not allowed to invest in interest-bearing assets. For this reason, we also compare the 
differences to the inflation rate (measured as the growth rate of the consumer price 
index) in the respective country as this has been commonly referred to in the Islamic 
finance literature as a suitable benchmark for Islamic financial investment returns (see, 
e.g., Bacha, 2008; Hanif, 2010). The inflation rate is also relevant for Conventional 
investors since it reflects the devaluation of profits obtained from investments. It should 
be mentioned that the rates on T-Bills, Conventional saving deposits, and inflation are 
interrelated since T-Bills’ returns take inflation into consideration, while Conventional 
saving deposits are usually determined in relation to T-Bills’ returns. 
III.3.2 Data Set and Data Cleaning 
III.3.2.1 Countries Covered in the Analysis 
We conduct our empirical analysis on a comprehensive sample of markets where Islamic 
investors are active (a total sample of 27 countries) based on E&Y’s Islamic Banks Universe 
as well as additional countries found on the World Database for Islamic Banking and 
Finance (see Appendix D.1.1). Since we include all countries mentioned in these two 
sources, we consider our sample to be quite representative as it includes the entire 
population of countries with a significant number of Islamic and Conventional investors. 
Iran and Sudan were excluded for two reasons: First, they were found to be purely Islamic 
and, hence, unsegmented markets whose valuation is identical to the naïve adaptations 
of the CAPM as was shown in Section III.2.2.5. Thus, no differences in valuation can be 
analyzed. Second, Iranian banks do not publish their financial statements (online and in 
English) on a regular basis (see, e.g., Bank Melli Iran) and due to sanctions until 2016 were 
not audited by international firms (see Iranian news: Four Top Audit Firms Plan Tehran 
Offices). Sudan data was highly problematic; no (online) access existed to the Khartoum 
Stock Exchange nor to the Sudanese Central Bank, which are both main sources of our 
input data. Consequently, we decided against including them in our analysis. Yemen and 
Brunei were eliminated for not having a running stock exchange until the time of data 
collection, which implies inaccessibility for investors to a large portion of the financial 
market thus practically eliminating the asset class of stocks. Four more countries had to 
be removed due to problems with data collection: Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Nigeria, 
since their Islamic banks only publish annual rather than quarterly financial reports―if at 
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all―i.e., only very few observations on Islamic assets are available. Furthermore, Libya is 
eliminated since it cannot be considered as segmented since it has no Islamic banks nor 
does it publish an Islamic stock index. Additionally, Saudi Arabia had to be removed as it 
has a unique financial reporting problem, namely, that all banks in Saudi Arabia, whether 
Conventional or Islamic, are obliged to report "Special Commission Income" and "Special 
Commission Expense" instead of interest and non-interest income/expense or their 
Islamic alternatives. This makes it impossible to identify the type of bank (Islamic or 
Conventional) (Warde, 2000: 208). 
Thus, we end up with 17 countries that are included in our empirical analysis. A list of the 
countries and their segmentation level can be seen in Table 28. 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain Pakistan 
Bangladesh Qatar 
Indonesia Sri Lanka 
Kuwait Thailand 
Malaysia Turkey 
Oman UAE 
Single Segmented with Respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt Philippines 
Jordan Syria 
Single Segmented with Respect to Risky Assets 
India  
Table 28: Types of market segmentation for each country taken in the sample. 
III.3.2.2 Data Set 
In order to be able to compute the theoretically exact valuation models for different levels 
of market segmentation (see Table 24), we require empirical data for the inputs of these 
models including expected values, variances, and covariances. 
The required inputs include data on all asset classes present in each country including 
returns for single assets as well as returns and volumes of the sub-market portfolios of 
the asset classes that are required to compute the market portfolio. The need for volume 
data seems surprising at first sight, however is necessary because the market portfolio on 
segmented markets is no longer proportional to an All-stock index (the typical proxy for a 
market portfolio in the classical CAPM), but rather consists of several asset classes. 
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(13) 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
)
+𝑤𝑀,0,𝑡 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 0
=
𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇
1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)
+
𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑛𝑠,𝑡
𝑇
1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
⋅ (
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)
+
𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇
1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
)
+
𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡
𝑇
1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
∙ 𝑟
+
𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
𝑇
1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 1𝑇 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,0,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
∙ 0 
For this reason, it is also necessary to collect data on 𝑊𝑀,𝑗,𝑡, the wealth invested in each 
asset class "𝑗" to construct a weighted average index of the returns on market  portfolios 
and sub-market portfolios of the different asset classes. When determining weights, we 
use the wealth at a base quarter, namely 2016Q2. We do not use historical wealth levels 
invested at each quarter for weighting since these vary across time adding an additional 
variation to the resulting portfolio return other than the variation (we are interested in) 
from the returns of the components. The components of each market portfolio depending 
on the types of market segmentation can be found in Table 24. 
We use an investment horizon of one financial quarter since this is the shortest 
investment horizon we can observe for Islamic assets using banks’ quarterly financial 
statements. For that reason, all returns (including interest rates) are computed as discrete 
quarterly returns even though, e.g., stock returns are available on a daily basis. 
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The number of quarterly observations collected per country can be seen in Table 29. 
Detailed information about bank names and stock indices collected in each country can 
be found in Appendix D.1.2 and Appendix D.1.3. 
Country Number of Quarterly 
Observations 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 30 
Bangladesh 29 
Indonesia 29 
Kuwait 29 
Malaysia 33 
Oman 14 
Pakistan 29 
Qatar 29 
Sri Lanka 19 
Thailand 29 
Turkey 29 
UAE 29 
Single Segmented with Respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 26 
Jordan 29 
Philippines 14 
Syria 26 
Single Segmented with Respect to Risky Assets 
India 30 
Table 29: Number of quarterly observations for each country analyzed in the sample. 
III.3.2.2.1 Data on Islamic Assets  
III.3.2.2.1.1 Description of the Data 
Islamic assets include Islamic bank investment accounts and Sukuk. Collecting data on 
Sukuk was found to be highly problematic for our analysis since the volume of outstanding 
Sukuk is not published in a comprehensive manner, but rather only the issue size which 
does not reflect what has actually been sold on the market. Another problem of Sukuk is 
that they are traded internationally and thus cannot be attributed to a particular country 
or financial market in terms of segmentation. Thus, we do not include Sukuk in our 
analysis. Put differently, the asset class Islamic assets in our empirical analysis consists 
only of Islamic investment accounts. 
III.3.2.2.1.2 Volume of Islamic Investment Accounts (Single Assets) 
The market observable data on Islamic investment accounts was obtained directly from 
each individual bank’s published financial reports. Data was available for most banks from 
2008Q1 to 2016Q2. The quarterly volume of Islamic investment accounts of each bank is 
taken as the position “Volume of Investment Accounts” or its equivalent such as “Volume 
of Mudharabah (non-Mudharabah)-based deposits” of each bank offering Islamic 
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investment accounts in the respective country. 
III.3.2.2.1.3 Returns of Islamic Investment Accounts (Single Assets) 
Returns on Islamic investment accounts are calculated as revenue received at the end of 
the investment period divided by the funds invested. The quarterly return of one 
particular bank’s Islamic investment accounts can thus be computed as “Income 
attributable to Mudharabah (non-Mudharabah)-based deposits” divided by the “Volume 
of Mudharabah (non-Mudharabah)-based deposits” at the last day of each quarter. 
III.3.2.2.1.4 Volume of Islamic Investment Accounts (Asset Class Sub-Market Portfolio) 
In order to obtain the volume of Islamic investment accounts for the sub-market portfolio 
of Islamic investment accounts, the volume of each single Islamic investment account 
offered by each bank in the respective country is summed up across all banks within that 
country to generate the overall volume of Islamic investment accounts in the market. 
III.3.2.2.1.5 Returns of Islamic Investment Accounts (Asset Class Sub-Market Portfolio) 
Returns on the sub-market portfolio of the asset class Islamic investment accounts are 
calculated as the weighted average return on single Islamic investment accounts using the 
volume of each respective Islamic investment account at the base quarter 2016Q2 as 
weighting factor, i.e., 
(14) 
𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡 =∑𝑅𝑖,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙
𝑊𝑖,𝐼𝐴,2016𝑄2
∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝐼𝐴,2016𝑄2
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
 
III.3.2.2.2 Data on Stocks 
III.3.2.2.2.1 Description of the Data 
The data needed for stocks depends on the degree of market segmentation: 
On double segmented markets we collect data on indices of All-stocks and Islamic stocks 
and compute a non-Islamic stocks index as the difference between the two; given that, by 
definition, the All-stocks index is a weighted average of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. It 
is important to note that the composition of indices in general and Islamic indices in 
particular changes dramatically over time (see S&P Dow Jones, 2011: 5). Companies that 
do not comply with Shariah, by engaging in non-Shariah-compliant business activities or 
taking out non-Islamic loans, are periodically eliminated from the Islamic index (subject 
to periodic review by the index’s Shariah board). These changes in index constituents are 
compensated by the index provider by using a specific compensation factor when 
rebalancing (see S&P Dow Jones, 2011: 6). 
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On single segmented markets with respect to risky assets, we need to differentiate 
between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. Again, since no non-Islamic stock index is 
published, we collect data on indices of All-stocks and Islamic stocks and compute a non-
Islamic stocks index as the difference between the two. 
On single segmented markets with respect to the riskless assets, we collect data on All-
stocks with no distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
Finally, we were forced to take stock indices that were available for the entire analysis 
period from 2008Q1 to 2016Q2, even if they did not cover the entire stock market as we 
would have wished (see Appendix D.1.3 for more details). 
III.3.2.2.2.2 Volume of Stocks (Single Assets) 
Data on the volume of stocks as single assets is not required for our calculations since the 
volume of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes of stocks can be captured by the 
market capitalization of the published indices. 
III.3.2.2.2.3 Returns of Stocks (Single Assets) 
Returns of single stocks is required within the valuation formula of non-Islamic stocks (7c) 
in the constant term, where returns of single stocks and single Islamic assets are required 
as data inputs. To obtain values for the returns of stocks, we compute discrete quarterly 
returns as the difference between the closing prices on the last days of consecutive 
quarters between 2008Q1 and 2016Q2. We differentiate between Islamic and other 
stocks based on the published lists available from each stock market regarding which 
stocks meet Shariah-compliance requirements. However, since these may change over 
time (see S&P Dow Jones, 2011: 5) we only consider as Islamic, the stocks included in the 
Shariah-compliant lists as available at the base quarter 2016Q2 to avoid inconsistencies 
in returns due to constituents’ revision over time. Returns of stocks were obtained from 
Reuters-DataStream. 
III.3.2.2.2.4 Volume of Islamic Stocks and All-Stocks (Asset Classes Sub-Market 
Portfolios) 
The total volume of Islamic stocks and All-stocks is taken as the market capitalization of 
their respective indices. However, two figures for market capitalization are available: Net 
market capitalization and full market capitalization (where net market capitalization 
equals full market capitalization adjusted for free float (see S&P Dow Jones, 2015: 2-4)). 
Most stock exchanges publish net market capitalization while information on full market 
capitalization was rarely available. Hence, we use net market capitalization at the base 
quarter 2016Q2 for all available stocks on the market in the sample countries. 
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III.3.2.2.2.5 Volume of non-Islamic Stocks (Asset Class Sub-Market Portfolio) 
The volume of the non-Islamic stocks index is taken as the difference in market 
capitalization between that of the All-stocks index’s net market capitalization and the 
Islamic stocks index’s net market capitalization at the base quarter 2016Q2. 
III.3.2.2.2.6 Returns of Islamic Stocks and All-Stocks (Asset Classes Sub-Market 
Portfolios) 
To obtain returns of All-stocks and Islamic stocks indices, we compute discrete quarterly 
returns as the difference between the index values on the last days of consecutive 
quarters between 2008Q1 and 2016Q2. The returns for Islamic stock indices were 
obtained from their publisher (usually S&P Dow Jones Indices) directly. 
III.3.2.2.2.7 Returns of non-Islamic Stocks (Asset Class Sub-Market Portfolio) 
Returns on the sub-market portfolio of the asset class non-Islamic stocks are calculated 
as the difference between the return on the All-stocks index and the Islamic stocks index 
weighted by their respective market capitalizations at the base quarter 2016Q2 in order 
to avoid double-variation bias, i.e., compute 
(15) 
𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑆,2016𝑄2 − 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑠,2016𝑄2
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑆,2016𝑄2 −𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑠,2016𝑄2
 
III.3.2.2.3 Data on Riskless Assets 
III.3.2.2.3.1 Description of the Data 
Conventional investors have the choice between a number of riskless assets such as T-
Bills or a more accessible Conventional saving deposit as their interest-bearing riskless 
asset (or a mixture of both). The data for volume and returns of all riskless assets was 
collected from the periodic reports of the respective central banks or reports of finance 
ministries of each country. We decide to include both riskless assets in our analysis for the 
following economic reasoning: Many of the countries in our sample tend to have relatively 
weak credit ratings implying that their T-Bills are not entirely riskless (see Table 30) and 
therefore investors may be indifferent―with regards to risk―between T-Bills and 
Conventional saving deposits. 
  
CHAPTER III ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS 
101 
Country 
Government Credit Rating (S&P) as at 
2016Q2 
Bahrain BBB- 
Bangladesh BB- 
Egypt B- 
India BBB- 
Indonesia BB+ 
Jordan BB- 
Kuwait AA 
Malaysia A- 
Oman A- 
Pakistan B- 
Philippines BBB 
Qatar AA 
Sri Lanka B+ 
Syria N/A 
Thailand BBB+ 
Turkey BB+ 
UAE AA 
Table 30: Country ratings obtained from http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/rating 
III.3.2.2.3.2 Volume of Riskless Assets 
We take the volume of T-Bills and of Conventional saving deposits as a proxy for the 
volume of the riskless asset. The sum of both volumes constitutes the volume of our mixed 
riskless asset. As a robustness check we also calculate a variation of the market portfolio 
only with the volume of T-Bills. 
III.3.2.2.3.3 Returns of Riskless Assets 
The return on the riskless asset was calculated as a weighted average of the returns on 
90-day T-Bills and the average interest rate on 3-month Conventional savings deposits. 
Returns on the riskless asset are collected as per annum returns and then transformed 
into quarterly returns. Weighting is done by the volume of each riskless asset at the base 
quarter 2016Q2 to avoid biasing the returns due to fluctuations in volumes. 
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III.3.2.2.4 Data on Current Accounts 
III.3.2.2.4.1 Description of the Data 
We assume that the only current accounts relevant for our market are those offered by 
Islamic banks since they are not demanded by Conventional investors (see Section 
III.2.1.1.1). Furthermore, it is unlikely Islamic investors who have the possibility to deposit 
in current accounts of Islamic banks would do so in Conventional banks. 
III.3.2.2.4.2 Volume of Current Accounts 
The overall volume of Islamic current accounts was taken as the position “volume of 
demand deposits” from the quarterly financial statements of each bank offering Islamic 
current accounts in the respective country and was summed up across all banks within 
that country to generate the overall volume of Islamic current accounts for each quarter. 
III.3.2.2.4.3 Returns on Current Accounts 
Current accounts do not generate returns, i.e., have returns of zero. 
III.3.2.2.5 Computation of the Market Portfolio 
III.3.2.2.5.1 Description of the Data 
Since the market portfolio on segmented markets consists of several asset classes, it must 
be computed by hand to include all asset classes available on the market. Having collected 
data on the volumes of each asset class’s sub-market portfolio, we can compute the 
market portfolio as the weighted average index of the returns on each asset class’s sub-
market portfolios at the base quarter 2016Q2. 
III.3.2.2.5.2 Volume of the Market Portfolio 
Volume of the market portfolio is the sum over all asset class sub-market portfolio 
volumes at the base quarter 2016Q2 including the volume of the riskless asset and of 
current accounts. 
III.3.2.2.5.3 Returns of the Market Portfolio 
The return on the market portfolio was calculated as a weighted average of returns on 
the components of the market portfolio using 2016Q2 as the base quarter for the 
weighting, i.e. 
(16) 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑆,2016𝑄2 + 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀𝐼𝐴,2016𝑄2 + 𝑅𝑀0,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀0,2016𝑄2
𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑆,2016𝑄2 +𝑊𝑀𝐼𝐴,2016𝑄2 +𝑊𝑀0,2016𝑄2 +𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐴,2016𝑄2
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III.3.2.2.6 Data for the Country-Specific Economic Benchmarks 
For our country-specific economic benchmarks used in the economic significance analysis, 
we collect transaction costs from the website of each country’s largest stock exchange. In 
most cases, these are the transaction costs levied on the purchase and sale of debt 
securities (T-Bills and corporate bonds). In the three cases Kuwait, Malaysia and Qatar, 
we could not be certain whether the published transaction fees were specifically for debt 
instruments or apply to all transactions undertaken, including debt instruments. The 
returns for T-Bills were collected as described in Section III.3.2.2.3.3. The annual inflation 
rates for each country defined as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were collected from the 
website http://tradingeconomics.com and were then transformed into quarterly rates. 
Details on the quarterly returns/growth rates for the respective country-specific 
economic benchmarks can be found in Appendix D.2. 
III.3.2.3 Data Cleaning 
Within the data set for Islamic investment accounts, missing values existed for some 
banks in some countries as can be seen in detail in Appendix D.1.2.—Missing values of 
one quarter were linearly interpolated as the average of the quarter before and the 
quarter after. This was done for a total of 50 observations across different banks. This was 
necessary since eliminating banks with missing values would shorten the time series even 
further. For longer spells of missing values (more than four quarters), the stock or bank 
would be dropped from the sample. This brought down the total number of banks from 
120 to 81. 
In the case of stock data, no returns were interpolated; instead, missing values or returns 
of 0% usually indicated that the stock was not frequently traded. Frequently traded 
Islamic stocks usually covered the larger part of the market capitalization of the Islamic 
index of each country. For stock indices, only indices that were complete with no missing 
data were included in the sample. Details of which stock indices were taken can be found 
in Appendix D.1.3. 
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After data cleaning, the number of stocks and investment accounts included in the sample 
can be seen in Table 31. 
Country Number of Islamic Stocks Number of Islamic Investment 
Accounts 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 6 6 
Bangladesh 5 7 
Indonesia 21 6 
Kuwait 15 5 
Malaysia 6 16 
Oman 6 7 
Pakistan 22 5 
Qatar 12 4 
Sri Lanka 13 1 
Thailand 8 1 
Turkey 18 4 
UAE 13 11 
Single Segmented Markets with Respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 0 3 
Jordan 0 2 
Philippines 0 1 
Syria 0 2 
Single Segmented Markets with Respect to Risky Assets 
India 11 0 
Table 31: Number of Islamic banks and Islamic stocks included in the sample for each country. 
III.3.2.4 Computing Expected Values, Variances, and Covariances of the Time 
Series 
The necessary input estimators for the expected values, variances, and covariances are 
computed from the empirically available time series. These can be calculated with 
classical time series estimators if the time series is stationary. However, if the time series 
is not stationary due to the presence of deterministic and/or stochastic trends, the 
computation must be altered to ensure unbiased estimation.  
In principle, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)-test would be best suited to 
test for stationarity because it tests the null hypothesis that a time series is stationary. 
However, the KPSS suffers from a significant size distortion especially for “quarterly data 
based on small samples” (Caner/Kilian, 2001: 655) which may result in rejecting 
stationarity more often. For the purposes of testing for stationarity, our time-series of 
quarterly returns of the asset class sub-market portfolios consists of a maximum number 
of 29 observations: 33 observations minus four lags (Four lags is the recommendation for 
testing of stationarity in quarterly data (Mahadeva/Robinson, 2004: 22)). For this reason, 
it is not recommended to apply the KPSS-test. Alternatively, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF)-test could be tried since it does not suffer from size distortion. Yet its drawbacks 
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are obvious: First, it tests the presence of unit root as the null hypothesis and, hence, for 
non-stationarity. Second, given this small sample size, it will have problems distinguishing 
between deterministic and stochastic trends in time series. Nevertheless, we present the 
results of testing for stationarity with a linear deterministic trend and four lags in 
Appendix D.3. 
Given the problems with statistical tests for stationarity, we conduct a kind of rule of 
thumb graphical analysis instead by running a trend line through our time series. We find 
that, graphically, all our time series suffer from the presence of a trend (for the example 
of the returns on Islamic assets in Malaysia, see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Returns on the asset class Islamic assets (sub-market portfolio) for Malaysia showing an upward 
running trend line. 
  
y = 5E-05x + 0.0051
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Malaysia - Returns on Islamic Assets
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However, after cleaning out the trend by moving from 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  to 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖,0 − 𝛽𝑖,1 ∙ 𝑡, the 
time series graph indicate stationarity (at least in mean) (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Returns on the asset class Islamic assets (sub-market portfolio) for Malaysia after cleaning upward 
trend. 
For that reason, we assume the following return generating model to hold 
(17) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1 ∙ (𝑡 + 1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
Based on this return generating model we obtain expected values, variances, and 
covariances using this deterministic trend model 
(18) 
𝐸𝑡{𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 ∙ (𝑡 + 1) 
where subscript 𝑡  indicates that expected values are computed conditional on 
information available up to time 𝑡. 
(19) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1 ∙ (𝑡 + 1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1) 
The variance of the residuals is estimated using the usual time series estimator 
(20) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1) =
1
𝑛 − 1
∙∑[𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖,0 − 𝛽𝑖,1 ∙ 𝑡]
2
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
since residuals are assumed to be (weakly) stationary (see Figure 7).  
y = -1E-20x - 5E-19
-0.15%
-0.10%
-0.05%
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
Malaysia - Excess Returns on Islamic Assets
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In a similar vein, 
(21) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑗,𝑡+1) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝜀𝑗,𝑡+1) 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝜀𝑗,𝑡+1) can be estimated as 
(22) 
1
𝑛 − 1
∙∑[𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖,0 − 𝛽𝑖,1 ∙ 𝑡] ∙ [𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑗,0 − 𝛽𝑗,1 ∙ 𝑡]
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
Technically speaking, these estimators are conditional one-period estimators, i.e., given 
the information available at time 𝑡  (conditional) a forecast for the next period (one-
period) is undertaken. 
III.3.3 Empirical Results 
III.3.3.1 Statistical Significance of the Differences across Valuation Models 
III.3.3.1.1 Testing Security Market Lines 
Applying the statistical test procedure outlined in Section III.3.1.2.1 to the intercepts 
yields Table 32. 
Country 
Theoretically Exact 
Model 
(Common Assets) 
Theoretically Exact 
Model 
(Restricted Assets) 
Naïve 
Islamic 
CAPM 
Classical 
CAPM 
Double Segmented 
Bahrain 0.6545% 0.8782% 0 0.3777% 
Bangladesh 2.1691% -0.6525% 0 1.2413% 
Indonesia 1.4620% 0.2342% 0 0.7652% 
Kuwait 0.4840% 19.0250% 0 0.2658% 
Malaysia 0.6913% -0.8607% 0 0.7946% 
Oman 0.4933% -0.1265% 0 0.6347% 
Pakistan 1.2901% 1.8681% 0 1.3472% 
Qatar 0.2298% -2.0438% 0 0.6413% 
Sri Lanka 1.4223% -1.7976% 0 1.8692% 
Thailand 0.8234% 0.8895% 0 0.2954% 
Turkey 1.5829% 1.7941% 0 2.6282% 
UAE 0.1496% -7.8809% 0 0.1248% 
Single Segmented with respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 1.9559% - 0 2.0472% 
Jordan 0.6654% - 0 1.8019% 
Philippines 2.2450% - 0 0.4207% 
Syria 0.5057% - 0 1.5200% 
Single Segmented with respect to Risky Assets 
India 1.0111% -6.4374% 1.0111% 1.0111% 
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Table 32: Comparison of the intercept values across valuation models. 
The intercepts of the theoretically correct model are different compared to the naïve 
Islamic and the classical CAPM across all countries with double segmented and single 
segmented markets with respect to the riskless asset. On single segmented markets with 
respect to risky assets, there are differences for restricted assets, but none for common 
assets.—The demand-effect term is responsible for this deviation. 
Beyond the mere elaboration of significantly different intercepts, additional aspects in 
Table 32 deserve attention. First, we know from the valuation formulas on double 
segmented markets  that the intercept for common assets is the average of the riskless 
rates weighted by the risk preference parameters of the investor groups (see Equation 
(5)) and should therefore lie between the two extremes of the riskless rates of the naïve 
Islamic CAPM (a riskless rate of zero) and the classical CAPM (a riskless rate of 𝑟). In the 
double segmented countries Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kuwait, Thailand and UAE, 
the riskless component for common assets is found to be higher than that of the classical 
CAPM. The reason for this surprising result for these countries is that one investor group 
appears to be risk-seeking in the considered time period 2008Q1 to 2016Q2. A risk seeking 
behavior results in negative values for the risk preference parameters of this investor 
group and an intercept value that does not lie between zero and 𝑟 . This risk-seeking 
behavior might be attributed to the rather short time period covered and may simply not 
capture the fact that investors may be long-term oriented and do not adapt their portfolio 
weights in the short term. An indication of this explanation is the negative market price 
of risk in some of these countries; see the security market line figures in Section III.3.3.1.2. 
The same is witnessed in the single segmented market with respect to the riskless asset 
in the case of Philippines. The odd position of the riskless component could be traced back 
to an outlier in the returns on Islamic investment accounts of the only Islamic bank in the 
country, which was 40 times greater than the average returns on Islamic investment 
accounts at that bank. However, this was not found to be a data collection mistake and 
therefore the return was not removed from the sample (also because the country already 
suffers from a low number of observations). It is worth noting that without the outlier, 
the riskless rate would have had a value of 0.035%, thus lies, as would be expected, 
between the two extreme riskless rates of the alternative models. 
Second, the intercept for restricted assets does not follow a specific trend regarding its 
position between the riskless rates of the unsegmented market models. This comes as no 
surprise given that the intercept for restricted assets does not only consist of the riskless 
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rate but in addition a demand-effect term, which heavily depends on the degree of 
substitution (reflected by the covariances) between restricted and common assets. This 
demand-effect term is also responsible for the fact that in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Oman, 
Qatar, Sri Lanka, UAE, and India a negative riskless component (not riskless rate!) can be 
observed. 
Applying the statistical test procedure for the slopes, outlined in Section III.3.1.2.2, yields 
Table 33 to Table 35. The differences in slope parameters were found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.000001% = 10−8 significance level across all market prices of risk for 
all countries and across models with no exceptions: 
Double Segmented Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
Test Values 
Common 
Assets 
Restricted 
Assets 
Common 
Assets 
Restricted 
Assets 
Bahrain 
Mean Market Price of Risk 55.8119 25.1400 
t-stat 1811.86 1817.06 644.00 650.47 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Bangladesh 
Mean Market Price of Risk 0.1946 -21.0021 
t-stat 6749.43 6700.79 -186.39 -200.80 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Indonesia 
Mean Market Price of Risk -3.7588 -9.1865 
t-stat 1797.92 1831.51 -171.87 -152.37 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Kuwait 
Mean Market Price of Risk -15.1344 -13.5883 
t-stat 5818.01 9566.48 3944.22 6392.56 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Malaysia 
Mean Market Price of Risk 6.0308 -3.0909 
t-stat 959.82 980.89 -606.05 -586.36 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Oman 
Mean Market Price of Risk -14.0303 -34.3673 
t-stat 1029.35 1061.03 -431.66 -415.45 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Pakistan 
Mean Market Price of Risk 21.1156 13.9498 
t-stat -275.34 -45943.68 -898.13 -36748.21 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
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Qatar 
Mean Market Price of Risk 2.0516 -5.9656 
t-stat 113.25 465.31 -1315.30 -1063.50 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Sri Lanka 
Mean Market Price of Risk 2.6880 -5.3497 
t-stat -2090.49 -6075.48 -800.82 -1437.40 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Thailand 
Mean Market Price of Risk -4.2518 -12.3194 
t-stat 3347.96 3452.80 136.91 179.79 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Turkey 
Mean Market Price of Risk -3.2887 -28.2476 
t-stat 3151.87 3138.79 -556.53 -563.03 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
UAE 
Mean Market Price of Risk 7.9123 0.7668 
t-stat 457.50 332.47 -1427.36 -1608.63 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 33: t-test results for the slopes (market price of risk) for double segmented markets. 
Single Segmented with respect to the Riskless 
Asset 
Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
Test Values All Assets All Assets 
Egypt 
Mean Market Price of Risk -0.6411 -13.5991 
t-stat 6691.53 -125.05 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 
Jordan 
Mean Market Price of Risk 3.8740 -0.5806 
t-stat -189.23 -837.83 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 
Philippines 
Mean Market Price of Risk 2.7960 -22.9773 
t-stat -1161.47 -2440.74 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 
Syria 
Mean Market Price of Risk 3.4205 -0.0439 
t-stat 303.24 -752.35 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 34: t-test results for the slopes (market price of risk) for single segmented markets with respect to the 
riskless asset. 
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Single Segmented with 
respect to Risky Assets 
CAPM for Restricted Group Classical CAPM 
Test Values 
Common 
 Assets 
Restricted 
 Assets 
Common 
Assets 
Restricted 
Assets 
India 
Mean Market Price of Risk 0.2097 -0.6234 
t-stat -29.35 -2738.61 -326.67 -2393.28 
p-value <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 35: t-test results for the slopes (market price of risk) for single segmented markets with respect to risky 
assets. 
Having derived statements on both intercept and slope of the security market line, we 
can now apply the test criterion developed in Table 25 regarding the combined effect of 
both components on the differences in security market lines: Since both intercepts and 
the mean of slopes are different across segmented and unsegmented markets, the 
security market lines will be different as well. To be more precise, on double segmented 
markets, single segmented markets with respect to the riskless asset, and restricted assets 
on single segmented markets with respect to risky assets the causes of the differences 
follow “Combination 4” of Table 25, while common assets on single segmented markets 
with respect to risky assets were found to be different through “Combination 3” of Table 
25. 
From that perspective, our findings for common assets on single segmented markets with 
respect to risky assets seem to deviate from Errunza/Losq (1985) who find that valuation 
results for common assets to be identical to results obtained using the classical CAPM. 
However, only if a specific model of asset returns is used, namely asset returns that are a 
linear function of the return of the market portfolio and another factor that is 
uncorrelated with the market portfolio’s return, will regression coefficients and, hence, 
the classical CAPM result. For general return models, we have 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}−𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1;𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 as 
opposed to 
𝐸(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)−𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 of the classical CAPM (see Table 27). Our empirical results indicate 
that using Errunza/Losq’s (1985, 111-113) specific return model leads to statistically 
significant deviations from a general return model. 
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III.3.3.1.2 Testing Specific Asset Classes: Double-Error Compensation Effect and 
Proximity Regions  
III.3.3.1.2.1 Double-Error Compensation Effect 
We do note that we cannot guarantee from the fact that the security market lines are 
different, whether valuation for specific assets will also result in different valuation. Given 
that security market lines have different intercepts and slopes, it is logical to conclude 
that security market lines will intersect at specific covariances. This implies that at these 
intersection points an identical valuation will be obtained regardless which valuation 
formula is used. In other words, “Combination 4” of Table 25 must now be split into two 
cases meaning that we have to adapt Table 25 to Table 36 when making statements for 
the valuation of specific assets: 
Combination 
Differences in 
Intercepts 
Differences in Slopes 
Implication for Valuation of a 
specific asset 
1 No No Identical 
2 Yes No Different 
3 No Yes Different 
4 Yes Yes Different 
5 Yes Yes Identical 
“Double-error compensation 
effect” 
because differences in 
intercept and slope exactly 
offset one another for a 
specific asset covariance 
Table 36: Implications regarding the difference in the valuation of specific assets based on the differences in 
intercepts and slope parameters of the security market lines. 
This 5th combination, which we conveniently call the “double-error compensation effect”, 
implies that in some cases identical valuation for single assets may appear coincidently 
when two simultaneous errors compensate one another leading to an identical valuation 
in the end. Naïvely interpreting the cases of the double-error compensation effect for 
specific assets as “resulting from identical valuation models/security market lines” is 
therefore a critical error from an economic perspective. The correct interpretation is that 
the alternative valuation models are doubly incorrect, i.e., incorrect in quantifying both 
riskless component and market price of risk, and that by pure coincidence the asset’s 
covariance was able to capture the double-error compensation. 
To illustrate the “double-error compensation effect”, we consider specific assets in all 
countries—remember, we need specific asset covariances. As assets we use asset class 
sub-market portfolios and calculate the required expected returns using the segmented 
markets valuation model and plot these along the theoretically correct security market 
line. We also plot the security market lines of the simulated unsegmented models. For 
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illustration purposes we do not plot all one million simulated security markets lines, but 
rather only the maximum and minimum, between which all other lines are located, while 
highlighting the three quartiles between them in the following figures (Note, the 
comparison across figures of a single country is conducted vertically). 
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Figure 8a: Bahrain Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 9a: Bangladesh Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 10a: Indonesia Naïve Islamic CAPM 
   
 
Figure 8b: Bahrain Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 9b: Bangladesh Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 10b: Indonesia Classical CAPM 
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Figure 11a: Kuwait Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 12a: Malaysia Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 13a: Oman Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 11b: Kuwait Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 12b: Malaysia Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 13b: Oman Classical CAPM 
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Figure 14a: Pakistan Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 15a: Qatar Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 16a: Sri Lanka Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 14b: Pakistan Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 15b: Qatar Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 16b: Sri Lanka Classical CAPM 
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Figure 17a: Thailand Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 18a: Turkey Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 19a: UAE Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 17b: Thailand Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 18b: Turkey Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 19b: UAE Classical CAPM 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III. ASSET PRICING ON SEGMENTED MARKETS 
118 
 
Figure 20a: Egypt Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 21a: Jordan Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 22a: Philippines Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 20b: Egypt Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 21b: Jordan Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 22b: Philippines Classical CAPM 
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Figure 23a: Syria Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
Figure 24a: India Naïve Islamic CAPM 
 
 
Figure 23b: Syria Classical CAPM 
 
Figure 24b: India Classical CAPM 
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III.3.3.1.2.2 Proximity Regions 
We define proximity regions as the covariance ranges where a double-error 
compensation effect may occur, i.e., the regions where the theoretically exact security 
market line intersects the region between the maximum and the minimum of the 
unsegmented market security market lines. Specific products lying outside the proximity 
region cannot be identically valued through the double-error compensation effect since 
no security market line of the unsegmented markets CAPM can rotate beyond the 
maximum or minimum bounds. Specific assets falling outside of the proximity region are 
definitely falling under Combination 4 of Table 36. 
Looking at the positions of the asset class sub-market portfolios in Figure 8a to Figure 24b, 
we can gain a number of valuable insights: First, all sub-market portfolios of stock asset 
classes (Islamic Stocks, non-Islamic Stocks, and All-Stocks) were found to always fall within 
the proximity region. This might provide hope for the green investment literature, e.g., 
Hong/Kacperczyk (2009), where market segmentation is clearly present, yet no second 
market factor is used. Their findings that green investments do not seem to suffer from a 
performance disadvantage compared to Conventional investments can be explained, not 
only by the use of a wrong model, but also because the covariances may be located in the 
proximity region thereby resulting in identical valuation. 
Second, sub-market portfolios of the asset class Islamic investment accounts are never 
located within the proximity region. The low covariances of Islamic investment accounts 
with the market portfolio lead to a situation where the differences in the market price of 
risk are never large enough to adequately compensate the differences in the intercept. 
The low covariance may be attributed to the practices of return smoothing conducted by 
Islamic banks that reduce return fluctuations (see Section II.3.3.2: Smoothing; IFSB GN-3, 
Articles 9, 10, and 11; Dubai International Financial Centre, 2009: 51-56). Yet in the case 
of the Philippines when valuation was conducted using the naïve Islamic CAPM Islamic 
investment accounts fell into the proximity region.—Remember, Philippines was the 
country where a return outlier in Islamic investment accounts existed, which may have 
resulted in a larger than “usual” covariance value (see Section III.3.3.1.1). If we eliminate 
the outlier (resulting in only 13 observations) and conduct our analysis once more, Figure 
25 shows the security market line diagram with the “corrected” sub-market portfolios of 
the asset classes plotted. One can immediately see how the sub-market portfolio of the 
asset class Islamic investment accounts no longer falls in the proximity region, which is 
not surprising considering its much lower covariance now that the outlier return has been 
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eliminated. 
 
Figure 25: Common assets security market line with asset class sub-market portfolios for Philippines with 13 
Observations (outlier removed) compared to the Islamic CAPM simulated valuation model. 
III.3.3.1.2.3 Statistical Significance of Valuation Differences for Specific Asset Classes 
For specific asset classes, we determined statistical significance by checking, with the help 
of a t-test, whether the mean of the one million simulated required expected returns of 
the unsegmented market model is different from the required expected return computed 
using the theoretically exact model. To be more precise, we take the one million 
simulations of the slope that were generated using the cleaned data set, and multiply 
them by the empirical value of the covariance (one value), then add the intercept (one 
value) to obtain one million different required expected returns for the unsegmented 
market models. The results of the statistical significance tests can be found in the ensuing 
tables. 
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Double Segmented Markets Classical CAPM 
Test Values Islamic Stocks non-Islamic Stocks 
Islamic Investment 
Accounts 
Bahrain 
Mean Required Return 0.0222 0.0164 0.0039 
t-stat 445.80 125.03 -22884.66 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Bangladesh 
Mean Required Return -0.0446 -0.0716 0.0132 
t-stat -539.41 284.83 -24820.31 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Indonesia 
Mean Required Return -0.0410 -0.0456 0.0073 
t-stat -465.63 52.66 -38639.98 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Kuwait 
Mean Required Return -0.0155 -0.0223 0.0027 
t-stat 3787.35 -3115.12 -68537.60 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Malaysia 
Mean Required Return 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0079 
t-stat -540.33 445.00 128980.26 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Oman 
Mean Required Return -0.0366 -0.0515 0.0062 
t-stat -379.06 -203.78 22292.63 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Pakistan 
Mean Required Return 0.0361 0.0407 0.0134 
t-stat -869.79 9.47 11396.24 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Qatar 
Mean Required Return -0.0141 -0.0117 0.0064 
t-stat -1109.23 479.03 253025.12 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Sri Lanka 
Mean Required Return 0.0093 0.0122 0.0186 
t-stat -655.00 317.31 9752.73 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Thailand 
Mean Required Return -0.0344 -0.0568 0.0030 
t-stat -129.37 -7.67 -107105.33 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
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Turkey 
Mean Required Return -0.0261 -0.0646 0.0256 
t-stat -77.35 -342.80 38357.20 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
UAE 
Mean Required Return 0.0063 0.0092 0.0012 
t-stat -1438.46 666.60 -20848.47 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 37: t-test results for the required returns for double segmented markets compared to the classical 
CAPM. 
Double Segmented Markets Islamic CAPM 
Test Values Islamic Stocks non-Islamic Stocks 
Islamic Investment 
Accounts 
Bahrain 
Mean Required Return 0.0521 -0.0046 -0.00004 
t-stat 1170.17 -7244.08 -317516.36 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Bangladesh 
Mean Required Return 0.0027 -0.0001 -0.00003 
t-stat 819.06 100865.34 -47725.02 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Indonesia 
Mean Required Return -0.0313 -0.0311 -0.0002 
t-stat -62.07 738.71 -110705.89 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Kuwait 
Mean Required Return -0.0645 0.0268 -0.0001 
t-stat 182.99 -997.65 -76194.86 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Malaysia 
Mean Required Return 0.0171 0.0159 -0.00001 
t-stat 542.40 1560.22 -1045089.88 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Oman 
Mean Required Return -0.0299 -0.0330 -0.0001 
t-stat -147.20 439.14 -107558.32 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Pakistan 
Mean Required Return 0.0664 0.0647 -0.0001 
t-stat 595.69 958.53 -237437.15 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Qatar 
Mean Required Return 0.0103 0.0068 -0.00001 
t-stat 123.87 1974.48 -128855.14 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
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Sri Lanka 
Mean Required Return 0.0337 0.0189 0.0006 
t-stat 136.29 690.23 -23926.38 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Thailand 
Mean Required Return -0.0339 -0.0360 0.0001 
t-stat -97.59 906.31 -172028.75 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Turkey 
Mean Required Return -0.0099 -0.0136 -0.0001 
t-stat 820.29 1576.27 -88237.84 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
UAE 
Mean Required Return 0.0440 0.0531 -0.00002 
t-stat 193.91 2027.89 -116965.32 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 38: t-test results for the required returns for double segmented markets compared to the Islamic CAPM. 
Single Segmented Market 
with respect to the 
Riskless Asset 
Classical CAPM Islamic CAPM 
Test Values All Stocks 
Islamic 
Investment 
Accounts 
All Stocks 
Islamic 
Investment 
Accounts 
Egypt 
Mean Required Return -0.0171 0.0201 -0.0127 -0.0001 
t-stat -99.12 2345.41 29.29 -55146.30 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Jordan 
Mean Required Return 0.0163 0.0180 0.0227 -0.0001 
t-stat -197.46 160011.79 148.38 -88064.77 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Philippines 
Mean Required Return -0.0857 0.0391 0.0165 -0.0064 
t-stat -1990.03 3612.55 90.60 2270.61 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Syria 
Mean Required Return 0.0148 0.0152 0.0322 -0.0001 
t-stat -421.33 169007.35 143.08 -80058.21 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 <<10-8 
Table 39: t-test results for the required returns for single segmented markets with respect to the riskless asset 
compared to Islamic and classical CAPM. 
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Single Segmented 
Market with respect to 
Risky Assets 
India 
Test Values Islamic Stocks 
non-Islamic 
Stocks 
Classical CAPM 
Mean Required Return -0.0043 -0.0070 
t-stat -330.32 -2400.99 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 
Restricted Group CAPM 
Mean Required Return 0.0121 0.0127 
t-stat 6.37 428.42 
p-value <<10
-8 <<10-8 
Table 40: t-test results for the required returns for single segmented markets with respect to risky assets 
compared to the restricted group and classical CAPM. 
We find that all valuation differences are statistically significant at the 10−8 level. The 
statistical significance implies that the double-error compensation effect is not 
intentional, but rather a matter of coincidence relying on the covariances of the specific 
assets being valued. 
III.3.3.2 Economic Significance of the Differences across Valuation Models 
Applying our test criterion for economic significance (see Section III.3.1.3) to the 
statistically significant valuation differences for asset class sub-market portfolios (see 
Section III.3.3.1.2.3), we obtain the results in Table 41 to Table 43. Summarizing the 
results: 
i) With transaction costs nearly all statistically significant valuation differences were also 
economically significant. Exceptional cases were found in UAE (Islamic assets using the 
classical CAPM), India (non-Islamic stocks using the classical CAPM), Qatar (Islamic 
stocks and Islamic assets using the Islamic CAPM), and Philippines (Islamic stocks using 
both models). 
ii) When the investment-alternative-based benchmarks (T-Bills rate, savings deposits’ 
rate, inflation rate) were used, some results were significant—a fact that is surprising 
given the relatively large values of these benchmarks. Most of the economically 
significant valuation differences were in the case of non-Islamic stocks. This indicates 
that the valuation differences when the non-linear two-factor model is overlooked are 
more likely to be of economic significance since unsegmented valuation makes two 
mistakes: It overlooks the fact that the model should include two market factors 
instead of one, and it overlooks the fact that the model should now be non-linear. 
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Islamic 
Stocks 
Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 3.77 10.49 6.38 325.31 11.83 0.57 1.59 0.97 49.44 1.80 
Bangladesh 2.49 2.42 3.37 109.67 131.60 0.76 0.74 1.04 33.73 40.48 
Indonesia 0.11 0.23 0.07 22.45 2.99 0.95 1.95 0.60 188.78 25.17 
Kuwait 1.32 3.80 4.07 10.13 10.13 7.28 20.92 22.40 55.79 55.79 
Malaysia 2.78 0.92 0.98 25.41 25.41 2.81 0.93 0.98 25.63 25.63 
Oman 0.38 0.19 0.49 245.68 122.84 1.06 0.54 1.37 683.35 341.68 
Pakistan 1.63 2.12 1.13 588.83 59.31 1.05 1.37 0.73 379.89 38.26 
Qatar 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.66 0.66 2.94 3.17 3.17 7.40 7.40 
Sri Lanka 0.07 0.06 0.04 4.82 0.15 1.32 1.19 0.87 93.62 2.93 
Thailand 1.43 0.14 0.10 35.70 35.70 0.48 0.05 0.03 11.87 11.87 
Turkey 0.71 0.58 0.58 1517.61 6.07 0.10 0.08 0.08 204.14 0.82 
UAE 0.49 1.77 N/A 8.02 1.77 7.31 26.19 N/A 118.84 26.14 
Single Segmented Markets with respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 0.06 0.11 0.07 16.96 16.96 0.01 0.03 0.02 3.83 3.83 
Jordan N/A 0.73 0.21 1.25 0.16 N/A 2.10 0.59 3.57 0.46 
Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Syria 0.02 0.14 0.14 417.02 38.61 0.13 0.84 0.84 2559.20 236.96 
Single Segmented Markets with respect to Risky Assets 
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.59 0.35 2.34 2.34 
Table 41: Results of economic significance tests for valuation compared to the naïve Islamic and Classical CAPM at 2016Q2 for Islamic Stocks. Green indicates economically significant. The 
inflation rate of Jordan was negative (deflation) at 2016Q2, hence we did not compute our test criterion. In addition, the UAE had until 2016Q2 issued no T-Bills, and therefore no 
relevant economic benchmark could be used.  
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Islamic 
Investment 
Accounts 
Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 0.77 2.15 1.31 66.57 2.42 0.31 0.87 0.53 27.03 0.98 
Bangladesh 1.70 1.65 2.30 74.84 89.81 0.70 0.68 0.95 30.89 37.06 
Indonesia 1.82 3.73 1.14 361.38 48.18 0.88 1.80 0.55 174.33 23.24 
Kuwait 0.67 1.93 2.07 5.15 5.15 0.30 0.87 0.93 2.32 2.32 
Malaysia 2.53 0.83 0.89 23.06 23.06 0.38 0.12 0.13 3.46 3.46 
Oman 1.52 0.77 1.97 981.76 490.88 0.43 0.22 0.56 280.56 140.28 
Pakistan 1.27 1.67 0.88 461.81 46.51 0.06 0.08 0.04 21.65 2.18 
Qatar 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.84 0.84 0.60 0.64 0.64 1.50 1.50 
Sri Lanka 0.98 0.89 0.65 69.63 2.18 0.29 0.26 0.19 20.72 0.65 
Thailand 33.06 3.16 2.37 826.29 826.29 21.18 2.02 1.52 529.30 529.30 
Turkey 0.72 0.59 0.59 1542.49 6.17 0.49 0.39 0.39 1034.89 4.14 
UAE 0.33 1.20 N/A 5.44 1.20 0.05 0.19 N/A 0.84 0.19 
Single Segmented Markets with respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 0.58 1.06 0.71 161.10 161.10 0.03 0.05 0.03 7.49 7.49 
Jordan N/A 4.12 1.16 7.04 0.90 N/A 7.05 1.99 12.02 1.54 
Philippines 2.06 2.19 2.46 194.09 194.09 1.67 1.78 2.00 157.72 157.72 
Syria 0.05 0.33 0.33 1014.19 93.91 0.10 0.67 0.67 2037.71 188.68 
Table 42: Results of economic significance tests for valuation compared to the naïve Islamic and Classical CAPM at 2016Q2 for Islamic investment accounts. Green indicates economically 
significant. The inflation rate of Jordan was negative (deflation) at 2016Q2, hence we did not compute our test criterion. In addition, the UAE had until 2016Q2 issued no T-Bills, and 
therefore no relevant economic benchmark could be used.  
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non-Islamic 
Stocks 
Islamic CAPM Classical CAPM 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
CPI 
(Inflation) 
Saving 
Deposits 
T-Bills 
T-Bills 
Transaction 
Costs 
Stocks 
Transaction 
Costs 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 2.25 6.28 3.81 194.54 7.07 0.04 0.10 0.06 3.16 0.12 
Bangladesh 6.25 6.08 8.47 275.57 330.69 1.29 1.26 1.76 57.12 68.55 
Indonesia 2.28 4.66 1.43 452.16 60.29 0.65 1.34 0.41 129.43 17.26 
Kuwait 1.87 5.37 5.75 14.32 14.32 7.79 22.39 23.97 59.70 59.70 
Malaysia 8.13 2.68 2.85 74.18 74.18 2.79 0.92 0.98 25.46 25.46 
Oman 5.06 2.58 6.57 3275.03 1637.52 0.52 0.26 0.67 334.95 167.48 
Pakistan 2.44 3.20 1.69 885.54 89.19 0.34 0.45 0.24 124.20 12.51 
Qatar 3.80 4.11 4.11 9.57 9.57 1.39 1.50 1.50 3.50 3.50 
Sri Lanka 0.79 0.72 0.52 56.07 1.75 0.52 0.47 0.34 36.73 1.15 
Thailand 92.61 8.85 6.65 2314.39 2314.39 16.22 1.55 1.16 405.32 405.32 
Turkey 1.83 1.48 1.49 3898.36 15.59 0.31 0.25 0.25 649.39 2.60 
UAE 14.22 50.93 N/A 231.06 50.83 5.12 18.35 N/A 83.25 18.31 
Single Segmented Markets with respect to Risky Assets 
India 0.76 1.13 0.67 4.45 4.45 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.88 0.88 
Table 43: Results of economic significance tests for valuation compared to the naïve Islamic and Classical CAPM at 2016Q2 for non-Islamic Stocks. Green indicates economically significant. The 
inflation rate of Jordan was negative (deflation) at 2016Q2, hence we did not compute our test criterion. In addition, the UAE had until 2016Q2 issued no T-Bills, and therefore no 
relevant economic benchmark could be used. 
.
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III.4 Conclusion 
Our starting point was the observation that the funding of Islamic financial intermediaries 
relies heavily on Islamic financial assets. Without fair valuation for these assets, the 
Islamic financial system is prone to massive withdrawals that can reach systemic 
proportions and become a cause for concern on the part of supervisory authorities (see 
IFSB GN-3, Article 9). However, no valuation formula for Islamic financial assets existed so 
far (Azad et al., 2017: 2).—From that perspective, there was a practical motivation to 
correctly value Islamic financial assets. In addition, the valuation of Islamic financial assets 
is also interesting from a theoretical perspective because markets where Islamic investors 
are active involve segmentation with respect to risky and riskless assets. Such a 
segmentation has not yet been considered in the asset pricing literature. 
Given both practical and theoretical motivations, we formulated the objectives of our 
paper as, first, to develop an asset pricing valuation formula for Islamic financial assets 
that takes into consideration the different levels of market segmentation. Second, we aim 
to analyze the practical relevance of our theoretical model compared to valuation 
formulas developed for unsegmented markets in order to highlight the extent of the 
valuation errors occurring due to overlooking market segmentation. 
We obtain the following results: First, we successfully derive valuation formulas for all 
assets available (including Islamic financial assets) on different levels of market 
segmentation. The required expected return on common assets (Islamic financial assets 
and Islamic stocks) is computed in an identical way as the classical CAPM with the 
exception that rather than taking a single riskless rate as the return on riskless assets, a 
mixture (weighted by the aggregated risk preference parameters of both investor groups) 
of the riskless rates available to Conventional investors and Islamic investors (assumed to 
be an interest rate of zero in our model) should be used. The required expected return on 
the restricted asset class (non-Islamic stocks) consists of a single riskless rate, namely that 
of the unrestricted group (Conventional investors) plus a risk correction that is based on 
the risk preferences of the unrestricted group and an additional term that reflects the 
demand frictions caused by the fact that Islamic investors cannot invest in non-Islamic 
stocks (a demand-effect term). 
Second, valuation formulas that contain unobservable quantities (risk preference 
parameters) and an explicit reference to the riskless rate cannot be used to value Islamic 
financial assets in practice. Hence, we express the valuation formulas only in market-
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observable quantities independent of the riskless rate. Using the reformulated valuation 
formulas, we can show that the valuation for common assets is no longer a linear function 
of the expected return of the market portfolio as is the case in the classical CAPM; instead 
we observe a linear two-factor valuation model for Islamic assets and Islamic stocks. For 
the restricted assets (non-Islamic stocks), the linear market portfolio structure breaks 
down completely resulting in a non-linear two-factor model of valuation. 
Third, statistical significance analysis found that the security market lines of the valuation 
formulas that overlook the segmented market framework are never identical to those of 
the theoretically correct valuation formula. For the valuation of specific assets, however, 
there are exceptions: Assets whose covariance/risk lies exactly at the intersection point 
of the security market lines for segmented (correct) and unsegmented (incorrect) markets 
have the same required expected return. We conveniently call this effect of an 
accidentally correct valuation result even if a wrong valuation formula is used the “double 
error compensation effect”. 
Fourth, we test the economic significance, i.e., whether valuation errors from using an 
incorrect valuation model are large enough to induce economic consequences. For this 
analysis, we use a sample of representative asset class sub-market portfolios as examples 
of specific assets. We find that the differences in the required expected returns between 
the theoretically exact segmented model and the unsegmented market model are nearly 
always economically significant when transaction costs are used as benchmarks. With 
other benchmarks, mixed results are obtained. 
The results of this investigation have two major implications: The first one relates to 
empirical research in connection with asset pricing models in general and segmented 
markets in particular. Our asset pricing formulas show that valuation formulas on 
segmented markets that consist of observable quantities only, comprise at least two 
market factors. Therefore, required expected returns cannot be determined using 
regressions that contain just one market factor (even when combined with Fama/French 
and Carhart factors); instead, at least a second market factor must be integrated into the 
analysis. Even then, the factor loadings of the segmented markets asset pricing models 
are not identical to regression coefficients in general. Only if a specific model of asset 
returns is used, namely asset returns that are a linear function of the return of the market 
portfolio and another factor that is uncorrelated with the market portfolio’s return, will 
regression coefficients result (see Errunza/Losq (1985) for such a model). 
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Second, our pricing formulas contain a valuation model for Islamic financial assets that 
does not contain any reference to the riskless interest rate 𝑟, thus, are indeed Shariah-
compliant. In other words, Equation (7b) is the asset pricing formula for Islamic financial 
assets that has been missing in the literature so far. In particular, it offers an alternative 
valuation of Islamic financial assets that does not rely on mimicking Conventional rates. 
Hence, it takes into account the criticism of the recent AAIOFI Standard 27 on Indices, 
Clause 7 as well as decision number 76 (§7) of the 8th conference of the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy of Saudi Arabia, which took place in Brunei 1993 that Conventional 
interest rates should not be used as a benchmark for Islamic assets (International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 489). We highlight the notion that a country-wide 
Islamic returns benchmark is not a very reliable index for valuation since it does not take 
into consideration the unique risk profile of each individual Islamic asset 𝑖, which would 
result in a unique required expected return for each Islamic financial asset. 
 
CHAPTER IV TRANSPARENCY AND INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
132 
CHAPTER IV 
TRANSPARENCY AND INVESTMENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ISLAMIC INVESTMENT 
ACCOUNTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
IV.1 Introduction 
Islamic investment accounts are in high demand by Islamic financial intermediaries relying 
on them for over 67% of their funding (see Appendix A.2). These Islamic investment 
accounts are based on a profit-sharing structure, which guarantees no fixed interest 
payments. This has given rise to Islamic financial institutions tweaking these profit-sharing 
products using return transformation techniques that smoothen the returns and mimic 
fixed interest payments of Conventional deposits and bonds. This is done in order to 
uphold a sustainable funding base for these financial institutions, to remain competitive, 
and to avoid mass withdrawals by depositors (see Section II.3.3.2.3). 
Yet these practices are highly problematic for a variety of reasons: First, such cash flow 
transformations give rise to displaced commercial risk which is “the risk arising from 
assets managed on behalf of IAH (investment account holders) which is effectively 
transferred to the (bank’s) own capital because (it) follows the practice of (smoothing) 
when it considers this necessary as a result of commercial and/or supervisory pressure” 
(IFSB GN-3: 3)12. Second, mimicking the returns of Conventional deposits violates the spirit 
of Shariah-conformity (International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 489) and 
is therefore not sustainable in the long-run. Third, it exerts additional pressure on Islamic 
banks by requiring them to match the returns of Conventional deposits even though 
Islamic banks are forced to invest in the real economy, and therefore their investments 
may possess a higher risk than Conventional deposits. Fourth, smoothing practices have 
inherent inter-generational reserve problems: Reserves that have been built up in the 
past are used today for the benefit of current investment account holders, who may be 
different than those who originally contributed to the reserves. Fifth, smoothing conceals 
the actual returns achieved by bank management and removes the ability of regulators 
and depositors to evaluate the quality of investment management at the bank. Finally, 
smoothing only hides the problem of fluctuations in the returns of investment accounts 
                                                          
12 Parenthesis and their content added by author as alternative synonyms of terminology used in 
original source. 
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from the depositors’ perspective, yet the banks must deal with these fluctuations and 
must determine the correct amount of smoothing and return transformation to apply. 
Recognizing the problems inherent in cash flow transformations, and as an alternative to 
tweaking returns, the Islamic Benchmark Project recommended enhanced transparency 
by comparing Islamic investment accounts’ returns to a tailored benchmark in the same 
sense that benchmarks in the context of Conventional deposits are applied. Investors 
should then simply compare the actual/expected return of Islamic investment accounts 
with the benchmark.―While the idea of comparing actual/expected returns with 
benchmarks is a good idea to maintain transparency, the benchmarks suggested so far by 
the Islamic Benchmark Project itself are less convincing: Investors/banks should simply 
use central bank’s over-night deposit rate since it is applicable for both Conventional and 
Islamic banks (ISRA, 2010: 49), yet they rightly state that this deposit rate is determined 
subjectively by the central bank and is therefore an “exogenous rate” that does not take 
into consideration the specific riskiness of individual Islamic investment accounts. Later 
the Islamic Benchmark Project accepted that Islamic investment accounts do include a 
unique risk factor and integrated this fact in their benchmark as the “probability of 
default” of Islamic investment accounts. However, they did neither mention how such a 
probability is determined (ISRA, 2010: 67) nor how to translate such a probability into a 
risk-adjusted rate of return. 
Consequently, no Islamic banks have adopted these benchmark suggestions until now. 
Instead Islamic banks have been found to use LIBOR (or a deviation of LIBOR) as a 
benchmark for assessing their returns on Islamic investment accounts even though LIBOR 
ignores the risks of individual Islamic investment accounts and goes strongly against 
Shariah recommendations (Smolo, 2009; Al-Ajmi et al., 2011; Azad et al., 2017). 
Now that a theoretically exact benchmark that is able to deal both with the risk of Islamic 
investment accounts and (different degrees of) market segmentation exists (see Section 
III.2), we suggest an alternative solution to the benchmark problem, namely applying the 
segmented markets’ asset pricing formula, which takes into account all the above-
mentioned criticisms of the Islamic Benchmark Project’s approach. What is missing is the 
translation of this theoretically exact benchmark into a practically implementable 
transparency scheme. In particular, private customers will not be able to use the 
benchmark return simply because they do not know what an expected value or a 
covariance is. 
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Therefore, the two objectives of this paper are: First, to use the segmented markets’ asset 
pricing model to reach valuation statements that can be translated into investment 
recommendations for Islamic investment accounts by empirically comparing returns of 
Islamic investment accounts with a tailored benchmark.―As a side aspect, this first 
objective involves elaborating the unique risk profile of each Islamic bank’s Islamic 
investment account.―Second, to refine these investment recommendations into 
communication forms suitable for private and institutional investors. 
To achieve these objectives, we empirically apply the segmented markets’ valuation 
formula derived in Section III.2 for the valuation of Islamic financial assets provided by 
banks across a sample of sixteen countries (twelve countries with double segmented 
markets and four countries with single segmented markets with respect to the riskless 
asset). We also use a rolling estimation window to show how the change in volume of 
investment accounts varies in relation to the theoretically correct investment 
recommendations. 
We obtain two results. Our first result is that we determine over-, correct, and 
undervaluation for both short- and long-term using full-sample and a five-year rolling 
estimation window for 81 Islamic banks in 16 countries. Based on these valuations—
second result—we develop investment recommendations for practical application by 
regulators and investors. On the one hand, a traffic-lights-system for private investors is 
developed that translates valuation results into withdraw, hold, and deposit 
recommendations. On the other hand, for institutional investors no standardized system 
like a traffic-lights-system is needed because, generally, institutional investors are 
assumed to possess a high degree of financial literacy. Therefore, only the necessary input 
data required for computations are provided. Only if the regulator wishes to assure that 
Islamic banks do not invest in overvalued Islamic investment accounts—out of concern 
for systemic risks in the Islamic financial system—a traffic-lights-system might come into 
play. Finally, since transparency is connected with the reliability of the Islamic financial 
system, the traffic-lights-system must be reliable as well. Consequently, regulators or 
central banks publishing the traffic-lights-system should do so regularly at periodic 
intervals and include the valuation results/recommendations on one (web)page because 
only then will comparisons of different banks’ Islamic investment accounts become 
possible. 
This chapter makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it could not be 
empirically proven that the returns of Islamic investment accounts mimic riskless rates, 
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whether by design or due to unsuccessful smoothing practices. Also we empirically 
confirm that each Islamic bank’s Islamic investment account possesses a unique risk 
profile and therefore, a country-specific benchmark as suggested by Azad et al. (2017: 2) 
is not recommended since it cannot handle unique risk profiles. 
Second, to the best of our information, there has been no analysis for the valuation and 
consequent provision of investment recommendations (both in the short- and long-term) 
for profit-sharing Islamic investment accounts using such a broad sample of countries 
while taking into consideration the institutional framework and degree of segmentation. 
Third, some rating agencies are providing recommendations for stocks and equity funds, 
e.g., Morningstar Rating (see Hartono/Soekarno/Damayanti, 2014). However, no such 
ratings exist for Islamic investment accounts, which can probably be explained by the fact 
that rating agencies are not used to rating bank deposits in the conventional sense (since 
they possess no risk, one may directly compare their interest rates and rate them 
accordingly). Rating agencies may believe that Islamic investment accounts can be treated 
in the same way. Having shown that Islamic investment accounts possess unique risk 
profiles, we prove this belief false, and contribute by allowing the differentiation and 
rating of Islamic investment accounts and therefore address the valuation and ratings gap. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section IV.2 briefly introduces the 
design of the analysis and the data set. Section IV.3 presents the empirical results 
(evaluation of each banks’ Islamic investment accounts) and develops usable 
transparency criteria (traffic-lights-system). Section IV.4 concludes the paper. 
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IV.2 Design of the Analysis and Data Set 
IV.2.1 Design of the Analysis 
To achieve the research objectives of measuring (i) the risk profiles of Islamic investment 
accounts (side aspect), (ii) (over- or under-) valuation of Islamic investment accounts, and 
(iii) development of practically implementable investment recommendations, we need 
some criteria to measure (i) and (ii) and methods of translating their results into 
investment recommendations for (iii). These criteria and methods are developed in this 
section on the design of the analysis. 
IV.2.1.1 Risk Profile of Islamic Investment Accounts 
The risk profile of Islamic investment accounts is, in a first step, measured with the help 
of the covariances between the return of Islamic investment accounts and the return of 
the market portfolio, i.e., 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1). Since the strength of the relation with 
the market portfolio matters for our analysis and not the specific amount of risk, we use 
correlation coefficients. To avoid making statements based on an arbitrary snapshot, we 
compute two correlation coefficients: On the one hand, we compute the correlation 
coefficient at 2016Q2 using the full-sample available for each country to make conclusions 
about whether the risk profile is different across banks. On the other hand, we compute 
correlation coefficients for earlier years based on five-year estimation windows, which 
translate into 20 quarterly observations per estimation window. 
In a second step, the risk profile of Islamic investment accounts is characterized by 
plotting the actual returns of Islamic investment accounts over time and comparing it with 
LIBOR and the country-specific T-Bills rate. A time-series plot gives us some intuitive 
insights into return fluctuations. The measurement against a riskless benchmark allows us 
to figure out whether market participants themselves believe in the riskiness or risk of 
Islamic investment accounts: If actual returns are different from the riskless rate, the 
market sees Islamic investment accounts as risky; otherwise Islamic investment accounts 
are categorized as riskless/very low risk investments and/or banks are successful in 
mimicking the returns of riskless assets. 
IV.2.1.2 Valuation Results for Islamic Investment Accounts 
The valuation of Islamic investment accounts must take into account the type of market 
segmentation in the different countries. A classification of our sample countries and their 
respective market segmentation are summarized in Table 44 followed by the valuation 
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formulas for each market segmentation type. As opposed to CHAPTER III where our focus 
was on segmented markets, here we are focusing on Islamic investment accounts and 
therefore exclude countries with single segmented markets with respect to risky assets, 
i.e., where no Islamic investment accounts are offered (India), and can include countries 
with a pure (unsegmented) Islamic market: Iran and Sudan (see Appendix D.1.1). 
Unfortunately, and as mentioned in Section III.3.2.1, Iranian banks do not publish their 
financial statements (online and in English) on a regular basis (see, e.g., Bank Melli Iran) 
and due to sanctions until 2016 were not audited by international firms (see Iranian news: 
Four Top Audit Firms Plan Tehran Offices). Sudan data was highly problematic; no (online) 
access existed to the Khartoum Stock Exchange nor to the Sudanese Central Bank, which 
are both main sources of our input data. Consequently, we decided against including them 
in our analysis. 
Type of Market Segmentation Country 
Double Segmented Market 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Indonesia 
Kuwait 
Malaysia 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Qatar 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
UAE 
Single Segmented Market with 
respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Philippines 
Syria 
Table 44: Classification of sample countries according to type of market segmentation. 
Having clarified the influence of market segmentation on the valuation of Islamic 
investment accounts, we check over- or undervaluation with the help of a short-term and 
a long-term valuation approach. 
The short-term approach focuses only on the return of the last period and makes a 
statement only for the following period. Due to its focus on the return of last period, it is 
a conditional approach―which is also the approach that is followed in classical stock 
picking. The long-term approach uses all return information (and not just the last period’s 
return, and can therefore be seen as unconditional) to make forecasts over the entire 
period (and not just the next period). 
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 Formal implementation of the short-term approach 
Type of 
Market 
Segmentation 
Valuation Formulas 
(based on Equations (7a) and (9a) in Section III.2.2) 
Double 
segmented 
market 
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,2016Q2
−
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,2016𝑄2 
Single 
segmented 
markets with 
respect to the 
riskless asset 
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,2016𝑄2
−
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,2016𝑄2 
Table 45: Valuation formulas across types of market segmentation (short-term approach). 
where 𝑡 +  1 denotes the planning horizon, 𝐼𝐴 refers to Islamic profit-sharing investment 
accounts, 𝐴𝑆 refers to All-stocks while 𝐼𝑠 refers to Islamic stocks, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 is the return on 
the market portfolio consisting of All-stocks, Islamic investment accounts, current 
accounts of Islamic banks, and the riskless asset, 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1, 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1, and 𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1 refer to 
the returns on the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes Islamic investment accounts, 
Islamic stocks, and All-stocks respectively. 
 Formal implementation of the long-term approach 
Type of Market 
Segmentation 
Valuation Formulas 
(based on Equations (7a) and (9a) in Section III.2.2) 
Double 
segmented 
market 
?̅?𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ ?̅?𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
−
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ ?̅?𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑡+1 
Single 
segmented 
markets with 
respect to the 
riskless asset 
?̅?𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ ?̅?𝑀𝐼𝐴
−
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ ?̅?𝑀𝐴𝑆  
Table 46: Valuation formulas across types of market segmentation (long-term approach). 
where ?̅?𝑡+1 denotes the estimator based on time series regression ?̅?𝑡+1 = 𝛽0,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡 ∙
(𝑡 + 1) (see Section III.3.2.4). 
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Based on Table 45 and Table 46 over- or undervaluation can be determined as follows: 
 Short-term approach 
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2 {
> 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 45 →     𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 45 → 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
< 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 45 →      𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 Long-term approach 
?̅?𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 {
> 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 46 →       𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 46 → 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
< 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 Table 46 →        𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Over- or undervaluation in the long-term is not possible when asset pricing is based on 
time-series models where the factors are determined from a time-series regression 
analysis of the type (only double segmented markets are depicted) 
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 + 𝜀0,𝑖,𝑡 
since in that case, the long-term is always correctly valued (the left-hand-side of the 
equation is estimated using the observed figures on the right-hand-side). 
Please refer to Section III.2.2.2.4 for a proof that a valuation on segmented markets for 
arbitrary return generating models does not lead to time-series regression 
coefficients.―In the case of a time-series regression ?̅?𝐼𝐴,𝑖  must, by construction (the 
expected value of 𝜀0,𝑖,𝑡 equals zero), be identical to the right hand side of the valuation 
formulas in Table 46 and in that case no over- or undervaluation could occur. 
Note that the economic meaning behind long- and short-term over- or undervaluation is 
different. Long-term over- or undervaluation signifies that the security market line itself 
deviates from the correct security market line which can only be the result of systematic 
rather than random factors, i.e., management is basing its investment decisions on an 
incorrect security market line. Short-term over- or undervaluation gives an indication on 
how randomly over- or undervalued Islamic investment accounts’ returns will adapt in the 
short-term in order to revert to a correct valuation, i.e., return back to the security market 
line. 
It is, however, clear that an exact determination of “correctly valued” assets is difficult 
since an exact zero difference between the left- and right-hand-side of the equations is 
unlikely to occur in real market situations. It is therefore important to define a range 
where an Islamic investment account can be considered as correctly valued even though 
the difference is not exactly equal to zero. Therefore, we set 
CHAPTER IV TRANSPARENCY AND INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
140 
 for the short-term approach 
−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 <
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2 − 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,2016𝑄2,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑
< +𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
 for the long-term approach 
−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 <
?̅?𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑡+1
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑡+1
< +𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
We test a set of different ranges: ±5%,  ±10%, and ±𝜎% (where 𝜎 = √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) refers 
to the standard deviation of the empirically observed returns). Since the returns of Islamic 
investment accounts exhibit different fluctuations (see Section IV.3.1.2), it is 
recommended to not just take absolute ranges (±5% & ±10%) that are identical for all 
Islamic investment accounts, but also a relative range (±𝜎%, i.e., the standard deviation 
of the returns of the respective Islamic investment account) that takes individual 
fluctuations into account. 
IV.2.1.3 Practically Implementable Investment Recommendations for Islamic 
Investment Accounts 
Based on the identification of over- and undervaluation (using different ranges) outlined 
in Section IV.2.1.2, it is principally straightforward to make investment 
recommendations.—Note that transparency will only be achieved if practically 
implementable investment recommendations for Islamic investment accounts are 
developed: 
         𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 (𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒)
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒)
            𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒)
→
→
→
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡            
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡               
 
If Islamic investment accounts are undervalued (overvalued), this implies the asset 
delivered a higher (lower) historical return that the risk-adjusted return, i.e., the required 
expected return according to the segmented markets asset pricing model. Consequently, 
investors should invest more funds into (withdraw funds from) this specific Islamic 
investment account. However, an additional inflow (outflow) of funds creates an 
investment problem for the bank in that additional (less) funds are available to be 
invested. Often this can be only achieved at a lower (higher) rate of return. Consequently, 
the return of the Islamic investment account will fall (rise) so that this specific Islamic 
investment account will eventually revert to the required expected return, i.e., revert to 
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the security market line of the segmented markets’ asset pricing model13. 
While the investment recommendations based on the over- and undervaluation are clear 
from a theoretical point of view, their practical implementation is a different story. First, 
it is not clear within which time period Islamic investment accounts’ returns will revert to 
the security market line since an inflow or an outflow of funds usually needs time. 
Therefore, a snapshot of over- and undervaluation is not a reliable criterion. Instead, a 
more sustainable judgment regarding over- and undervaluation must be developed. 
Consequently, we apply our valuation formulas across both short- and long-term, once 
using the full-sample of observations available for each country and once using five-year 
rolling estimation windows. 
Short-term investment 
recommendations 
Full-Sample 5-Year Rolling Estimation 
Long-term investment 
recommendations 
Full-Sample 5-Year Rolling Estimation 
Table 47: Overview of the four valuation analyses conducted. 
Practically, long-term investment recommendations give investors an indication how 
good banks’ managers are at investing the funds underlying the Islamic investment 
account. Short-term recommendations on the other hand focus on the correction of 
short-term return distortions at a given quarter. Thus, short-term recommendations 
cannot judge the quality of banks’ management; instead, they address random deviations 
from the security market line at a given quarter. 
Both short- and long-term investment recommendations might be subject to length of 
sample effects. Therefore, they are computed for both full-sample and for a 5-year rolling 
estimation window. If results of the rolling estimation window and the full-sample are 
consistent, then investment recommendations are robust and straightforward: 
i) Both overvalued  withdraw; both correctly valued  hold; both undervalued  
deposit (see diagonal A1, B2 and C3 in Table 48) 
  
                                                          
13 Note that the adjustment procedure is different from the CAPM for stocks. Since Islamic 
investment accounts are not traded (see Section II.3.4), investors cannot simply buy (sell) them 
and the additional (reduced) demand will result in increasing (decreasing) prices that in turn will 
bring the return up (down). 
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If, however, the recommendations are inconsistent, the deviations between full-sample 
and rolling window must be evaluated. We recommend the following: 
ii) If full-sample is correctly valued, then the valuation of the rolling estimation 
window can be followed (B1 and B3 in Table 48), and similarly if the rolling 
estimation window is correctly valued, then the valuation of the full-sample can be 
followed (A2 and C2 in Table 48). 
Reason: A correctly valued full-sample does not contradict any valuations in the 
rolling estimation window and vice versa. 
iii) If full-sample is not correctly valued and rolling estimation is consistently showing 
the opposite valuation across time as that of the full-sample, no consistent 
recommendation is possible (A3 and C1 in Table 48). Example, see Indonesia Bank 
Syariah Mandiri short-term valuation Figure 94 (undervalued full-sample) and 
Figure 126c (overvalued rolling estimation). 
Reason: The valuation results are subject to length of sample effects and hence, are 
not robust. 
iv) If full-sample is not correctly valued and rolling estimation is showing mixed 
valuation across time (Row 4 in Table 48), we recommend looking only at the last 4 
quarters: 
a) If these are consistent internally (the last 4 quarters show an identical valuation) 
and not contradictory with the full-sample, a recommendation can be made. 
b) If these are contradictory whether internally (the last 4 quarters show no 
identical valuation) or externally (the valuation of the last 4 quarters, although 
identical, does not match that of the full-sample), no consistent 
recommendation is possible 
Reason: In general, mixed results in the rolling estimation indicate no consistent 
valuation across time. However, if the last four quarters from the rolling estimation 
window point to the same direction, some “trend” regarding the rolling estimation 
window can be derived. 
The decision to take only 4 quarters is in an attempt to isolate one business cycle 
across a year; however, one may decide to use more (or less) quarters to identify a 
longer (shorter) trend. 
Finally, the investment recommendation from comparing the “trend” of rolling 
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windows with full-sample is then clear: Consistent recommendations are treated in 
analogy to i) and ii), the contradictory case is parallel to iii). 
  A B C 
 Full 
Rolling                                Sample 
Estimation 
Overvalued 
Correctly 
Valued 
Undervalued 
1 Overvalued Withdraw Funds 
Withdraw 
Funds 
No 
Recommendation 
2 Correctly Valued Withdraw Funds Hold Deposit Funds 
3 Undervalued 
No 
Recommendation 
Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
4 
Mixed 
(Internally 
Consistent) 
Last 4 
Quarters 
Overvalued 
Withdraw Funds 
Withdraw 
Funds 
No 
Recommendation 
Last 4 
Quarters 
Correctly 
Valued 
Withdraw Funds Hold Deposit Funds 
Last 4 
Quarters 
Undervalued 
No 
Recommendation 
Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Mixed 
(Internally 
Inconsistent) 
Last 4 
Quarters’ 
Valuations 
are Not 
Identical 
No Recommendation 
Table 48: Investment recommendations based on full-sample and rolling estimation windows. 
It is important to note, however, that private investors will not be able to compute the 
valuation of Islamic investment accounts by themselves in order to obtain investment 
recommendations: Neither do they have easy access to data nor do they know what a 
covariance is, let alone have the ability to conduct accurate de-trending of empirical time 
series given that investment account returns are usually not stationary. Furthermore, they 
are unable to recognize and solve the issue with length of sample effects and distinguish 
consistent investment recommendations. Therefore, valuation results must be 
communicated in different manners depending on the degree of the decision maker’s 
financial literacy. 
For private investors, we propose using only the long-term valuation results. This is our 
own recommendation given our belief that private investors should be interested in long-
term investments and not speculative behavior or short-term profits. These 
recommendations can be published in the form of a traffic-lights-system. In the cases iii) 
and iv-b), however, no investment recommendation can be given since no consistent 
long-term valuation can be obtained. A traffic-lights-system communicates the results of 
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the under-, correct and overvaluation in the same way stock picking recommendations 
are generated; where buy recommendations for undervalued assets are associated with 
a green light, hold recommendations for correctly valued with a yellow light, and sell 
recommendations for overvalued with a red light.—Note , however, that stock picking in 
the classical CAPM is by construction based on short-term valuation.—In the case of 
Islamic investment accounts, these recommendations can be translated into withdraw, 
hold, and deposit funds respectively as Table 48 outlines.  
For institutional investors (or those with high financial literacy), regulators can provide 
them with the necessary input data required for computing the benchmarks themselves. 
Investors can then report any inaccuracies compared to the regulators’ computations as 
a form of double-check and to ensure transparency. In general, no standardized system 
like a traffic-lights-system is needed for institutional investors because they are assumed 
to possess a high degree of financial literacy. Only if the regulator is concerned about 
systemic risk of the Islamic financial system, the regulator might wish to ensure that 
Islamic banks do not invest in overvalued Islamic investment accounts. In that case, a 
traffic-lights-system might come into play. Observe, however, the completely different 
motivation behind the traffic-lights-system: stability of the system for institutional 
investors versus lack of financial literacy for private investors. 
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IV.2.2 Data Set and Data Cleaning 
The data set is identical to the data set in Section III.3.2 but only includes countries where 
Islamic banks operate (see Table 49). 
Country Number of Quarterly Observations 
Double Segmented Markets 
Bahrain 30 
Bangladesh 29 
Indonesia 29 
Kuwait 29 
Malaysia 33 
Oman 14 
Pakistan 29 
Qatar 29 
Sri Lanka 19 
Thailand 29 
Turkey 29 
UAE 29 
Single Segmented Markets with Respect to the Riskless Asset 
Egypt 26 
Jordan 29 
Philippines 14 
Syria 26 
Table 49: Number of quarterly observations for each country analyzed. 
All countries of Table 49 are used in the full-sample analysis. For the rolling estimation 
window, the three countries that have an observation size of less than 20 (Oman, Sri 
Lanka, and Philippines) must be eliminated from the rolling estimation analysis. Further 
details regarding the data set, its cleaning, and the method of estimating of expected 
values, variances, and covariances can be found in Section III.3.2.4. The resulting factor 
loadings for the valuation formulas can be found in Appendix E.1. Finally, for comparisons 
with riskless rates, no data for T-Bills rates for UAE or Syria were available. UAE had not 
issued any T-Bills until time of data collection, while no data for Syrian government 
finances have been available since 2010. 
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IV.3 Empirical Results 
IV.3.1 Risk Profile of Islamic Investment Accounts 
IV.3.1.1 Correlation Coefficient between the Return of Islamic Investment 
Accounts and the Return of the Market Portfolio 
Figure 26 to Figure 38 below show clearly: (i) Correlation coefficients are different from 
zero and for some Islamic investment accounts even negative. (ii) Islamic investment 
accounts of different banks14 indeed possess different risk profiles. (iii) The risk profile of 
one particular Islamic investment account changes over time. In countries where 
limitations existed such as having only one Islamic investment account and/or number of 
observations was too low to conduct a rolling estimation window analysis, we could only 
confirm a subset of the results: Sri Lanka and Philippines only (i) can be confirmed, Oman 
only (i) and (ii) can be confirmed, while in Thailand only (i) and (iii). 
Furthermore, even with return/cash flow transformation techniques, in particular 
smoothing, the risk of (the underlying real investments of) each Islamic investment 
account remain distinct and will therefore have a unique effect on the required expected 
return valuation of each Islamic investment account. This implies that banks are either 
not conducting smoothing on a regular basis or they are indeed in need of a returns’ 
benchmark to base their smoothing practices on. This finding supports Azad et al.’s (2017: 
2) emphasis that a global Islamic pricing benchmark is unrealistic since Islamic financial 
assets across countries have unique risk profiles that are not generalizable on a global 
scale. 
                                                          
14 Note that we include all banks that provide Islamic investment accounts. These include Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks that possess an Islamic window. The latter are marked with “*” 
next to their names. 
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Figure 26: Bahrain: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 27: Bangladesh: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 28: Egypt: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 29: Indonesia: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
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Figure 30: Jordan: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 31: Kuwait: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 32a: Malaysia Part 1: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 32b: Malaysia Part 2: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
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Figure 33: Oman: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(full-sample result). 
 
Figure 34: Pakistan: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 35: Philippines: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (full-sample result only). 
 
Figure 36: Qatar: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
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Figure 37: Sri Lanka: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (full-sample result only). 
 
Figure 38: Syria: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 39: Thailand: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 40: Turkey: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market portfolio 
(5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
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Figure 41a: UAE Part 1: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
 
Figure 41b: UAE Part 2: Correlation coefficient of Islamic investment accounts with the market 
portfolio (5-year-rolling estimation window as well as full-sample result). 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
National Bank of AbuDhabi* Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank*
Dubai Islamic Bank Emirates NBD*
Emirates Islamic Bank
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
Mashreq Al Islami* Sharjah Islamic Bank National Bank of RAK*
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Al Hilal Bank Ajman Bank
CHAPTER IV TRANSPARENCY AND INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
152 
IV.3.1.2 Time-Series Plot of Islamic Investment Accounts’ Returns and 
Comparison to LIBOR/Country-specific T-Bills Rates 
Figure 43 to Figure 58 in Appendix E.2 clearly show that: (i) The (historical) returns of 
Islamic investment accounts fluctuate over time. (ii) The return fluctuations do not 
entirely mimic the fluctuations of T-Bill rates and are vastly different form the fluctuations 
of LIBOR. (iii) The value of the (historical) returns of Islamic investment accounts is 
different from the value of T-Bills of LIBOR. In other words, these results indicate that 
Islamic investment accounts do not mimic the returns on riskless assets in the market 
implying that Islamic financial institutions themselves do not believe that Islamic 
investment accounts are entirely riskless and therefore do not try to completely mimic 
their returns. It is, however, important to note that from the fact that riskless rates are 
not mimicked nothing can be inferred about the intentions of bank management. On the 
one hand, it is possible that bank management has been unsuccessful in its attempts to 
mimic returns on riskless assets. On the other hand, it might be the case that bank 
management uses its own benchmark. However, one may speculate that given the very 
low covariance (risk) values of Islamic investment accounts compared to the sub-market 
portfolios of the asset classes Islamic and non-Islamic stocks (see Section III.3.3.1.2.2) 
bank management indeed uses smoothing techniques actively. 
IV.3.2 Valuation Results for Islamic Investment Accounts 
In this section, the valuation formulas of Section IV.2.1.2 are applied to our empirical 
dataset to identify over-, correctly, or undervalued Islamic investment accounts. Besides 
getting an impression regarding the valuation of real-world Islamic investment accounts, 
we are interested in preparing the traffic-lights-system. Thus, we wish to answer whether 
classifications in over-, correctly, and undervalued are robust. To do this, we pose the 
following questions: 
(i) How important are the different ranges ( ±5% , ±10% , and ±𝜎% ) for the 
classification as over-, correctly, or undervalued? 
(ii) Are long- and short-term valuations consistent even though they measure different 
aspects?—Long-term: quality of bank’s investment management of the funds 
underlying the Islamic investment account. Short-term: random deviations from the 
security market line at a given quarter. 
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(iii) How important is the length of sample effect, i.e., are valuations based on full-sample 
consistent with valuations on a 5-year rolling estimation window? Is there a certain 
pattern of over/undervaluation, e.g., does an overvaluation in one quarter lead to a 
correct or undervaluation in the next quarter? 
(iv) Do investors react to over/undervaluation by adjusting the volume of funds they 
invest in Islamic investment accounts? 
To answer these four questions, we divide this section into the sub-sections full-sample 
(Section IV.3.2.1), rolling estimation (Section IV.3.2.2), and analysis of the changes in 
volume invested in Islamic investment accounts (Section IV.3.2.3). With the help of sub-
section full-sample questions (i) and (ii) can be analyzed. Question (iii) is tackled by means 
of comparing the results obtained from full-sample and rolling estimation in sub-section 
rolling estimation and. Insights from all three sub-sections allow us to answer question 
(iv). 
IV.3.2.1 Full-Sample 
Applying the steps outlined in the design of the analysis outlined in Section IV.2.1.2, we 
derive Figure 59 to Figure 90 in Appendix E.3, which show the location of the empirical 
returns in relation to the required expected return and its ranges. To offer a concise 
overview, the percentage of Islamic investment accounts per country15 where the correct 
valuation occurs across different ranges are summarized in Table 50 and Table 51. 
  
                                                          
15 Countries with only one Islamic investment account (Sri Lanka, Thailand and Philippines) are not 
included in the table since on this market the sub-market portfolio for the asset class Islamic 
investment accounts is identical to the only available Islamic investment account Hence, they 
are by construction (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) =  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)) always correctly valued 
and they cannot show any change between short- and long-term valuations. 
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 Short-term valuation 
Country 
(Total Number 
of Investment 
Accounts) 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝟓% 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝟏𝟎% 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝝈% 
Bahrain 
(6) 
0% 0% 33% 
Bangladesh 
(7) 
14% 29% 71% 
Egypt 
(3) 
33% 33% 67% 
Indonesia 
(6) 
0% 17% 33% 
Jordan 
(2) 
100% 100% 100% 
Kuwait 
(5) 
0% 0% 80% 
Malaysia 
(16) 
6% 25% 63% 
Oman 
(7) 
14% 14% 71% 
Pakistan 
(5) 
20% 20% 40% 
Philippines 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Qatar 
(4) 
0% 0% 75% 
Sri Lanka 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Syria 
(2) 
0% 0% 100% 
Thailand 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Turkey 
(4) 
50% 50% 100% 
UAE 
(11) 
9% 18% 64% 
Table 50: Percentage of correctly valued investment accounts using different ranges in the short-term. 
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 Long-term valuation 
Country 
(Total Number 
of Investment 
Accounts) 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝟓% 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝟏𝟎% 
Percentage of 
Investment 
Accounts 
Correctly Valued 
at ±𝝈% 
Bahrain 
(6) 
0% 0% 33% 
Bangladesh 
(7) 
29% 43% 71% 
Egypt 
(3) 
0% 0% 100% 
Indonesia 
(6) 
0% 0% 50% 
Jordan 
(2) 
0% 0% 100% 
Kuwait 
(5) 
0% 20% 40% 
Malaysia 
(16) 
25% 50% 69% 
Oman 
(7) 
43% 43% 71% 
Pakistan 
(5) 
40% 80% 100% 
Philippines 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Qatar 
(4) 
25% 25% 100% 
Sri Lanka 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Syria 
(2) 
0% 0% 100% 
Thailand 
(1) 
100% 100% 100% 
Turkey 
(4) 
0% 25% 50% 
UAE 
(11) 
0% 0% 82% 
Table 51: Percentage of correctly valued investment accounts using different ranges in the long-term. 
From the figures and the above tables, we observe the following. First, the range of ±𝜎% 
finds the most “correct valuations” compared to the other ranges, while the ±5% finds 
the least “correct valuations”. The ±10%  range lies in between. This can be easily 
explained by the fact that by expanding the range for the correct valuation, borderline 
cases move into the correctly valued region. In other words, the choice of the range exerts 
massive influence on the classification as over-, correctly, or undervalued.—This is the 
answer to question (i). It implies that anyone computing or publishing valuations should 
transparently mention the range used for correct valuation since results can differ 
considerably based on the chosen range. 
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Second, from the figures we could not recognize any specific pattern across short- or long-
term valuations. However, we can clearly see how the theoretically correct valuation 
model does indeed give different results across both short- and long-term as Table 52 
illustrates. We can see in Table 52 that at least one change occurred across all countries 
with the exception of Syria across all ranges, Kuwait using the 5% range, and Turkey and 
Jordan using the 𝜎%. For all other countries, there are valuation differences across short- 
and long-term results, however, no pattern could be identified in the changes. In other 
words, long-term valuation (quality of banks’ managers at investing the funds underlying 
the Islamic investment account) and short-term valuation (random deviations from the 
security market line at a given quarter) have been empirically shown to measure two 
different things, meaning we have found an answer to question (ii). 
Country 
(Total Number of 
Investment 
Accounts) 
Percentage of Investment Accounts where changes occurred between 
short- and long-term valuation 
Using ±𝟓% Range Using ±𝟏𝟎% Range Using ±𝝈% Range 
Bahrain 
(6) 
17% 17% 33% 
Bangladesh 
(7) 
57% 43% 29% 
Egypt 
(3) 
67% 67% 33% 
Indonesia 
(6) 
17% 17% 67% 
Jordan 
(2) 
100% 100% 0% 
Kuwait 
(5) 
0% 20% 40% 
Malaysia 
(16) 
38% 38% 13% 
Oman 
(7) 
29% 29% 29% 
Pakistan 
(5) 
20% 40% 60% 
Qatar 
(4) 
25% 25% 25% 
Syria 
(2) 
0% 0% 0% 
Turkey 
(4) 
25% 25% 0% 
UAE 
(11) 
27% 27% 18% 
Table 52: Changes in short- and long-term valuation using required expected returns across all ranges in the 
full-sample. 
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IV.3.2.2 Rolling Estimation 
The figures in Appendix E.4.3 and Appendix E.4.4 (for the 5% range) and Appendix E.5.3 
and Appendix E.5.4 (for the 10% range) illustrate first that valuation results are not stable 
across time in any country implying that length of sample effects exist regardless of the 
range used. This might be explained by the fact that required expected returns change 
over time with changes in risk over time. An indication for this explanation can be seen in 
Pakistan where the correlation coefficients across time (see Figure 34) shift from negative 
to positive across different estimation windows. The changing risk can also be observed 
in other countries (see Figure 26 to Figure 41) although the connection to valuation is less 
pronounced. Second, there is no identifiable pattern of over/undervaluation, e.g., an 
overvaluation in one quarter does not lead to a correct or undervaluation in the next 
quarter. Both the first and the second result answer question (iii). It is important to 
highlight that the results of the rolling estimation should be taken with a grain of salt since 
the available time series of data is quite short. A more reliable classification can be 
achieved in future analyses when a longer time series is available. 
IV.3.2.3 Analysis of the Changes in Volume Invested in Islamic Investment 
Accounts 
Sections IV.3.2.1 and IV.3.2.2 have clearly shown that both over- and undervaluation exist. 
The question (question (iv) in Section IV.3.2) thus arises whether investors react to this 
over/undervaluation by moving their funds into/out of Islamic investment accounts. Note, 
however, that until now investors cannot compare the observed empirical returns to the 
segmented markets benchmark since they are not yet aware of the required expected 
returns that we propose, and therefore cannot make correct investment decisions based 
on over- or undervaluation using the theoretically exact valuation. It is nevertheless 
interesting to investigate whether an intuition exists on the market as to whether specific 
accounts are over- or undervalued without formally using required expected returns. 
Moreover, private investors might be less likely to possess such an intuition regarding the 
performance of financial products than institutional investors. For that reason, we 
differentiate between private and institutional investors investing in Islamic investment 
accounts. Such a differentiation was only possible in the case of Malaysia where detailed 
financial reporting allows this information to be captured across all banks. Other countries 
aggregate both figures so that one cannot differentiate between private and institutional 
investors’ Islamic investment accounts. 
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In the context of short-term valuation, one would forecast an inflow of funds in the 
quarter (or at most the following quarter, i.e., with a lag of one quarter) when an Islamic 
investment account is identified as undervalued. On the other hand, we would expect an 
outflow of funds when an Islamic investment account is identified as overvalued (or at 
least no inflow since some Islamic investment accounts are structured as time deposits 
and therefore withdrawals are not possible at every point in time without incurring a 
penalty). In the context of long-term valuation, one would forecast regular management 
changes if an Islamic investment account is identified as over- or undervalued. These 
cannot be observed directly. We do however attempt to capture these decisions indirectly 
using the change in flow of funds for Islamic investment accounts as an indication of 
whether management has been successful in communicating its systematic changes to 
the public. 
As can be seen in the figures of Appendix E.4 and Appendix E.5 and the summarizing 
information in Table 62 and Table 64, no general volume pattern or lagged volume pattern 
can be identified for over- and undervaluation of Islamic investment accounts in any 
country using both 5% and 10% ranges as well as short- and long-term. Only one single 
Islamic investment account follows the forecasted pattern in the long-term: Al Hilal Bank 
in UAE (Figure 148j with 5% range and Figure 210j with 10% range). 
Some other cases at least show increased volumes for undervaluation: Turkiye Finans 
across both short- and long-term (Figure 147d for long-term and Figure 134d for short-
term with 5% range, Figure 196d for short-term and Figure 209d for long-term with 10% 
range) and Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank in the long-term (Figure 140a using 5% range and 
Figure 202a using 10% range) or decreased volumes for overvaluation: Asya Bank Turkey 
in the long-term (Figure 147a for long-term with 5% range and Figure 209d for long-term 
with 10% range). However, they are not perfectly consistent with investment 
recommendations over both over- and undervaluation since they tended to either be 
always over- or always undervalued, i.e., we cannot really claim that investors are reacting 
correctly to both over- and undervaluation, but rather are simply repeating their previous 
actions which seem to coincidently work out. 
This should be seen as a critical problem, more in the case where positive changes in 
volume were witnessed with overvalued Islamic investment accounts since it would make 
it even harder for management to bring the Islamic investment account’s returns back to 
its correct valuation. Although failure of investors to withdraw funds when an Islamic 
investment account is deemed overvalued can partially be explained by the fact that 
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Islamic investment accounts usually have a specific maturity, thus not allowing depositors 
to withdraw their funds immediately without incurring a penalizing fee (see Section 
III.2.2.1). An example of this withdrawal effect is Asya Bank in Turkey, which has been in 
the middle of a politically driven defamation campaign16 and consequently has witnessed 
a continuous trend of fund withdrawal (explaining the negative volume change and the 
consistent overvaluation). Yet, the change in volume is not abrupt, but rather occurs 
across many quarters showing that investors may not be able to withdraw their funds 
immediately. However we can see from the cases where the volume of Islamic investment 
accounts in overvalued accounts increased that investors are still following a wrong 
investment strategy, i.e., there are no penalties for not-depositing, so at least one would 
expect no increase in volume when an account is identified (through intuition) as 
overvalued—this is not the case. 
Finally, we do not find any evidence that financial institutions fare better than private 
investors, see Table 63 and Table 65 (detailed in Appendix E.4.5/Appendix E.4.6 using the 
5% range and Appendix E.5.5/Appendix E.5.6 using the 10% range). This implies that even 
financial institutions are basing their investment decisions to deposit/withdraw on 
something other than the risk-adjusted performance benchmark of Islamic investment 
accounts. This finding should act as a critical warning to regulators with regards to the 
riskiness of the Islamic financial system. If financial institutions themselves are investing 
in Islamic investment accounts of other financial institutions in a less-than-efficient 
manner, this could result in higher systemic risk for the banking sector, since the failure 
of one Islamic investment account will automatically bring down other financial 
institutions (contagion effect). 
Additionally, using different benchmarks like T-Bills rate and LIBOR—which are only 
possible for short-term valuation since the capital tie-up of T-Bills is by design only one 
quarter and therefore can only be compared to the latest quarterly empirical returns on 
Islamic investment accounts—instead of the theoretically correct segmented market 
model does not allow us to correctly explain the changes in volume better than the 
theoretically correct model (see Appendix E.6), i.e., there is still no consistent pattern 
between volume of Islamic investment accounts and over/undervaluation. This finding 
does not support the Islamic finance literature (see ISRA, 2010: 74) which claims that 
investors are supposed to be using riskless benchmarks to guide their investment 
                                                          
16 See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-seize-robust-bank.html 
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decision-making. We do find two exceptions: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank and Sri Lanka’s 
Amana Bank using both 5% and 10% ranges but only using LIBOR. These results are once 
again explained by the “always over- or always undervalued” coincidental results, 
especially given that LIBOR was always much lower than the empirical returns of Islamic 
investment accounts so that they were always seen as undervalued when using LIBOR as 
a benchmark. In other words, if, by coincidence and during our estimation period, these 
banks managed to always attract more investments, then it will appear as if investors do 
possess an intuition regarding the performance of the bank, without them actually using 
any benchmark whatsoever. 
To sum up, the inability of any benchmark to explain volume changes can only be clarified 
by the lack of transparency inherent in the current Islamic financial system that results in 
uninformed, random, and incorrect investment decision-making, and consequently 
inefficient flow of funds, on the part investors. We can thus conclude that the changes in 
volume in the Islamic financial system until now are not driven by valuation-based 
investment recommendations, nor by any correct intuition, even though Islamic 
investment accounts do possess different risk profiles as was shown in a previous section. 
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IV.3.3 Practically Implementable Investment Recommendations 
for Islamic Investment Accounts 
IV.3.3.1 Traffic-Lights-System for Private Investors 
IV.3.3.1.1 Illustration 
Applying the traffic-lights-system developed in Section IV.2.1.3, the following results are 
obtained for both 5% and 10% ranges. 
Traffic-Lights-System Traffic-Lights-System 
(5% Range) 
Traffic-Lights-System 
(10% Range) 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Al Salam Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Bahrain Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Ithmaar Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Kuwait Finance House Bahrain Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank Bangladesh Withdraw Funds No Recommendation 
Al-Arafah Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Export Import Bank Deposit Funds No Recommendation 
Social Islami Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Shahjalal Islami Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
First Security Islami Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
ICB Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds No Recommendation 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Syariah Mandiri Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Syariah Mega Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Syariah Bukopin Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Bank Jaber Banten* Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Jordan Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds No Recommendation 
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Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Kuwait International Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Kuwait Finance House No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Boubyan Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Warba Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad Deposit Funds No Recommendation 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia Deposit Funds No Recommendation 
Alliance Islamic Bank Hold Hold 
AmBank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Asian Finance Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Bank Islam Malaysia Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Bank Muamalat No Recommendation Hold 
CIMB Islamic Deposit Funds Hold 
HSBC Amanah Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Hong Leong Islamic Hold Hold 
Kuwait Finance House No Recommendation Deposit Funds 
Maybank Islamic No Recommendation Withdraw Funds 
OSBC Al Amin No Recommendation Hold 
Public Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Hold 
RHB Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Standard Chartered Saadiq No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Oman 
Nizwa Bank Hold Hold 
Al Izz Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Bank Muscat Meethaq Hold Hold 
Muzn National Bank of Oman Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Maisarah Dhofar Bank Hold Hold 
Sohar Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Hilal Al Ahli Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank Pakistan No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Bank Islami Pakistan No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Burj Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Meezan Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Philippines 
Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank* Hold Hold 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Qatar Islamic Bank No Recommendation Hold 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Masraf Al Rayan Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
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Sri Lanka 
Amana Bank Hold Hold 
Syria 
Al Baraka Bank Syria Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Syria International Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Thailand 
Islamic Bank of Thailand Hold Hold 
Turkey 
Asya Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Al-Baraka Turk No Recommendation Hold 
Kuveyt Turk Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Turkiye Finans Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
UAE 
National Bank of AbuDhabi* Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Dubai Islamic Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Emirates NBD* Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Emirates Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Mashreq Al Islami* Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Sharjah Islamic Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
National Bank of RAK* Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Withdraw Funds Withdraw Funds 
Al Hilal Bank No Recommendation No Recommendation 
Ajman Bank Deposit Funds Deposit Funds 
Table 53: Traffic-lights-system for Islamic investment accounts using 5% and 10% ranges. No consistency 
check were possible for Oman, Sri Lanka and Philippines since their sample size did not allow for a 
rolling estimation. The traffic-lights-system results for these three countries are based only on their 
full-sample results. “*” refer to Islamic windows. 
From Table 53 we can see how a traffic-lights-system would look like across our sample 
of countries and using both the 5% and 10% ranges for correct valuation, and thus how 
we suggest a traffic-lights-system should be illustrated/published. 
A few differences can be seen when comparing the investment recommendations across 
the 5% and 10% ranges. One clear difference is that there are more “Hold” 
recommendations when a wider range for defining correctly valued accounts is used.—
There are nine “Hold” recommendations when using the 10% range compared to only 
three when using the 5% range. Another observation is that “No Recommendations” in 
the 5% range either remain “No Recommendations” in the 10% range or change to a 
“Hold” recommendation in most cases. Only two exceptions to this rule are observed 
(Malaysia: Kuwait Finance House and Maybank Islamic). However, this finding cannot be 
used to argue for using a wider range to decrease the number of “No Recommendations” 
since the total number of “No Recommendations” is constant across both ranges as Table 
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54 shows: Using both the 5% and 10% ranges investment recommendations are possible 
in 73.6% of cases. The remaining 26.4% are cases where internal or external 
inconsistencies across rolling estimation valuations and full-sample do not allow 
investment recommendations to be generated. 
Consistency across Full-
Sample and Rolling 
Estimation Window17 
Percentage 
of Cases 
(5%) 
Percentage 
of Cases 
(10%) 
Case 
from 
Section 
IV.2.1.3 
Recommendation 
Possible 
Consistent valuation 45.8% 44.4% (i) 
Yes 
Partially consistent 
valuation with either full-
sample or rolling being 
correctly valued 
1.4% 0.0% (ii) 
Inconsistent valuation 
across full-sample and 
rolling with last 4 quarters 
internally consistent 
26.4% 29.2% (iv) a) 
Inconsistent valuation 
across full-sample and 
rolling with last 4 quarters 
internally consistent but 
externally inconsistent 
or 
rolling with last 4 quarters 
internally inconsistent 
26.4% 26.4% (iv) b) No 
Table 54: Possibility of reaching investment recommendations using both full-sample and rolling estimation 
window long-term and 5% and 10% ranges. 
IV.3.3.1.2 Assignment of Computation and Publication 
In practice, it is important to decide who should be computing and publishing the traffic-
lights-system for private investors given that they cannot compute it themselves. In 
theory, it can be conducted by numerous entities including banks themselves as a method 
of advertising their products. However, own evaluations might impose a clear conflict of 
interest and potential lack of comparability between valuations of different banks. This 
lack of comparability is also the reason why accepting the use of own models will be 
reduced in banking supervision: The Capital Requirements Regulations18 (CRR) allowed 
financial institutions to use own models (based on specific eligibility criteria) for 
calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts (credit risk), the so-called Internal Ratings-
Based Approach (IRBA) (§107ff and §142ff), for quantifying operational risk, the so-called 
Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) (§312ff and §321ff), and for market risk in 
                                                          
17 The three countries with no rolling estimation were excluded from these statistics (Oman, Sri 
Lanka and Philippines). 
18 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=DE 
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the trading book (§362ff). CRR II19, however, will move considerably away from allowing 
banks to use their own models. The use of own models for credit and market risks are still 
allowed but in a more restrictive manner (see §399 for credit risk, §325bm-§325bq). The 
revisions in CRR II enforce stricter disclosure requirements for financial institutions that 
use their own models for credit risk (§ 452) and for operational risk (§454). At the same 
time, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 355, §5-8)20 has expressed its 
determination to completely withdraw acceptance for the use of own models for 
operational risk. 
Learning from these developments, we do not recommend allowing Islamic banks to 
compute their own ratings, even if there is only one set of models or formulas. The 
computation itself includes many variations that can influence the result and decrease 
transparency and comparability. These include among others: decisions to use full-or net-
market capitalization of indices, taking different estimation windows for the time series, 
the choice to publish short- or long-term valuation or using different ranges for defining 
correctly valued assets. We therefore recommend that banks only communicate the 
necessary inputs to the regulator who would then compute and publish the traffic-lights-
system. Regulators are mentioned here in a wider sense encompassing rating agencies, 
regulatory authorities, and central banks. 
Finally, since transparency is connected with the reliability of the Islamic financial system, 
the traffic-lights-system must be reliable as well. Consequently, regulators or central 
banks publishing the traffic-lights-system should do so periodically and include the 
valuation on one (web)page because only then will comparisons of different banks’ 
Islamic investment accounts become possible and transparent. 
  
                                                          
19 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-850-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF 
20 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.pdf 
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IV.3.3.2 Data Availability for the Valuation of Islamic Investment Accounts 
IV.3.3.2.1 Data Availability for Private Investors 
Principally, private investors do not need data because the traffic-lights-system is 
everything they require. While this is true, it is too narrowly considered since it does not 
take the agencies into account that have to develop the traffic-lights-system. 
To get information regarding Islamic investment accounts, we recommend in a first step 
that central banks establish a reporting system similar to that of the German 
Bundesbank21, which allows the public to access summarized information for the entire 
banking sector. Based on these reports, parties wishing to publish a traffic-lights-system 
can get information on the time series of returns for each individual Islamic investment 
account as well as the return of the market portfolio. In a second step, the adjusted net 
or full-market capitalization of the relevant stocks are needed. Since index providers 
already adjust the index, regulators should ask index providers to deliver net market 
capitalizations in addition to the information currently provided to the public. Having this 
information, investment recommendations can be calculated. 
IV.3.3.2.2 Data Availability for Institutional Investors 
Transparency should not be restricted to private investors, but also include institutional 
investors since these also hold a portion of Islamic investment accounts, e.g., in Malaysia 
12% of Islamic investment accounts are held by financial institutions. Principally, financial 
literacy of institutional investors should be higher than that of private investors. 
Therefore, a traffic-lights-system might conceal too much information. In particular, the 
trade-off between short- and long-term mispricing might be seen differently by 
institutional investors. 
Institutional investors might wish to obtain factor loadings (based on Table 45 and Table 
46) to compute the required returns themselves. Institutional investors with a very high 
degree of financial literacy might even want to use their own time series estimates for the 
valuation formula. For those investors who wish to do so, the times series of the overall 
market portfolio, the market portfolio of Islamic stocks, and the market portfolio of 
Islamic investment accounts would be helpful. This information would also be helpful to 
the most sophisticated sub-class of institutional investors who wish to apply portfolio 
selection to Islamic investment accounts. In principle, portfolio selection is superior since 
                                                          
21 https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Banks_and_other_financial_institutions/ 
Banks/banks.html 
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investors can determine their optimal investment in Islamic investment accounts, thereby 
automatically avoiding overvalued investment accounts and allocating an optimal amount 
of funds to undervalued investment accounts. 
Lastly, transparency regarding Islamic investment accounts might help supervisors 
monitor the stability of the Islamic financial system. On the one hand, Islamic banks who 
offer overvalued Islamic investment accounts might be confronted with withdrawal risk 
or, at least, will have problems getting enough funding in the future. On the other hand, 
Islamic banks are closely connected since they invest funds in Islamic investment accounts 
of other banks. A repeated investment in overvalued Islamic investment accounts by 
some banks might indicate a potentially dangerous investment chain. 
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IV.4 Conclusion 
Islamic investment accounts are the cornerstone of deposit-based funding for the Islamic 
banking system and are based on a profit-sharing structure that guarantees no fixed 
interest payments. To avoid mass withdrawals by depositors (mitigating displaced 
commercial risk), transparency regarding the quality of Islamic investment accounts 
through their correct valuation is crucial. Now that a theoretically exact benchmark exists 
(see Section III.2) valuation can, in principal, be applied. What is still specifically missing, 
however, is the translation of the results of the theoretically exact benchmark into a 
practically implementable transparency scheme. In particular, private investors may not 
be able to use the benchmark results simply because they do not know what an expected 
value, a factor loading, or a covariance is. 
Therefore, the two objectives of this paper were first, to use the segmented markets’ 
asset pricing model to reach valuation statements that can be translated into investment 
recommendations for Islamic investment accounts by empirically comparing returns of 
Islamic investment accounts with the tailored benchmark.―As a side aspect, this first 
objective involved elaborating the unique risk profile of each Islamic bank’s Islamic 
investment account. The second objective was to refine these investment 
recommendations into communication forms suitable for private and institutional 
investors. 
We obtained two results. Our first result is that we determined over-, correct, and 
undervaluation for both short- and long-term using full-sample and a five-year rolling 
estimation window for 81 Islamic banks in 16 countries. Based on these valuations—
second result—we develop investment recommendations for practical application. On 
the one hand, a traffic-lights-system for private investors is developed that translates 
valuation results into withdraw, hold, and deposit recommendations. On the other hand, 
for institutional investors no standardized system like a traffic-lights-system is needed 
because, generally, institutional investors are assumed to possess a high degree of 
financial literacy. Therefore, only the necessary input data required for computations are 
provided. Only if the regulator wishes to assure that Islamic banks do not invest in 
overvalued Islamic investment accounts—out of concern for systemic risks in the Islamic 
financial system—a traffic-lights-system might come into play. Finally, since transparency 
is connected with the reliability of the Islamic financial system, the traffic-lights-system 
must be reliable as well. Consequently, regulators or central banks publishing the traffic-
lights-system should do so regularly at periodic intervals and include the valuation 
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results/recommendations on one (web)page because only then will comparisons of 
different banks’ Islamic investment accounts become possible. 
With Islamic banks now equipped with correct valuation methods, and investors equipped 
with correct investment recommendations provided by market regulators, Islamic banks 
are no longer forced to use unrealistic or unrepresentative asset pricing formulas 
currently proposed in the Islamic finance literature, nor adopt Conventional models using 
LIBOR-based benchmarks. Islamic banks can now better market their products as they can 
always refer to how their product performed vis-à-vis the required return benchmark 
specific to their risk return profile and investment portfolio and published by a trusted 
market regulator, thus also addressing the ratings gap for Islamic investment accounts. 
Moreover, the failure of riskless benchmarks to explain the movement in Islamic 
investment accounts’ volumes, and the availability of the theoretically correct benchmark 
necessitates a revisiting of any and all conclusions in the Islamic finance literature that 
were based on comparing the risk-return performance of Islamic investment accounts to 
an inappropriate (riskless) benchmark. Lastly, transparency regarding Islamic investment 
accounts might help supervisors monitor the stability of the Islamic financial system. On 
the one hand, Islamic banks, which offer overvalued Islamic investment accounts, might 
be confronted with withdrawal risk in the future or, at least, will have problems getting 
enough funding. On the other hand, Islamic banks are closely connected since they invest 
funds in Islamic investment accounts of other banks. A repeated investment in overvalued 
Islamic investment accounts by some banks might indicate a potentially dangerous 
investment chain. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The starting point for this thesis was that although Islamic financial assets and 
Islamic financial intermediaries have grown into relevant players, they are highly 
dependent on one another since funding of financial intermediaries has typically 
been achieved through Islamic investment accounts, which are profit-sharing-
based contracts and represent 67% of Islamic banks’ funding (see Appendix A.2). 
This reliance on profit-sharing-based contracts—that do not guarantee fixed 
interest payments—comes at a cost, namely, the risk that inadequate rates of 
return could lead to massive withdrawals that may reach systemic proportions and 
cause concern on the part of supervisory authorities as expressed in IFSB Guidance 
Note 3, Article 9. 
Consequently, the main objective of this thesis was to develop an asset pricing 
(valuation) formula for Islamic financial assets that captures the segmented 
market nature of financial markets where Islamic banks operate and solves their 
adequate returns benchmark problem. 
In the second chapter, we analyzed the cash flows and risks involved in Islamic 
financial contracts and found in the case of Islamic investment accounts and Sukuk 
that their cash flows and risks depend on a two-stage structure. On the one hand, 
their cash flows and risks hinge on their underlying contracts (first stage). Mark-
up contracts are able to secure riskless cash flows while profit-sharing contracts 
are unable to do so. On the other hand, these cash flows are then subject to a 
number of transformations (second stage) such as smoothing, management fees, 
reserve creation, and pooling of different investments. These transformations may 
alter the stochasticity of the cash flows distributed to depositors/Sukuk holders in 
a sense that individually riskless contracts become slightly risky and individually 
risky contracts become slightly less risky. 
In the third chapter, we obtained four main results: First, we successfully derived 
valuation formulas for all assets available (including Islamic financial assets) on 
different levels of market segmentation. The required expected return on 
common assets (Islamic financial assets and Islamic stocks) is computed in an 
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identical way as the classical CAPM with the exception that rather than taking a 
single riskless rate as the return on riskless assets, a mixture (weighted by the 
aggregated risk preference parameters of both investor groups) of the riskless 
rates available to Conventional investors and Islamic investors (assumed to be an 
interest rate of zero in our model) should be used. The required expected return 
on the restricted asset class (non-Islamic stocks) consists of a single riskless rate, 
namely that of the unrestricted group (Conventional investors) plus a risk 
correction that is based on the risk preferences of the unrestricted group and an 
additional term that reflects the demand frictions caused by the fact that Islamic 
investors cannot invest in non-Islamic stocks (a demand-effect term). Second, 
valuation formulas that contain unobservable quantities (risk preference 
parameters) and an explicit reference to the riskless rate cannot be used to value 
Islamic financial assets in practice. Hence, we express the valuation formulas only 
in market-observable quantities independent of the riskless rate. Using the 
reformulated valuation formulas, we can show that the valuation for common 
assets is no longer a linear function of the expected return of the market portfolio 
as is the case in the classical CAPM; instead, we observe a linear two-factor 
valuation model for Islamic assets and Islamic stocks. For the restricted assets 
(non-Islamic stocks), the linear market portfolio structure breaks down completely 
resulting in a non-linear two-factor model of valuation. Third, statistical 
significance analysis found that the security market lines of the valuation formulas 
that overlook the segmented market framework are never identical to those of 
the theoretically correct valuation formula. For the valuation of specific assets, 
however, there are exceptions: Assets whose covariance/risk lies exactly at the 
intersection point of the security market lines for segmented (correct) and 
unsegmented (incorrect) markets have the same required expected return. We 
conveniently call this effect of an accidentally correct valuation result even if a 
wrong valuation formula is used the “double error compensation effect”. Fourth, 
we test the economic significance, i.e., whether valuation errors from using an 
incorrect valuation model are large enough to induce economic consequences. For 
this analysis, we use a sample of representative asset class sub-market portfolios 
as examples of specific assets. We find that the differences in the required 
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 
172 
expected returns between the theoretically exact segmented model and the 
unsegmented market model are nearly always economically significant when 
transaction costs are used as benchmarks. With other benchmarks mixed results 
are obtained. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, we obtained two results. Our first result is that we 
determine over-, correct, and undervaluation for both short- and long-term using 
full-sample and a five-year rolling estimation window for 81 Islamic banks in 16 
countries. Based on these valuations—second results—we develop 
recommendations for practical application. On the one hand, a traffic-lights-
system for private investors is developed that translates valuation results into 
withdraw, hold, and deposit recommendations. On the other hand, for 
institutional investors no standardized system like a traffic-lights-system is needed 
in general because institutional investors are assumed to possess a high degree of 
financial literacy. Therefore, only the necessary input data required for 
computations are provided. Only if the regulator is concerned about systemic risk 
of the Islamic financial system, i.e., if the regulator might wish to assure that 
Islamic banks do not invest in overvalued Islamic investment accounts, in that 
case, a traffic-lights-system might come into play. Finally, since transparency is 
connected with the reliability of the Islamic financial system, the traffic-lights-
system must be reliable as well. Consequently, regulators or central banks 
publishing the traffic-lights-system should do so periodically and include the 
valuation on one (web)page because only then will comparisons of different 
banks’ Islamic investment accounts become possible. 
Our results have a number of practical implications. The first relates to empirical 
research in connection with asset pricing models in general and segmented 
markets in particular. Our asset pricing formulas show that valuation formulas on 
segmented markets that consist of observable quantities only, comprise at least 
two market factors. Therefore, required expected returns cannot be determined 
using regressions that contain just one market factor (even when combined with 
Fama/French and Carhart factors); instead, at least a second market factor must 
be integrated into the analysis. Even then, the factor loadings of the segmented 
markets asset pricing models are not identical to regression coefficients in general. 
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Only if a specific model of asset returns is used, namely asset returns that are a 
linear function of the return of the market portfolio and another factor that is 
uncorrelated with the market portfolio’s return, will regression coefficients result 
(see Errunza/Losq (1985) for such a model). Second, our pricing formulas contain 
a valuation model for Islamic financial assets that does not contain any reference 
to the riskless interest rate 𝑟, thus, are indeed Shariah-compliant. In other words, 
Equation (7b) is the asset pricing formula for Islamic financial assets that has been 
missing in the literature so far. In particular, it offers an alternative valuation of 
Islamic financial assets that does not rely on mimicking Conventional rates. Hence, 
it takes into account the criticism of the recent AAIOFI Standard 27 on Indices, 
Clause 7 as well as decision number 76 (§7) of the 8th conference of the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Saudi Arabia, which took place in Brunei 
1993 that Conventional interest rates should not be used as a benchmark for 
Islamic assets (International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 489). We 
highlight the notion that a country-wide Islamic returns benchmark is not a very 
reliable index for valuation since it does not take into consideration the unique 
risk profile of each individual Islamic asset  𝑖 , which would result in a unique 
required expected return for each Islamic financial asset. Third, we provide 
financial institutions with an alternative to tweaking the returns of profit-sharing 
products. Consequently, there remains no need to smoothen the returns and 
mimic those of Conventional deposits and bonds which was done in order to 
remain competitive or to avoid mass withdrawals by depositors. These return 
transformation techniques came at a high cost: (i) mimicking the returns of 
conventional deposits violates the spirit of Shariah conformity (International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy, 1993; AAOIFI, 2010: 489) and is therefore not sustainable 
in the long-term; (ii) it exerts additional pressure on the bank by forcing them to 
meet the returns of Conventional deposits if the returns on actual investments 
were not high enough; (iii) they give rise to displaced commercial risk which is “the 
risk arising from assets managed on behalf of IAH (investment account holders) 
which is effectively transferred to the (bank’s) own capital because the (bank) 
follows the practice of (smoothing) when it considers this necessary as a result of 
commercial and/or supervisory pressure” (IFSB GN-3: 3); (iv) smoothing practices 
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have inherent inter-generational reserve problems: Reserves that have been built 
up in the past and are used today for the benefit of the current investment account 
holders, who may be different than those who contributed to the reserves in the 
past; (v) smoothing conceals the actual returns achieved by bank management 
and removes the ability of regulators and depositors to evaluate the quality of 
investment management at the bank, (vi) smoothing only hides the problem of 
fluctuations in the returns of investment accounts from the depositors’ 
perspective, yet the banks must deal with these fluctuations and must determine 
the correct amount of smoothing and return transformation to apply. By removing 
the need for smoothing, transparency regarding Islamic investment accounts can 
be guaranteed and might help supervisors to monitor the stability of the Islamic 
financial system. On the one hand, Islamic banks who offer overvalued Islamic 
investment accounts might be confronted with withdrawal risk in the future or, at 
least, will have problems getting enough funding in the future. On the other hand, 
Islamic banks are closely connected since they invest funds in Islamic investment 
accounts of other banks. A repeated investment in overvalued Islamic investment 
accounts by some banks might indicate a potentially dangerous investment chain. 
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Appendix A. Characterization of Islamic Markets 
Appendix A.1. Islamic Banks’ Market Share in Total Banking 
Assets by Country 
 
Figure 42: Islamic banks’ market share in total banking assets by country, average depicted by grey horizontal 
dashed-line (IFSB, 2015:9). 
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Appendix A.2. Islamic Assets as Percentage of Bank Total 
Liabilities and Equity (by Country) for Segmented 
Markets 
Country Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks (*) 
offering Islamic 
Financial assets 
Date of Last 
Available 
Quarterly Report 
Volume of Islamic 
financial assets (Sukuk, 
investment accounts, 
and current accounts) 
as percentage of each 
bank’s total liabilities 
and equity 
Algeria 1) Al Salam Bank Algeria  2015Q4 47.83% 
2) Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank Algeria 
2014Q4 60.09% 
Bahrain 1) Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 
2016Q2 68.49% 
2) Al Salam Bank 2016Q2 61.41% 
3) Bahrain Islamic Bank 2016Q2 69.77% 
4) Ithmaar Bank 2016Q2 71.19% 
5) Khaleeji Commercial 
Bank 
2016Q2 72.87% 
6) Kuwait Finance House 
Bahrain 
2016Q2 64.15% 
Bangladesh 1) Islamic Bank 
Bangladesh 
2016Q2 77.47% 
2) Al-Arafah Bank 2016Q2 64.60% 
3) Export Import Bank 2016Q2 74.07% 
4) Social Islami Bank 2016Q2 74.48% 
5) Shahjalal Islami Bank 2016Q2 64.96% 
6) First Security Islami 
Bank 
2016Q2 84.28% 
7) Union Bank 2015Q4 83.49% 
8) ICB Islamic Bank 2016Q2 84.09% 
Brunei 1) Bank Islam Brunei 
Darussalam 
2015Q4 71.56% 
Egypt 1) Faisal Islamic Bank 2016Q2 86.49% 
2) Al Baraka Islamic 
Egypt 
2015Q4 76.66% 
3) Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Egypt 
2016Q2 59.72% 
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Indonesia 1) Bank SRI Syariah 2016Q2 62.42% 
2) Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia 
2016Q1 67.04% 
3) Syariah Mandiri 2016Q2 75.48% 
4) Syariah Mega Bank 2016Q2 69.00% 
5) Syariah Bukopin 2016Q2 69.98% 
6) Bank Jaber Banten* 2016Q2 * 
Jordan 1) Jordan Dubai Islamic 
Bank 
2016Q2 81.28% 
2) Jordan Islamic Bank 2016Q2 57.88% 
3) Al Rajhi Jordan N/A N/A 
Kuwait 1) Ahli United Bank 2016Q2 66.76% 
2) Kuwait International 
Bank 
2016Q2 61.16% 
3) Kuwait Finance 
House 
2016Q2 65.70% 
4) Boubyan Bank 2016Q2 81.84% 
5) Warba Bank 2016Q2 64.97% 
6) Al Rajhi Kuwait N/A N/A 
Lebanon 1) Al Baraka Lebanon 2014Q4 N/A 
2) Arab Finance House N/A N/A 
3) Lebanese Islamic 
Bank 
2014Q4 N/A 
Malaysia 1) Affin Islamic Bank 2016Q2 77.13% 
2) Al Rajhi Bank 2016Q2 85.44% 
3) Alliance Islamic Bank 2016Q2 89.83% 
4) AmBank Islamic 2016Q2 77.31% 
5) Asian Finance Bank 2016Q2 80.55% 
6) Bank Islam Malaysia 2016Q2 89.51% 
7) Bank Muamalat 
Malaysia 
2016Q2 89.12% 
8) CIMB Islamic 2016Q2 81.36% 
9) HSBC Amanah 2016Q2 65.95% 
10) Hong Leong Islamic 2016Q2 87.06% 
11) Kuwait Finance 
House 
2016Q1 78.50% 
12) Maybank Islamic 2016Q2 92.58% 
13) OCBC Al-Amin 2016Q2 90.37% 
14) Public Islamic Bank 2016Q2 90.44% 
15) RHB Islamic Bank 2016Q2 76.28% 
16) Standard Chartered 
Islamic Saadiq 
2016Q1 65.09% 
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Nigeria 1) Jaiz Bank 2013Q4 38.72% 
Oman 1) Nizwa Bank 2016Q2 49.94% 
2) Al Izz Bank 2016Q1 57,54% 
3) Bank Muscat 
Meethaq* 
2016Q2 * 
4) Muzn National Bank 
of Oman* 
2016Q1 * 
5) Oman Arab Bank Al 
Yusr 
2015Q4 69.46% 
6) Maisarah Dhofar 
Bank* 
2016Q2 * 
7) Sohar Islamic Bank* 2016Q2 * 
8) Hilal Al Ahli Bank* 2016Q2 * 
Pakistan 1) Al Baraka Bank 
Pakistan 
2016Q2 61.88% 
2) Bank Islami Pakistan 2016Q2 54.00% 
3) Burj Bank 2016Q2 54.14% 
4) Dubai Islamic Bank 
Pakistan 
2016Q2 59.40% 
5) Meezan Bank 2016Q2 57.59% 
Philippines 1) Al Amanah 
Investment Bank* 
2015Q4 * 
Qatar 1) Barwa Bank 2016Q2 50.77% 
2) Qatar Islamic Bank 2016Q2 58.92% 
3) Qatar International 
Islamic Bank 
2016Q2 56.97% 
4) Masraf Al Rayan 2015Q4 72.03% 
Saudi Arabia 1) National Commercial 
Bank 
N/A N/A 
2) Al Rajhi Bank N/A N/A 
3) Saudi British Bank 
(HSBC) 
N/A N/A 
4) Saudi Investment 
Bank 
N/A N/A 
5) Al Inma Bank N/A N/A 
Sri Lanka 1) Amana Bank 2016Q2 78.92% 
Syria 1) Al Baraka Bank Syria 2016Q2 7.17% 
2) Cham Bank 2014Q4 6.12% 
3) Syria International 
Islamic Bank 
2016Q2 25.38% 
4) Syria Finance House N/A N/A 
Thailand 1) Islamic Bank of 
Thailand 
2016Q2 108.10% 
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Turkey 1) Asya Bank 2015Q3 42.23% 
2) Al-Baraka Turk 2016Q2 53.39% 
3) Kuveyt Turk 2016Q2 42.02% 
4) Turkiye Finans 2016Q2 42.45% 
UAE 1) National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi* 
2016Q1 * 
2) Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank* 
2016Q2 * 
3) Arab Bank for 
Investment and 
Foreign Trade* 
2016Q1 * 
4) Commercial Bank of 
Dubai* 
2016Q2 * 
5) Dubai Islamic Bank 2016Q2 76.76% 
6) Emirates NBD* 
 
2016Q2 * 
7) Emirates Islamic 
Bank 
 
2016Q2 84.25% 
8) Mashreq Al Islami* 2016Q2 * 
9) Sharjah Islamic Bank 2016Q2 70.86% 
10) United Arab Bank* N/A * 
11) National Bank of 
Ras Al Khaima* 
2016Q2 * 
12) National Bank of 
Fujairah* 
2016Q2 * 
13) National Bank of 
Umm Al Qaiwain* 
N/A * 
14) First Gulf Bank* N/A * 
15) Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
2016Q2 81.65% 
16) Al Noor Bank 2015Q4 87.49% 
17) Al Hilal Bank 
 
2016Q2 82.44% 
18) Ajman Bank 
 
2015Q4 * 
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Yemen 1) Saba Islamic Bank 2014Q4 38.96% 
2) Tadamon 
International Islamic 
Bank 
2014Q4 62.49% 
3) Islamic Bank of 
Yemen for Finance 
and Investment 
N/A N/A 
4) Al Kuraimi 
Microfinance Islamic 
Bank 
N/A N/A 
22 Countries 121 Banks Average: 67.99% 
Table 55: Total Islamic assets (Sukuk, investment accounts and current accounts) in percentage of total 
liabilities and owner’s equity for various Islamic banks and windows. Source: own computations 
based on financial statements of individual banks. 
We only include countries where Islamic banks are operating alongside Conventional 
banks (segmented markets) because only then percentages will be less than 100% and, 
hence, nontrivial. In other words, Iran and Sudan are not included in this list. We include 
all banks offering Islamic financial assets in this list with Conventional banks offering 
Islamic financial assets (Islamic windows) marked with a “*”. An Islamic window is defined 
as part of a Conventional financial institution, which may be a branch or dedicated unit, 
which provides Shariah-compliant fund management and financing (IFSB-5, Article 56: 
12). Islamic windows are not included since it is not possible to disentangle the total assets 
of the Islamic from the Conventional units of the bank (IRTI/GARP, 2016: xv). If total assets 
are individually reported, then they are reported here. Data for some banks could not be 
found and are therefore marked as N/A: Not Available. 
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Appendix B. Notes on Sukuk 
Appendix B.1. Securitization Process of Sukuk 
This appendix aims to briefly explain the securitization process within a Sak contract 
(IFSB15, §450-§454). The securitization process is analogous to Conventional 
securitization. It is important to note that this process is part of the actual Sak contract, 
i.e., a Sak contract includes within itself a securitization process. This is illustrated in the 
following three steps. However, it should be noted that the exact order of the steps is not 
sequential and may occur in parallel since the issuer of the Sukuk certificates uses money 
obtained from investors in step 3 to buy the asset in step 1, for this reason the exact order 
of steps is not fixed: 
1. Designation of the Sukuk assets by the issuer and establishment of a special purpose 
entity which is set up to manage the assets on behalf of the Sukuk-holders and to issue 
the Sukuk certificates. These assets must be Shariah-compliant. Examples include the 
subject matter of Ijarah contracts, or partnership interests in Musharakah or 
Mudharabah contracts. 
2. Transfer of ownership of the designated assets (or pool of assets) to be securitized to 
the special purpose entity. This transfer of ownership must occur in the case of asset-
backed Sukuk. In the case of asset-based Sukuk where only beneficial ownership is 
transferred to the special purpose entity, contractual agreements can exist (so called 
“credit enhancements”) which enable the special purpose entity to have the same 
credit rating as the originator while offering recourse through the originator to the 
Sukuk-holders in case of default. 
3. Sukuk (ownership rights) are then issued to the investors. Repurchase agreements are 
not permissible, except at market value at maturity not at its nominal value or a pre-
determined price. Since a “true sale” must exist, even if the originator goes bankrupt, 
the underlying asset owned by the Sukuk-holders may continue to yield returns and 
cash flows even if the originator defaults. 
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Appendix B.2. Exceptions to Trading Murabahah Sukuk 
As Murabahah is considered strictly debt-based and Shariah prohibits the trading of debt, 
this limits the tradability of Sukuk issued under the Murabahah structure, which 
essentially represent entitlements to shares of debt receivables from the purchaser of the 
underlying (Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2015: 46-50). 
However, the following exceptions have been known to exist although not accepted by all 
countries/Shariah boards: 
 Murabahah Sukuk certificates are exceptionally tradable if they were issued prior 
to the sale of the Murabahah commodities from the originator to the underlying 
purchaser. As such, Sukuk certificates issued prior to a Murabahah commodity sale 
would represent ownership in those commodities rather than the right to the 
receivables generated by their sale. 
 The transfer of Murabahah Sukuk certificates is permitted even if they are issued 
after the sale of commodities of the underlying Murabahah as long as they are 
traded at face value (rather than sold at a discount or a profit). 
 Sukuk certificates derived from an underlying Murabahah structure may still be 
tradable if the Murabahah receivables form a small proportion (exact percentages 
may vary depending on the transaction and the analysis of each Shariah scholar) of 
a larger portfolio of Sukuk assets comprising mostly other tradable instruments 
such as Ijarah Sukuk, Musharakah Sukuk, and/or Mudharabah Sukuk. 
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Appendix C. Detailed Derivation of Valuation Formulas 
Appendix C.1. Asset Pricing on Double Segmented Markets 
Appendix C.1.1. Decision Problems and Required Expected Returns of Individual 
Investors 
Appendix C.1.1.1. Decision Problems expressed with Explicit Budget Constraints 
 Explicitly Budget Constrained Decision Problem of individual Conventional Investor 
𝑘𝐶  
(A-1) 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡,𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡
{𝐸𝑘𝐶{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} −
𝑎𝑘𝐶
2
⋅ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1)} 
with 
1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 =∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑟) 
subject to the budget constraint 
∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 = 1 
subject to the short selling constraint on Islamic assets 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
where 𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 denotes the weight of the riskless asset and 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇
= (𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ⋯ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ⋯ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ⋯ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡) 
the vector of weights of risky assets in Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶’s portfolio. 
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 Explicitly Budget Constrained Decision Problem of individual Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
(A-2) 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡,𝑤𝑘𝐼,0,𝑡
{𝐸𝑘𝐼{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} −
𝑎𝑘𝐼
2
⋅ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1)} 
with 
1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 =∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡
∙ 1 
subject to the budget constraint 
∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 = 1 
subject to short selling constraints on all assets 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ≥ 0 
where 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 denotes the weight of the current account and 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 = (𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ⋯ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ⋯ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡) 
the vector of weights of risky assets in Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼’s portfolio. 
Appendix C.1.1.2. Decision Problems expressed with Implicit Budget Constraints 
 Implicitly Budget Constrained Decision Problem of individual Conventional Investor 
𝑘𝐶  
Expressing 𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡  with the help of individual Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶 ’s budget 
constraint yields 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 = 1 −∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
−∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
−∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
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Since 𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡 always balances the budget, the budget constraint is always met; however, 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑡  is then no longer a decision variable. For that reason, the implicitly budget-
constrained decision problem of individual Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  reads 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
{𝐸𝑘𝐶{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} −
𝑎𝑘𝐶
2
⋅ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1)} 
with 
1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 =∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟)
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟)
𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟)
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+ (1 + 𝑟) 
subject to the short selling constraint on Islamic assets 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
 Implicitly Budget Constrained Decision Problem of individual Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
If we assume an interior optimum, we can express 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡  with the help of individual 
Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼’s budget constraint to get 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 = 1 −∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
−∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
 
Since 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 always balances the budget, the budget constraint is alsways met; however, 
then 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐶𝐴,𝑡  is no longer a decision variable. For that reason, the implicitly budget-
constrained decision problem of individual Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼 reads 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
{𝐸𝑘𝐼{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} −
𝑎𝑘𝐼
2
⋅ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1)} 
with 
1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 =∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+ 1 
subject to short selling constraints on all assets 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
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𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
Appendix C.1.1.3. Specifying Expected Returns and Variances  
 For individual Conventional Investor 𝑘𝐶  
Computing the expected value of 1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 leads to 
𝐸𝑘𝐶{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} =
=∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟}
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟}
𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑟}
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+ (1 + 𝑟)
= 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (𝐸𝑘𝐶 − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟) + (1 + 𝑟) 
where 
𝐸𝑘𝐶 − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑟 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) 
where 𝟏 is a vector of ones of length 𝑛𝐼𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠, and 𝑛𝐼𝐴 respectively. 
and 
𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
⋮
1
1
⋮
1
1
⋮
1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
∙ 𝑟 =
(
 
 
 
 
 
𝑟
⋮
𝑟
𝑟
⋮
𝑟
𝑟
⋮
𝑟)
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The variance of 1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 reads 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐶,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1) = 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡 
where 
𝛺𝑘𝐶 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 𝛺𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶
) 
and 
𝛺𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
) 
𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
) 
𝛺𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐶 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐶(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
) 
For that reason, the decision problem of individual Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  can finally 
be written as  
(A-3) 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
{𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (𝐸𝑘𝐶 − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟) + (1 + 𝑟) −
𝑎𝑘𝐶
2
⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ Ω𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡} 
subject to the short selling constraint on Islamic assets 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
  
APPENDIX 
195 
 For individual Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
Computing the expected value of 1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 leads to 
𝐸𝑘𝐼{1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1} =∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1}
𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝑖=1
+∑𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1}
𝑛𝐼𝐴
𝑖=1
+ 1
= 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝐸𝑘𝐼 + 1 
where 
𝐸𝑘𝐼 =
(
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1}
⋮
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1})
 
 
 
 
= (
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
The variance of 1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1 reads 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(1 + 𝑅𝑘𝐼,𝑃𝑓,𝑡+1) = 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡 
where 
𝛺𝑘𝐼 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼 𝛺𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼
) 
and 
Ω𝐼𝑠,𝑘𝐼 = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1)
) 
Ω𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼 = (
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴,𝑘𝐼 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑘𝐼(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)
) 
For that reason, the decision problem of individual Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼  can finally be 
written as  
(A-4) 
max
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
{𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ 𝐸𝑘𝐼 + 1 −
𝑎𝑘𝐼
2
⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ Ω𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡} 
subject to short selling constraints on all assets 
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𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 = (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ≥ 0 
Appendix C.1.1.4. Required Expected Returns for Individual Investors 
Asset pricing in the context of returns means deriving an expression for the required 
expected return for each asset. Required expected returns are derived as follows: first, 
we determine the necessary conditions with respect to portfolio weights that yield 
decision makers’ interior optima; second, we solve these necessary conditions with 
respect to the expected return. 
 Conventional Investor 𝑘𝐶  
This two-step procedure described at the beginning of Appendix C.1.1.4 delivers for 
individual Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  (based on the decision problem (A-3)) as required 
expected returns 
(A-5) 
(
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐶{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
where 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑡 =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
 Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
This two-step procedure described at the beginning of Appendix C.1.1.4 delivers for 
individual Islamic investor 𝑘𝐼 (based on the decision problem (A-4)) as required expected 
returns  
(A-6) 
(
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸𝑘𝐼{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝛺𝑘𝐼 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
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where 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝑡 =
(
 
 
 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡)
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
Appendix C.1.1.5. Required Expected Returns for Individual Investors after 
Applying the Assumption of Homogenous Expectations 
Homogenous expectations signify that all investors use identical values for expected 
values, variances, and covariances. Therefore, not only investors within the group of 
Conventional and Islamic investors have identical expectations, but also within both 
investor groups. Formally, this means we can drop the subscripts 𝑘𝐶  and 𝑘𝐼 which were 
previously used to distinguish each investor’s expectations. Note, however, the 
investment universe of Conventional investors comprises the three asset classes Islamic 
and non-Islamic stocks as well as Islamic assets whereas Islamic investors can only invest 
in Islamic stocks and Islamic assets. For that reason, even under homogenous 
expectations, the components of the variance/covariance matrices will still be different 
which is why we use the subscripts 𝐶  and 𝐼  to distinguish between the 
variance/covariance matrix of Conventional and Islamic investor groups. Moreover, risk 
preference parameters and portfolio weights remain investor-specific. 
 Conventional Investor 𝑘𝐶  
The required expected return (A-5) simplifies under homogenous expectations to 
(A-7) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
 Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
The required expected return (A-6) simplifies under homogenous expectations to 
(A-8) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
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Appendix C.1.2. Market Equilibrium 
Appendix C.1.2.1. Statement of Market Equilibrium 
Market equilibrium means that the total demand for each asset must equal its supply, i.e., 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
+ ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
+ ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑁𝑀,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑁𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) = 𝑁𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 
where 𝑁𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 refers to the portfolios holdings of investor 𝑘 in asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
The above expression can be expressed as total wealth invested in each asset by each 
investor must equal the total wealth invested in all of these assets as follows 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
+ ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
)
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑁𝑀,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑁𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 refers to the price of asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
Since 
𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑁𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
 
where 𝑊𝑘,𝑡 refers to the total wealth invested by investor 𝑘 at time 𝑡, 
it is obtained 
(A-9) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
+
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
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where 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 refers to the total wealth of all assets on the market at time 𝑡. 
For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(A-10) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
(A-11) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
+
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
For the riskless asset 
(A-12) 
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,0,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡 =
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
𝑤𝑀,0,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡  
For current accounts 
(A-13) 
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,0,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡 =
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
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Appendix C.1.2.2. Aggregating Required Expected Return Equations (A-7) and 
(A-8) across all Investors in the Market 
 Conventional Investor 𝑘𝐶  
Multiplying (A-7)  
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) = 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
by 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡 leads to 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑘𝐶 ⋅ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
) 
i.e., 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) ∙
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐶
= 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
) 
and by aggregating across all Conventional investors in the market 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) ∙ ∑
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐶
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
= 𝛺𝐶 ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where 
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐶
 denotes the relative risk tolerance, i.e., the absolute risk tolerance  of 
Conventional investor 𝑘𝐶  (
1
𝑎𝑘𝐶
) multiplied by the wealth of this investor 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡. 
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Finally, 
(A-14) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) = 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with 
1
𝑎𝐶
≡ ∑
𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐶
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
 
 Islamic Investor 𝑘𝐼 
Following the same procedure with Islamic investors, it is obtained from (A-8) 
(A-8) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝑘𝐼 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼 ∙ (
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
(A-15) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝐼 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼 ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
with 
1
𝑎𝐼
≡ ∑
𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐼
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
 
  
APPENDIX 
202 
Appendix C.1.2.3. Plugging in the Market Equilibrium Conditions 
Using market equilibrium (A-9) to (A-11) yields 
For Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(A-16) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 −
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
For non-Islamic stock 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠 
(A-17) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛𝐼𝐴 
(A-18) 
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡
⋮
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 −
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
⋮
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
and after combining all three asset classes in one vector 
(A-19) 
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 −
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
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Appendix C.1.3. Required Expected Returns in Market Equilibrium 
Plugging (A-19) into the risk premia formulae (A-14) delivers 
(A-20) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) = 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
From (A-20) risk premia for asset classes can be derived that do not depend on portfolio 
weights of Conventional investors. 
Appendix C.1.3.1. Islamic Assets 
Cutting out the rows referring to Islamic assets from the expected return equations for 
Conventional investors (A-20)—this can be done by multiplying (A-20) by a matrix that 
contains ones in the rows of the assets in focus and zeros in all other rows—yields 
(A-21) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑎𝐶
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴) ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
i.e., 
(A-22) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑎𝐶
∙ [𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 ∙ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
+ 𝛺𝐼𝐴 ∙ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
] 
To remove the dependence of the expected return equation (A-21) on 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡 and 
𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡 as well as to create one expected return equation for all Islamic assets, we 
use (A-15) to find an expression for 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡 and 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡. Cutting out all rows 
referring to Islamic Assets from (A-15) and plugging  the resulting expression into (A-21), 
yields 
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(A-23) 
1
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 ∙ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
+ 𝛺𝐼𝐴 ∙ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
 
Plugging (A-23) into (A-21) delivers 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} 
After solving for 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}, it is obtained 
(A-24) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠.𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠.𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
or rather 
(A-25) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛺𝐼𝐴 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 
and 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
)+ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ⋅ (
𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1
⋮
𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1
)
+𝑤𝑀,0,𝑡 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 0 
If the ith Islamic asset is considered, the ith row is cut out by multiplying (A-24) by a vector 
(0 ⋯ 0 1 0 ⋯ 0). This procedure finally yields 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 𝛺𝐼𝐴𝑖) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
where 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 = (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)) 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 = (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)) 
𝛺𝐼𝐴𝑖 = (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1)) 
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Since in addition 
(𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴𝑖 𝛺𝐼𝐴𝑖) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
holds, Equation (3a) follows immediately for Islamic asset 𝑖: 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Appendix C.1.3.2. Islamic Stocks 
Cutting out the rows referring to Islamic stocks from the expected return equations for 
Conventional (A-20) and Islamic investors (A-15)—this can be done by multiplying them 
with a matrix that contains ones in the rows of the assets in focus and zeroes in all other 
rows—and then following the same procedure as was done for Islamic Assets, we obtain 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
or 
(A-26) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝛺𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 
or for Islamic stock 𝑖 (Equation (3b)) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Appendix C.1.3.3. Non-Islamic Stocks 
Cutting out the rows referring to non-Islamic shares from the expected return equations 
for Conventional investors 
(A-20) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
) = 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
206 
leads to 
(A-27) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
−𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙
(
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
−𝑎𝐶 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
The term (
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
) is unobservable, and thus cannot be used to obtain an 
observable expression for the expected returns on non-Islamic stocks. In order to 
eliminate this unobservable term, we use equation (A-15) 
(A-15) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝐼 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼 ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
and, finally, obtain 
(A-28) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
where 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 +Ω𝑛𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠 ∙ 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 
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or for non-Islamic stock 𝑖 (Equation (3c)) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑖) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) become accessible from (A-25) and (A-26). 
Appendix C.1.4. Required Expected Returns in Market Equilibrium: Only 
Observable Quantities 
To determine the unknown terms involving a combination of 𝑟, 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 in Formulae 
(3a), (3b), (3c), a procedure is applied that is similar to the one of the classical CAPM: Using 
the expected return equation of the market portfolio, the unknown risk preference 
parameter is determined and a CAPM-formula derived that consists of observable 
quantities only. Here, however, two unknowns must be determined why a three-step 
procedure is necessary. In a first step, the expected return equation for each of the five 
asset classes is determined (the three asset classes shown above as well as an “All-Stocks” 
asset class and a “Market Portfolio” as an asset class). In a second step, consistency of the 
valuation must be guaranteed: there are five expected return equations and one riskless 
rate 𝑟 to determine the two unknowns (𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 ), In a third step, the values for the 
unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 are determined. 
Appendix C.1.4.1. First Step: Expected Return Equation for Each Asset Class 
The expected return equations for each asset class equals the expected return of the 
assets in this class multiplied by the portfolio weights of the assets in this class. To 
implement this procedure, both the expected value of each asset in this class and the 
portfolio weight of each asset in this class must be determined and the expected value of 
the class must be computed. 
Appendix C.1.4.1.1. Asset Class Islamic Stocks 
Appendix C.1.4.1.1.1. Portfolio Weights of the Sub-Market Portfolio of the Asset Class 
Islamic Stocks 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇  describes the weights of the respective Islamic stocks in the sub-market portfolio 
of the asset class “Islamic stocks”. In other words, it represents wealth invested in a 
respective Islamic stock divided by the sum of the entire wealth invested in the entire 
asset class of Islamic stocks given market equilibrium. 
It is important to note that the portfolio weights of the sub-market portfolio of the asset 
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class Islamic stocks 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇  (with subscript asset class) are unequal to 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇  (with the 
asset class separated by commas). 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇  refers to the portfolio weights of Islamic stocks 
in the market portfolio which is defined as wealth invested in the respective Islamic stocks 
divided by the sum of the entire wealth invested in all assets classes (Islamic stocks, non-
Islamic stocks, Islamic assets, riskless asset, and current accounts) given market 
equilibrium. 
For that reason, the sum of portfolio weights of the sub-market portfolio of the asset class 
Islamic stocks add up to one 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 = 1 
but the weights of Islamic assets, Islamic stocks, and non-Islamic stocks in the market 
portfolio do not 
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 = 1 − 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 − 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 − 𝑤𝑀,0,𝑡 −𝑤𝑀,𝐶𝐴,𝑡 
Appendix C.1.4.1.1.2. Expected Return of the Asset Class Islamic Stocks 
Multiplying the expected return of each Islamic stock (A-26) by the asset class sub-market 
portfolio weight 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇  yields 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
i.e., using 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 = 1, 
(A-29) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
= 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
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Appendix C.1.4.1.2. Asset Class Islamic Assets 
Appendix C.1.4.1.2.1. Portfolio Weights of the Sub-Market Portfolio of the Asset Class 
Islamic Assets 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇  is defined similarly to 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 : it describes the weights of the respective Islamic 
assets in the sub-market portfolio of the asset class “Islamic asset” and should not be 
confused with 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇  (one with subscript asset class, the other with the asset class 
separated by commas), i.e., the portfolio weights of Islamic assets in the market portfolio. 
For that reason, the portfolio weights of the sub-market portfolio of the asset class Islamic 
assets add up to one 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 = 1 
Appendix C.1.4.1.2.2. Expected Return of the Asset Class Islamic Assets 
Multiplying (A-25) by 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇  yields 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
i.e., 
(A-30) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
(1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
where 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} 
𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
= 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Appendix C.1.4.1.3. Asset Class non-Islamic Stocks 
Appendix C.1.4.1.3.1. Portfolio Weights of the Sub-Market Portfolio of the Asset Class 
non-Islamic Stocks 
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇  is defined similarly to 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 : it describes the weights of the respective non-Islamic 
stocks in the sub-market portfolio of the asset class “non-Islamic stocks” and should not 
be confused with 𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇  (one with subscript asset class, the other with the asset class 
separated by commas), i.e., the portfolio weights of non-Islamic stocks in the market 
portfolio.  
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For that reason, the portfolio weights of the sub-market portfolio of the asset class non-
Islamic stocks add up to one 
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 = 1 
Appendix C.1.4.1.3.2. Expected Return of the Asset Class non-Islamic Stocks 
Multiplying the expected return of each non-Islamic stock (A-28) by the asset class sub-
market portfolio weights  𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇  leads to  
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 ∙ 𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝟏 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
i.e., 
(A-31) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
where 
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} 
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) = 𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,1,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
= 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐴,𝑛𝐼𝑠) = (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)) 
Appendix C.1.4.1.4. Asset Class All-Stocks 
The All-Stocks (AS) asset class is a weighted average of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
Hence, we do not have to determine the expected return of each asset in this class and 
the portfolio weights then finally multiply both quantities to obtain expected value of the 
asset class All-Stocks as it was the case with the asset classes Islamic stocks, non-Islamic 
stocks, and Islamic assets before. Instead, we can directly compute the expected value of 
the asset class All-Stocks. 
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(A-32) 
1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝐸 {
𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑠 ,𝑡+1
𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡
} = 𝐸 {
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
}
=
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1})
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
=
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) +
𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) 
where 
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
 represents market capitalization of Islamic stocks divided by 
market capitalization of All-Stocks and 
𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
 market capitalization of non-Islamic 
stocks divided by market capitalization of All-Stocks. 
Appendix C.1.4.1.5. Asset Class Market Portfolio 
The expected return of the market portfolio is a weighted average of the expected return 
of its components, i.e., 
(A-33) 
1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1} = 𝐸 {
𝑊𝑀,𝑡+1
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
} = 𝐸 {
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 +𝑊𝑀0,𝑡 ++𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐴,𝑡
}
=
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}) +
𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) +
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) +
𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
+
𝑊𝑀0,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ (1 + 𝑟) 
From that perspective, the analysis of the market portfolio parallels that of the asset class 
All-Stocks. 
Appendix C.1.4.2. Second Step: Consistency of the Valuation Model 
Appendix C.1.4.2.1. Origin of Consistency Issues 
Consistency issues will arise if more than two expected return equations exist to 
determine the two unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼. 
Appendix D.1.1 illustrates that for most countries with an Islamic banking system both All-
Stocks indices as well indices for Islamic stocks are published meaning that the difference 
between the All-Stocks and the Islamic stocks index, i.e., an index of non-Islamic stocks, 
can be determined as well. None of these countries publishes an index on Islamic assets, 
but it can be computed using available data on Islamic assets. In addition, its 
determination is even required because otherwise the return of the market portfolio that 
is an integral component of valuation equations (3a) and (3b) cannot be computed. 
Finally, the expected return of the market portfolio itself is available. In sum, there are 
five valuation equations to determine the two unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼. Consistency of the 
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valuation model requires that the (
5
2
) = 10 possibilities to compute the unknowns must 
coincide. Last, but not least, the riskless rate should not be overlooked in a consistent 
valuation model. Since a general equilibrium is considered, the riskless return must be 
consistent with the five expected return equations of the asset class sub-market portfolios 
meaning that an additional condition must be met. 
Appendix C.1.4.2.2. General Consistency Considerations 
If the All-stocks index is constructed correctly, its return must be a weighted average of 
the returns of its components, i.e., 
(A-34) 
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1 =
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝑆,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝑆,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1 
A similar reasoning holds for the market portfolio 
(A-35) 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 =
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀0,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑟 +
𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 0 
or rather 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1 =
𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1 +
𝑊𝑀0,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 𝑟 +
𝑊𝑀𝐶𝐴,𝑡
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
∙ 0 
Equations (A-34) and (A-35) demonstrate that the asset class All-stocks’s sub-market 
portfolio as well as the market portfolio itself are linearly dependent on the returns of 
their components. In other words, the asset class All-stocks’s sub-market portfolio does 
not convey information beyond the weighted sum of the sub-market portfolios of the 
asset classes Islamic stocks and non-Islamic stocks; the market portfolio does not convey 
information beyond the weighted sum of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes 
Islamic stocks, non-Islamic stocks, Islamic assets, riskless assets, and current accounts. For 
that reason, they cannot contribute to the determination of the unknowns and the 
number of equations to determine the two unknowns is reduced from five to three: 
Islamic stocks (A-29), non-Islamic stocks (A-31), and Islamic assets (A-30). In addition, 
consistency with the riskless asset must be checked. 
Appendix C.1.4.2.3. Equations used for the Consistent Determination of the Unknown 
Terms 
Whether 𝑎𝐶 and 𝑎𝐼 are determined with the help of combinations of “Islamic stocks (A-
29) and non-Islamic stocks (A-31) ” or “Islamic stocks (A-29), and Islamic assets (A-30)” or 
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“Islamic assets (A-30) and non-Islamic stocks (A-31)” they all must lead to identical values 
of 𝑎𝐶 and 𝑎𝐼. The riskless rate 𝑟 is used to make these three approaches coincide. 
From that perspective, 𝑎𝐶 ,  𝑎𝐼 , and 𝑟  are determined technically as solutions to the 
following equation system: 
Sub-market portfolio of the asset class Islamic stocks 
(A-29) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Sub-market portfolio of the asset class Islamic assets 
(A-30) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Sub-market portfolio of the asset class non-Islamic stocks 
(A-31) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1))
∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
Appendix C.1.4.3. Third Step: Determination of the Unknown Terms as well as 
the general equilibrium riskless rate 𝒓 
In principle, the equation system (A-29), (A-30), and (A-31) contains the (abstract) 
solutions for the unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 as well as the general equilibrium riskless rate 𝑟. 
However, such a solution is too abstract and does not, in particular, allow expressing 
valuation equations (3a) and (3b) in a way that consists of observable variables only. For 
that reason, some details of the solutions are offered. 
Appendix C.1.4.3.1. Determination of the Unknown Terms for Common Assets 
Both unknown terms of valuation equations (3a) and (3b), however, are not empirically 
observable. Yet they can be determined directly from (A-29) and (A-30): 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
) ∙
(
 
 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼 )
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Note that the matrix will be invertible as long as both covariances are different. 
Hence, it is obtained 
(A-36) 
(
 
 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼 )
 
 
= (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1}
) 
or rather 
(A-37) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and, finally, 
(A-38) 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
Appendix C.1.4.3.2. Determination of the Unknown Terms for Restricted Assets 
To express the valuation (3c) for non-Islamic stocks in terms of observable quantities only, 
an expression of the general equilibrium riskless rate 𝑟  must be given. A three-step 
procedure is used to achieve this goal. In a first step, terms containing 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼  are 
determined from (A-29) and (A-30). The results are, in a second step, plugged into (A-31) 
to compute 𝑟. 
 First step 
From (A-25) and (A-26), we can express (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) as 
(A-39) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
) ∙
(
 
 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼 )
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Plugging Equation (A-39) into the valuation equation for non-Islamic stocks (A-31) 
(A-31) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1))
∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
yields 
(A-40) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1))
∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
) ∙
(
 
 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼 )
 
 
 
Since we know from (A-36) that 
(A-36) 
(
 
 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼 )
 
 
= (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1}
) 
we can plug this expression into (A-40) to obtain 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1))
∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙ (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
∙ (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
(
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
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If the abbreviation 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≡ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1)) ∙ (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
)
−1
∙
(
 
 
 
 
1
⋮
1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1
⋮
1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝐴.𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
 
 
 
∙ (
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
1 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
is used, it is finally obtained 
(A-41) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
= 𝑟 + (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
) 
(
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
) becomes again accessible from (A-29) and (A-30) 
(A-29) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
(A-30) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Hence, 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} ∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
= 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
= 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
i.e., 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟 = 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑟 = 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
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and finally, 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1}
) − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) ∙ (
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
) 
from which it is immediately obtained 
(
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
−
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
) = (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
− (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 
Hence, 
(A-42) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 + (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
− (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
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 Second step 
Solving (A-42) with respect to 𝑟 gains 
𝑟 = 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1}
)
1 − (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
)
𝑇
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
)
−1
∙ (
1
1
)
 
and for the riskless rate 
𝑟 =
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡)
∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) + 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
which can further be simplified into 
(A-43) 
𝑟 =
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
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We can now obtain observable terms for the other terms in the valuation formula for non-Islamic stocks as 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 =
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1})
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
+(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
−(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 as defined in (A-41).
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Appendix C.2. Asset Pricing on Segmented Markets with Respect 
to the Riskless Asset: No Distinction between 
Islamic and non-Islamic Stocks 
This segmented market is obtained if markets are only segmented with respect to the 
riskless asset but not with respect to stocks. In other words, the single segmented market 
no longer differentiates with respect to Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
Appendix C.2.1. Valuation Equations (8a) and (8a) in this Single Segmented 
Market 
Building on the work of Section Appendix C.1, the required expected returns for investors 
(after applying the assumption of homogenous expectations and aggregation) read 
 Conventional Investors 
(A-44) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺 ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
 Islamic Investors 
(A-45) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝛺 ⋅
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
where 
𝛺 = (
𝛺𝐴𝑆 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑆,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑆,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
) 
Note that there is just one variance/covariance matrix 𝛺 for Conventional and Islamic 
investors because the market for stocks is no longer segmented. Segmentation only 
occurs with regards to the riskless asset which does not affect the variance/covariance 
matrix. 
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 Market equilibrium conditions 
(A-46) 
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
+ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
+ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐴𝑆,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
Integrating market equilibrium conditions (A-46) into (A-44) yields 
(A-47) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝛺 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐴𝑆,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) − 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺 ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
Using (A-45) to compute (
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐴𝑆,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
) produces for (A-47) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝛺 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐴𝑆,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) 
and, finally, 
(A-48) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝛺 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐴𝑆,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
which can be expressed as 
(A-49) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ (
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴𝑆,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
) 
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Appendix C.2.2. Required Expected Returns in Market Equilibrium: 
Only Observable Quantities 
Appendix C.2.2.1. Consistency Issues 
There are just two sub-market portfolios, asset classes All-stocks and Islamic assets, with 
expected return equations 
(A-50) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
(A-51) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} =
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
+
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
The expected return of the market portfolio remains a weighted sum of the expected 
returns of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes All-stocks, Islamic assets, and the 
riskless asset. For that reason, it cannot contribute to the determination of the unknowns 
𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼. Put differently, there are just two unknowns and two equations ((A-50) and (A-
51)) and no riskless rate must be determined that aligns three different valuation 
approaches as was the case with double segmented markets (see Appendix C.1.4.3). 
Hence, no consistency issues arise. 
Appendix C.2.2.2. Determination of the Unknown Terms 
Since in the single segmented market All-Stocks take the role of Islamic stocks, the 
determination of these two unknowns develops completely in parallel to (A-36) and it is 
obtained 
(A-52) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and 
(A-53) 
𝑟
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1} ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
  
APPENDIX 
223 
Appendix C.3. Asset Pricing on Segmented Markets with Respect 
to Risky Assets: No Distinction between Riskless 
Interest Bearing Assets and Current Accounts 
This segmented market is obtained if markets are only segmented with respect Islamic 
and non-Islamic stocks, but there is no Islamic banking system. Hence, there are no Islamic 
assets and no Islamic current accounts. 
Appendix C.3.1. Valuation Equations (10a) and (10a) in this Single Segmented 
Market 
Building on the work of Appendix C.1.1.1, the required expected returns aggregated over 
all investors of one investor group (after applying the assumption of homogenous 
expectations and aggregation) read 
 Conventional Investors 
(A-54) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
where 
𝛺𝐶 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠
) 
 Islamic Investors 
(A-55) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝛺𝐼𝑠 ⋅ ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
 
 Market equilibrium conditions 
(A-56) 
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐶,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐶,𝑡
𝐾𝐶
𝑘𝐶=1 )
 
 
 
 
+(∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
) = (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
Integrating market equilibrium conditions (A-56) into (A-54), yields 
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(A-57) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) − 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
) 
Using (A-55) to compute (
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
0
) produces 
(A-58) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
) = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝛺𝐶 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ 𝛺𝐶
∙ (𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ⋅ (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟)
0
) 
 Islamic stocks 
Cutting out from (A-58) the rows referring to Islamic stocks leads to 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ (𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ (𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠)
∙ (𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ⋅ (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟)
0
)
= 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟) 
and, finally, 
(A-59) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
 Non-Islamic stocks 
Cutting out from (A-58) the rows referring to non-Islamic stocks gains 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠) ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅ (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 𝛺𝑛𝐼𝑠)
∙ (𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ⋅ (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟)
0
) 
i.e., 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟
= 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1
⋅ (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟) 
Substituting for (𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟) according to (A-59) delivers 
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(A-60) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝟏 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
⋅
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝑛𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
Appendix C.3.2. Required Expected Returns in Market Equilibrium: Only 
Observable Quantities 
Appendix C.3.2.1. Consistency Issues 
There are just two sub-market portfolios, asset classes Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
Moreover, the expected return of the market portfolio remains a weighted sum of the 
expected returns of the sub-market portfolios of the asset classes All-stocks, Islamic 
assets, and riskless asset. For that reason it cannot contribute to the determination of the 
unknowns 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼. 
Put differently, there are just two unknowns and two equations and no riskless rate must 
be determined that aligns three different valuation approaches as it was with double 
segmented markets (see Appendix C.1.4.3). Hence, no consistency issues arise. 
Appendix C.3.2.2. Determination of the Unknown Terms 
To eliminate the unknown risk preference parameters 𝑎𝐶  and 𝑎𝐼 from Equations (A-59) 
and (A-60), Equations (A-59) and (A-60) are multiplied by the portfolio weights of the sub-
market portfolios of the asset classes to obtain 
(A-61) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} = 𝑤𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑟 +
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
(A-62) 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} = 𝑤𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡
𝑇 ∙ 𝐸{𝑅𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
= 𝑟 + 𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) −
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 
It follows from (A-61) 
(A-63) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
 
and 
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𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 =
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠 ,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
and, finally, 
(A-64) 
𝑎𝐶 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡
1 +
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
∙
𝑎𝐶
𝑎𝐼
=
(𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) − (𝐸{𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1} − 𝑟) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1))
 
with 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑀𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1) ∙ 𝛺𝐼𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
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Appendix C.4. Asset Pricing on a Purely Islamic Market 
In a pure Islamic market there are just Islamic, but no Conventional investors. Hence, it 
holds (after applying the assumption of homogenous expectations and aggregation) for 
 Islamic Investors 
(A-65) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) ∙
1
𝑎𝐼
= 𝛺
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
 
where 
𝛺 = (
𝛺𝐼𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑠,𝐼𝐴 𝛺𝐼𝐴
) 
 Market equilibrium conditions 
(A-66) 
(
 
 
 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝐼,𝐼𝐴,𝑡 ∙ 𝑊𝑘𝐼,𝑡
𝐾𝐼
𝑘𝐼=1 )
 
 
 
 
= (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝑛𝐼𝑠,𝑡
) ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 
Integrating market equilibrium conditions (A-66) into (A-65) yields 
(A-67) 
(
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑡+1}
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑡+1}
) = 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝛺 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) 
Multiplying (A-67) by (𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡) leads to 
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1} = 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ (𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡 𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝛺 ∙ (
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑀,𝐼𝐴,𝑡
) = 𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
since current accounts are non-stochastic and possess a return of zero. Thus, 
𝑎𝐼 ∙ 𝑊𝑀,𝑡 =
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1}
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
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Finally, it is obtained as valuation equation 
For Islamic asset 𝑖 
(12a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1}
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝐴,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
For Islamic share 𝑖 
(12a) 
𝐸{𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1} =
𝐸{𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1}
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1)
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐼𝑠,𝑖,𝑡+1; 𝑅𝑀,𝑡+1) 
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Appendix D. Details to Data Set, Data Cleaning and Stationarity 
Appendix D.1. Overview of Data Available in Countries with Mixed Islamic and Conventional Markets  
Appendix D.1.1. General Overview of Banks, Stock Indices, and Type of Segmentation 
Country22 
Number of 
Islamic Banks 
All-Stocks Index Islamic Stocks Index Type of Segmentation 
Algeria 2 Index None Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
Bahrain 6 Bahrain Bourse All Share Index S&P Bahrain Domestic Shariah Double Segmented 
Bangladesh 8 DSEX Broad Index S&P Shariah Index Bangladesh Double Segmented 
Brunei 1 None None Cannot be Determined23 
Egypt 2 EGX 30 (Top 30 only) Not Publicly Available24 Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
India 0 S&P BSE 500 S&P BSE 500 Shariah Single Segmented w.r.t. Risky Assets 
Indonesia 6 Jakarta Composite Index Jakarta Islamic Index (JII) Double Segmented 
Iraq 12 ISX None Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
Iran 29 Tehran Stock Exchange Total Index Purely Islamic 
Jordan 3 Amman Stock Exchange Index None Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
Kuwait 6 Kuwait Stock Exchange Index S&P Kuwait Domestic Shariah Double Segmented 
Lebanon 3 Blom Beirut All Shares None Single Segmented (Riskless) 
Malaysia 16 EMAS Index EMAS Shariah Index Double Segmented 
Nigeria 1 Nigeria All Share Index NSE Lotus Islamic Index (15 Stocks) Double Segmented 
Oman 8 MSM30 (Top 30 only) S&P Oman Domestic Shariah Double Segmented 
Pakistan 5 Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) All Share Index KSE-Meezan Index (KMI30) Double Segmented 
Philippines 1 PHP Dow Jones Philippines Price Index None Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
Qatar 4 QE All Share Index QE Al Rayan Islamic Index Double Segmented 
                                                          
22 Countries list obtained from Ernst & Young World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 p.80 (Islamic Banks Universe) 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_World_Islamic_Banking_Competitiveness_Report_2013%E2%80%9314/$FILE/EY-World-Islamic-Banking-Competitiveness-Report-2013-
14.pdf 
as well as from the website of the World Database for Islamic Banking and Finance http://www.wdibf.com/islamic_banks.html 
23 Brunei stock exchange launch planned for 2017: http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/brunei-darussalam-edges-closer-stock-market-launch 
24 Announcement exists, but index data is not available http://www.idealratings.com/naeem-holding-announces-nise25-egypt-islamic-real-time-index-by-idealratings.html 
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Saudi Arabia 6 Tadawul All Share index S&P Saudi Arabia Domestic Shariah Double Segmented25 
Sri Lanka 1 All Shares Price Index Dow Jones Islamic Market Sri Lanka Index Double Segmented 
Sudan 32 Khartoum Stock Index Purely Islamic 
Syria 4 Index None Single Segmented w.r.t. Riskless Asset 
Thailand 1 FTSE SET All-Share Index FTSE Shariah SET Double Segmented 
Turkey 4 XUTUM BIST All Shares Dow Jones Islamic Market Turkey Double Segmented 
UAE 18 Dow Jones UAE Total Stock Market Index S&P UAE Domestic Shariah Double Segmented 
Yemen 4 None None Cannot be Determined 
Table 56: Degree of financial market segmentation of countries considered relevant for Islamic finance according to the E&Y “Islamic bank universe” and the World Database of Islamic Banking 
and Finance showing each country’s credit rating, number of Islamic banks and published stock indices for all-stocks and Islamic stocks if present. “Cannot be determined” are those 
markets that have to stock exchange, and therefore it is difficult to categorize how risky assets are treated/segmented. 
  
                                                          
25 All Banks in Saudi Arabia are obliged to report "Special Commission Income" & "Special Commission Expense" instead of Interest and non-interest. “Saudi Arabia does not 
recognize the concept of Islamic banking. The logic is that if one bank is recognized as an Islamic institution then all others, by implication, would be un-Islamic. The official 
line is that all banks operating in Saudi Arabia are by definition Islamic. In addition, the country’s vast bank deposits and foreign holdings generate substantial interest 
income, and thus the Saudi authorities tread carefully around the issue of Riba. Saudi banks for example report interest income as ‘special commission income’, as ‘service 
charges’ or as ‘book-keeping fees’.” Warde: Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, p. 208 
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Appendix D.1.2. Islamic Banks Overview 
Countries Banks Financial 
Statements 
Data 
Available 
IA as 
percentage 
of total 
liabilities 
and equity 
as at last 
available 
quarter 
Equity as 
percentage 
of total 
liabilities 
and equity 
as at last 
available 
quarter 
Number of 
quarterly 
observations 
of Islamic 
Bank Returns 
General Notes during 
Data Collection 
Islamic Assets Definition used 
when collecting Data for each 
country 
Algeria 1) Al Salam Bank Algeria  
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
2012-2015 47.83 25.63 0  Data not available 
quarterly. 
 
2) Al Baraka Islamic Bank 
Algeria 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
2008-2014 60.09 9.26 0  Data not available 
quarterly. 
Bahrain 1) Al Baraka Islamic Bank 2008-2016 68.49 9.17 33  Balance Sheet: Equity of 
Investment Accountholders 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Return on 
Equity of Investment 
Accountholders net of 
Mudharib Fee, PER and IRR 
taken as “Income attributable 
to Investment Accounts” 
(Income on Islamic Assets) 
2) Al Salam Bank 2008-2016 61.41 18.87 34  
3) Bahrain Islamic Bank 2008-2016 69.77 11.15 34  
4) Ithmaar Bank 2008-2016 71.19 4.87 34  Reported in USD 
except 2013—
conversion to BHD at 
last day of quarter 
(Exchange Rate of 
0.377BHD/USD on 
average). 
 Report Income on 
Equity of Investment 
Account Holders only 
annually starting from 
2012 - divided annual 
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amount across 4 
quarters starting 2012. 
 Report Income on 
Profit paid to Banks 
and other institutions 
only annually in 2011 - 
divided annual 
amount across 4 
quarters in 2011. Not 
reported before 2011, 
reported quarterly 
after 2011. 
5) Khaleeji Commercial 
Bank 
2008-2016 72.87 16.83 34  Equity of Investment 
Account Holders 
includes Banks, Non-
Banks, PER and IRR + 
Sukuk but excludes 
some Murabahah and 
Wakalah which are 
included in 
Placements from 
Financial and 
Placements from Non-
Financial Institutions 
and Individuals. These 
are appended to the 
calculation of 
Investment Accounts 
(In reports before 
2009 termed 
“Investors’ Funds”).  
 Expenses on 
Placements from 
Financial and 
Placements from Non-
Financial Institutions 
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and individuals (In 
reports before 2011Q3 
termed “Investments 
related expenses”) are 
appended to the 
returns on investment 
accounts in the 
calculation of Income 
on Investment 
Accounts. 
 Data missing for 
2010Q3—Averaged26 
2010Q2/2010Q4. 
6) Kuwait Finance House 
Bahrain 
2008-2016 64.15 23.96 34  Equity of Investment 
Account Holders 
includes all funds 
received by the bank 
for purposes of 
investment including 
all Reserves and Sukuk 
(p. 12) but excludes 
some Murabahah due 
to non-banks, 
Investments due to 
banks as well as 
Subordinated 
Murabahah, these are 
appended in the 
calculation of 
Investment Accounts. 
 Profit on “due to 
banks”, Murabahah 
due to non-banks as 
                                                          
26 Averaging refers only to balance sheet figures (Total assets, equity and investment accounts). Income statement figures are obtained from following financial statements. 
If both are missing, no averaging is attempted. 
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well as subordinated 
Murabahah are 
appended to the 
returns on investment 
accounts in the 
calculation of Income 
on Investment 
Accounts. 
Bangladesh 1) Islamic Bank 
Bangladesh 
2009-2016 77.47 6.48 28  Balance Sheet: Mudharabah 
Savings, Term and Other 
Mudharabah Deposits were 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Profit paid 
on Mudharabah Deposits taken 
as “Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts” (Income 
on Islamic Assets) 
2) Al-Arafah Bank 2009-2016 64.60 7.53 29  Data missing for 
2010Q1—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q2. 
3) Export Import Bank 2010-2016 74.07 9.19 24  
4) Social Islami Bank 2011-2016 74.48 6.12 19  Data missing for 
2012Q1—Averaged 
2011Q4/2012Q2. 
5) Shahjalal Islami Bank 2009-2016 64.96 7.59 27  Data missing for 
2011Q1—Averaged 
2010Q4/2011Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2010Q1—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q2. 
6) First Security Islami 
Bank 
2009-2016 84.28 3.68 27  Data missing for 
2011Q1—Averaged 
2010Q4/2011Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2010Q3—Averaged 
2010Q2/2010Q4. 
 Data missing for 
2010Q1—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q2. 
7) Union Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
2013-2015 83.49 8.11 3  Data missing for 
2014Q1-Q3. 
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8) ICB Islamic Bank 2010-2016 84.09 -76.19 24  Data missing for 
2011Q1—Averaged 
2010Q4/2011Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2011Q3—Averaged 
2011Q2/2011Q4. 
 Data missing for 
2012Q3—Averaged 
2012Q2/2012Q4. 
Brunei 1) Bank Islam Brunei 
Darussalam 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
2012-2015 71.56 18.05 0  Only annual reports Only one Islamic Bank in Brunei 
http://www.ambd.gov.bn/regul
atory/banking-specialized-
markets  
Egypt 1) Faisal Islamic Bank 2012-2016 86.49 7.73 14  Data missing for 
2013Q1—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2013Q2—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q3. 
 Data missing for 
2013Q3—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q4. 
“Deposits with No Returns—
Taken as Current Accounts” vs. 
“Deposits with (Variable) 
Returns—Taken as Investment 
Accounts” 
 
“Cost of Deposits” as Returns 
on Investment Accounts 
2) Al Baraka Islamic Egypt 2011-2015 76.66 5.15 17  Data missing for 
2012Q1—Averaged 
2011Q4/2012Q2.  
 
3) Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Egypt 
2009-2016 59.72 5.01 26  Data missing for 
2010Q1—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2010Q2—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q3. 
 Data missing for 
2010Q3—Averaged 
2009Q4/2010Q4. 
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India No Islamic Banks - - - 0   
Indonesia 1) Bank SRI Syariah 2009-2016 62.42 7.97 30  Balance Sheet: “Dana Investasi 
Tidak Terikat (Mudharabah)” 
were taken as “Volume of 
Investment Accounts” (Islamic 
Assets) 
“Dana Simpanan Wadiah” were 
taken as Current Accounts 
Income Statement: “Bagi Hasil 
untuk Investor Dana Investasi 
Tidak Terikat” taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
2) Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia 
2009-2016 67.04 6.66 29  
3) Syariah Mandiri 2009-2016 75.48 8.03 30  
4) Syariah Mega Bank 2009-2016 69.00 17.58 30  
5) Syariah Bukopin 2009-2016 69.98 10.15 30  
6) Bank Jaber Banten* 2010-2016 Islamic Window 23  No Data on Shariah 
Compliant Deposits or 
Profit Sharing before 
2010Q4 
 
Iraq 
(Not included 
in Sample due 
to lack of 
usable Data) 
1) Iraqi Islamic Bank for 
Investment and 
Development 
- - - 0  Only annual reports. According to Central Bank, 8 
banks and 1 under 
incorporation. Although it 
seems at least 3 banks have no 
website (Government 
cooperative banks) 
(http://www.cbi.iq/index.php?p
id=IraqFinancialInst) 
 
A more updated list exists with 
12 banks on 
http://www.iraqitic.com/iraqiti
c_islamic.php  
 
 
2) Elaf Islamic Bank - - - 0  Only annual reports, 
only till 2011. 
3) Kurdistan 
International Bank 
- - - 0  No reports. 
4) International 
Development Bank for 
Investment 
- - - 0  Only annual reports. 
5) Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank Iraq 
- - - 0  Not separately 
reported from UAE 
Bank. 
6) National Islamic Bank - - - 0  Only 2 annual reports 
2010, 2011. 
7) Dijlah & Furat Bank - - - 0  Website fail. - No data 
could be collected 
8) Regional Cooperation - - - 0  Only E-Mail available: 
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of the Islamic Bank taawenbank@yahoo.c
om - No data could be 
collected 
9) Bank Al-Bilad Islamic - - - 0  Website fail. - No data 
could be collected 
10) Cihan Bank for 
Islamic Investment 
- - - 0  Only E-Mail available: 
gihan@yahoo.com - 
No data could be 
collected 
11) Al-Baraka Turkatilim 
Bankasi 
- - - 0  Only E-Mail available: 
mzf2009@hotmail.co
m - No data could be 
collected 
12) Vakif Bank - - - 0  Turkish Bank operating 
in Iraq, no separate 
reporting. 
Iran 
(Non-
Segmented 
Market—Not 
included in 
Sample) 
 It is common practice to exclude Iran from Islamic banking data (see Ernst & Young Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 
for example “For the purpose of this report, the analysis excludes the Iranian market because of its unique characteristics.” 
and “*International Participation banking assets exclude Iran which has a unique domestic industry.” 
Reuters also mentions in an article (https://www.reuters.com/article/islamic-finance-iran/iran-to-chair-islamic-finance-body-
ifsb-in-2017-idUSL5N1EA0A3) Quotation from different parts of the article: “Years of isolation have led the country to develop 
practices that can contrast with those in other Islamic financial centres, but a prominent role within the Kuala Lumpur-based 
IFSB could help narrow those differences. The IFSB Council said late on Wednesday it had appointed Iran’s central bank 
governor Valiollah Seif as chairman effective from Jan. 1, with Bangladesh Bank governor Fazle Kabir as deputy chairman. 
Since 1983, Iran’s entire banking system has followed Islamic principles, which includes 34 Islamic banks that held total assets 
of 14,451 trillion rials ($448 billion) as of March. This represents around a third of total Islamic banking assets globally, 
although Iran’s version of Islamic finance can differ with what is observed in other Muslim-majority countries. For instance, 
Islamic finance is interpreted by scholars around the world to ban the payment of interest. This is also observed in Iran, 
although banks charge a profit rate that is periodically set by the central bank, a measure partly borne out of efforts to curb 
high inflation. Derivative contracts are also used in Iran’s capital market, while Islamic banks elsewhere are barred from using 
conventional options and future contracts. There are also differences in trading some debt instruments: A common type of 
Islamic bond traded in Iran uses a deferred sale contract known as salam, while buying and selling salam contracts has been 
disallowed in most other markets for over a decade.” 
Jordan 1) Jordan Dubai Islamic 
Bank 
2010-2016 81.28 15.50 26  Source of Data is Stock 
Exchange 
http://www.ase.com.jo/en/disc2) Jordan Islamic Bank 2008-2016 57.88 8.03 34  
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3) Al Rajhi Jordan 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
- - - 0  No separate reporting 
for Jordan Branches 
losures?category=1&symbol=A
RBK 
 
Unrestricted investment 
accounts as Volume of 
Investment Accounts 
Share of Unrestricted 
investment account holders as 
Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts 
Kuwait 1) Ahli United Bank 2010-2016 66.76 10.60 25  Balance Sheet: Deposits from 
Customers were taken as 
“Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
Important in all Kuwaiti Banks: 
Current Accounts are included 
and thus adversely affect the 
accurate returns on investment 
deposits/Islamic Assets. 
 
Income Statement: Distribution 
to Depositors  taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
2) Kuwait International 
Bank 
2009-2016 61.16 13.61 29  
3) Kuwait Finance House 2008-2016 65.70 12.01 34  
4) Boubyan Bank 2010-2016 81.84 11.86 26  
5) Warba Bank 2011-2016 64.97 10.14 19  No data earlier than 
2011Q4. 
6) Al Rajhi Kuwait 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
- - - 0  No individual data for 
Kuwait Branch are 
published. 
Lebanon 1) Al Baraka Lebanon 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
2011-2014 - - 0  No Quarterly Reports. 
 
 
2) Arab Finance House 
(Not included in 
- - - 0  No reports available. 
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Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
3) Lebanese Islamic Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
2010-2014 - - 0  No Quarterly Reports. 
Libya No Islamic Banks       
Malaysia 1) Affin Islamic Bank 2011-2016 77.13 7.25 22  From 2014Q3 they 
began re-classifying 
Demand or Savings 
Mudharabah Deposits 
as General and Special 
Mudharabah 
Investment Deposits. 
Balance Sheet: Customer 
Deposits + Bank Deposits were 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
[Including Bank Deposits will 
also bias % of Total Assets, but 
is included since we have clear 
data showing the returns 
distributed to these banks 
deposits, and that they are 
clearly Mudharabah/non-
Mudharabah contracts] 
 
Income Statement: Income 
attributable to Customer 
Deposits + Income attributable 
to Bank Deposits taken as 
“Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts” (Income 
on Islamic Assets) 
 
2) Al Rajhi Bank 2008-2016 85.44 9.95 34  They consider 
Wakalah a non-
Mudharabah 
Investment before 
2014Q1, and thus its 
income is hidden 
within the Income 
Attributable to non-
Mudharabah. Starting 
2014Q1 they move it 
outside non-
Mudharabah 
Investment and begin 
to report it alone as 
Income Attributable to 
Wakalah. We keep it 
with non-Mudharabah 
Investment for these 3 
quarters in till 2014Q3 
to maintain 
consistency. It makes 
no difference in the 
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calculation of Total 
Volume or Total 
Return on Deposits. 
3) Alliance Islamic Bank 2008-2016 89.83 8.39 34  
4) AmBank Islamic 2008-2016 77.31 7.26 34  
5) Asian Finance Bank 2008-2016 80.55 18.99 34  
6) Bank Islam Malaysia 2008-2016 89.51 8.68 34  
7) Bank Muamalat 
Malaysia 
2008-2016 89.12 9.10 34  
8) CIMB Islamic 2008-2016 81.36 6.43 34  
9) HSBC Amanah 2008-2016 65.95 9.21 32  
10) Hong Leong Islamic 2008-2016 87.06 7.08 34  
11) Kuwait Finance 
House 
2009-2016 78.50 16.76 29  
12) Maybank Islamic 2008-2016 92.58 4.86 34  
13) OCBC Al-Amin 2009-2016 90.37 6.86 30  
14) Public Islamic Bank 2008-2016 90.44 6.83 31  
15) RHB Islamic Bank 2008-2016 76.28 5.68 34  
16) Standard Chartered 
Islamic Saadiq 
2009-2016 65.09 5.72 29  
Nigeria 1) Jaiz Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of Observations) 
2012-2013 38.72 32.33 0  Data not available 
quarterly. Nothing 
after 2013Q4. 
Balance Sheet: Equity of 
Investment Accountholders 
Customers’ Investment 
Accounts taken as “Volume of 
Investment Accounts” (Islamic 
Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Return on 
Equity of Investment 
Accountholders net of 
Mudharib Fee taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
Oman 1) Nizwa Bank 2013-2016 49.94 29.91 14  Balance Sheet: Equity of 
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2) Al Izz Bank 2013-2016 57,54 28.78 11  Unrestricted Investment 
Accountholders and 
Customer/Interbank Wakala 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Return on 
Equity of Investment 
Accountholders net of 
Mudharib Fee and Profit on 
Customer/B ank Wakala taken 
as “Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts” (Income 
on Islamic Assets) 
3) Bank Muscat 
Meethaq* 
2013-2016 Islamic Window 14   
4) Muzn National Bank of 
Oman* 
2013-2016 Islamic Window 13  Starting 2014Q3 
Islamic Deposits are 
not reported except 
annually. 
 Data missing for 
2015Q1—Averaged 
2014Q4/2015Q2.  
 Data missing for 
2015Q2—Averaged 
2014Q4/2015Q3. 
 Data missing for 
2015Q3—Averaged 
2014Q4/2015Q4. 
 Data missing for 
2016Q1—Taken as 
linear progression of 
previous 4 quarters. 
5) Oman Arab Bank Al 
Yusr 
(Not included in 
2014-2015 69.46 16.74 0  No quarterly Data  
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Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
6) Maisarah Dhofar 
Bank* 
2013-2016 Islamic Window 13  Investment Accounts 
include Current and 
Savings Accounts of 
the Islamic Window. 
 
7) Sohar Islamic Bank* 2013-2016 Islamic Window 13  Income on Deposits 
only available annually 
until 2016Q1. 
 
8) Hilal Al Ahli Bank* 2013-2016 Islamic Window 14  Quarterly reports start 
2014. 
 2016Q2 not detailed. 
Deposits information 
not available, used 
2016Q1. 
Pakistan 1) Al Baraka Bank 
Pakistan 
2009-2016 61.88 6.62 30  Balance Sheet: All deposits that 
are deemed “remunerative” are 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
(includes Customer and 
Financial Institutions) 
 
Income Statement: Return on 
Deposits and other dues 
expensed taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
(Includes Sukuk when available) 
2) Bank Islami Pakistan 2009-2016 54.00 6.42 30  
 
 
 
3) Burj Bank 2009-2016 54.14 14.01 30  Previously Dawood 
Islamic Bank until 
2011Q4 
 2009 & 2010 reporting 
only Total Deposits. 
Used same proportion 
of overall Average of 
years 2011-2014 to 
obtain values for 
Current Accounts and 
Investment Accounts 
in 2009 & 2010. 
4) Dubai Islamic Bank 
Pakistan 
2009-2016 59.40 5.56 15  Quarterly Data 
available from 2014. 
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 Data missing for 
2015Q1—Averaged 
2014Q4/2015Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2016Q1—Averaged 
2015Q4/2016Q2. 
5) Meezan Bank 2009-2016 57.59 4.89 30  Data missing for 
2009Q3—Averaged 
2009Q2/2009Q4. 
Philippines 1) Al Amanah Investment 
Bank* 
2013-2015 Islamic Window 12  Income attributed to 
Islamic deposits refers 
only to General 
Investment Accounts. 
Total General Investment 
Deposits taken as “Volume of 
Investment Accounts” (Islamic 
Assets) 
General Investment Expenses 
taken as “Income attributable 
to Investment Accounts” 
(Income on Islamic Assets) 
Qatar 1) Barwa Bank 2010-2016 50.77 15.27 23  Data missing for 
2016Q1—Averaged 
2015Q4/2016Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2014Q1—Averaged 
2013Q4/2014Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2012Q3—Averaged 
2012Q2/2012Q4. 
 Data missing for 
2012Q1—Averaged 
2011Q4/2012Q2. 
Balance Sheet: Equity of 
Investment Account Holders 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Return on 
Investment Account Holders 
taken as “Income attributable 
to Investment Accounts” 
(Income on Islamic Assets) 
2) Qatar Islamic Bank 2009-2016 58.92 12.79 30  Data missing for 
2015Q3—Averaged 
2015Q2/2015Q4. 
3) Qatar International 
Islamic Bank 
2009-2016 56.97 12.72 30  Data missing for 
2009Q3—Averaged 
2009Q1/2009Q4. 
 Data missing for 
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2009Q2—Averaged 
2009Q1/2009Q3. 
4) Masraf Al Rayan 2009-2015 72.03 14.63 0  Quarterly Data missing 
from 2015Q1. 
 Quarterly Reports not 
accessible online. 
Saudi Arabia 1) National Commercial 
Bank 
Impossible to identify Islamic Banks/Islamic Windows/Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia since all Banks in Saudi Arabia are 
obliged to report "Special Commission Income" & "Special Commission Expense" instead of Interest and non-
interest/Investment Accounts Expense etc. which makes it unclear what is paid to Islamic depositors. According to Warde 
2008: “Saudi Arabia does not recognize the concept of Islamic banking. The logic is that if one bank is recognized as an 
Islamic institution then all others, by implication, would be un-Islamic. The official line is that all banks operating in Saudi 
Arabia are by definition Islamic. In addition, the country’s vast bank deposits and foreign holdings generate substantial 
interest income, and thus the Saudi authorities tread carefully around the issue of riba. Saudi banks for example report 
interest income as ‘special commission income’, as ‘service charges’ or as ‘book-keeping fees’.” Warde: Islamic Finance in 
the Global Economy, p. 208. 
2) Al Rajhi Bank 
3) Saudi British Bank 
(HSBC) 
4) Saudi Investment Bank 
5) Al Inma Bank 
Sri Lanka 1) Amana Bank 2011-2016 78.92 10.83 19  Data missing for 
2013Q3—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q4. 
 Data missing for 
2013Q2—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q3. 
 Data missing for 
2013Q1—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q2. 
Balance Sheet: Due to 
Customers (Savings and Term 
Deposits) taken as “Volume of 
Investment Accounts” (Islamic 
Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Financing 
Expenses taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
Sudan 
(Non-
Segmented 
Market—Not 
included in 
Sample) 
       
Syria 1) Al Baraka Bank Syria 2012-2016 7.17 9.72 15  Data missing for 
2014Q2—Averaged 
2014Q1/2014Q3. 
Balance Sheet: Investment 
Accounts (Savings and Term 
Deposits) taken as “Volume of 
Investment Accounts” (Islamic 2) Cham Bank 2010-2014 6.12 14.3 0  No Quarterly Reports. 
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(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Share of 
Investment Accounts taken as 
“Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts” (Income 
on Islamic Assets) 
3) Syria International 
Islamic Bank 
2009-2016 25.38 11.56 29  Data missing for 
2009Q3—Averaged 
2009Q2/2009Q4. 
4) Syria Finance House 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
   0  Not yet operational. 
Thailand 1) Islamic Bank of 
Thailand 
2009-2016 108.10 -15.96 30  Data missing for 
2014Q1—Averaged 
2013Q4/2014Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2012Q1—Averaged 
2011Q4/2012Q2. 
Balance Sheet:  Savings and 
Term Deposits taken as 
“Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Financial 
Expenses taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
Turkey 1) Asya Bank 2009-2015 42.23 13.35 27  No data after 2015Q3 
(Insolvent) 
Balance Sheet:  Total Funds 
Collected less Demand Deposits 
taken as “Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
 
Income Statement: Expense on 
Profit Sharing taken as “Income 
attributable to Investment 
Accounts” (Income on Islamic 
Assets) 
2) Al-Baraka Turk 2009-2016 53.39 7.40 30  Data missing for 
2011Q1—Averaged 
2010Q4/2011Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2013Q1—Averaged 
2012Q4/2013Q2. 
3) Kuveyt Turk 2009-2016 42.02 8.47 30  
4) Turkiye Finans 2009-2016 42.45 8.86 30  
UAE 1) National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi* 
2010-2016 Islamic Window 24  Depositor’s Share of 
Profits is available in 
2009Q4, but not 
before that. The 
Volume of Islamic 
Customer Deposits are 
Balance Sheet:  Islamic 
Customer Deposits (or Total 
Islamic Deposits) plus Sukuk 
issued if available taken as 
“Volume of Investment 
Accounts” (Islamic Assets) 
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not available prior to 
2010Q1 Thus no data 
is considered available 
prior to 2010. 
 Data on Volume of 
Islamic Deposits is not 
available from 
2016Q1. 
 
 Cannot disentangle Current 
Account, they are included in 
Customer Deposits.  
 Unclear whether income on 
Due to Banks is included in 
Depositor’s Share of Profits, 
thus Due to Banks (volume) 
was not included. 
 
Income Statement: Depositor’s 
Share of Profits (or Islamic 
Profit Distribution) plus profit to 
Sukuk holders if available taken 
as “Income attributable to 
Investment Accounts” (Income 
on Islamic Assets) 
2) Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank* 
2009-2016 Islamic Window 20  Islamic Window 
Established 2009Q2. 
 Details on Customer 
Deposits are 
unavailable in 
quarterly reports 
notes, only in Annual 
reports do they report 
which part of the Total 
Deposits belong to 
Islamic Investors 
before 2011Q3. 
 Unable to isolate 
Islamic Current 
Accounts from Total 
Islamic Deposits 
(except in Annual 
reports, thus ignored 
and maintained only 
total). 
 
 
3) Arab Bank for 
Investment and 
Foreign Trade* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
2015-2016 Islamic Window 4  No information about 
Islamic activities in 
financial statements 
before 2015Q2. 
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4) Commercial Bank of 
Dubai* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
2012-2016 Islamic Window 5  Quarterly reports: 
returns on Islamic 
deposits mixed with 
interest expense and 
cannot be 
disentangled. Only 
Annual statements 
usable. 
5) Dubai Islamic Bank 2008-2016 76.76 15.02 34   
6) Emirates NBD* 
 
2008-2016 Islamic Window 31   
7) Emirates Islamic Bank 
 
2008-2016 84.25 9.21 34  Data missing for 
2012Q1—Averaged 
2011Q4/2012Q2. 
 Data missing for 
2014Q1—Averaged 
2013Q4/2014Q2. 
 
8) Mashreq Al Islami* 2008-2016 Islamic Window 31  Only Annual Reports 
available for Islamic 
Bank with minimal 
data (No data on 
deposits or income on 
deposits). 
 Full data available 
from Mashreq Bank 
(Conventional) 
including information 
about Islamic 
activities. 
 
9) Sharjah Islamic Bank 2009-2016 70.86 15.86 30  Data missing for 
2009Q3—Averaged 
2009Q1/2009Q4. 
 
10) United Arab Bank* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of usable Data) 
- Islamic Window 0  No Islamic items on 
Financial Statements 
(no notes available for 
financial statements). 
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11) National Bank of Ras 
Al Khaima* 
2013-2016 Islamic Window 14  
12) National Bank of 
Fujairah* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of usable Data) 
2014-2016 Islamic Window 1  No info in financial 
statements about 
Islamic items (deposits 
or returns). 
 According to Quarterly 
Report 
2015Q1/2014Q4 Note 
12.1/16.1, p. 19/85, 
Islamic activities 
started October 2014 
through NPF Islamic 
Window. Customer 
Deposits include 
Shariah Compliant but 
are not specifically 
disentangled except 
from 2015Q4. 
 
 
 
13) National Bank of 
Umm Al Qaiwain* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of usable Data) 
- Islamic Window 0  No info in financial 
statements about 
Islamic items (deposits 
or returns). Only 
Annual Reports except 
2016Q1/Q2. 
14) First Gulf Bank* 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of usable Data) 
- Islamic Window 0  Deposits do not 
specify how much 
belong to Islamic 
Deposits 
 On the other hand, 
Interest Expense note 
specifies the portion of 
Islamic Financing 
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Expense only in 
Annual Reports. 
 The Islamic Financing 
may refer to the Sukuk 
but is not entirely 
clear 
 No quarterly data 
available, only Annual 
Reports. 
15) Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
2008-2016 81.65 12.41 34   
16) Al Noor Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack 
of Observations) 
2011-2015 87.49 8.90 0  Only Annual Reports 
available. 
17) Al Hilal Bank 2009-2016 82.44 13.37 27  Quarterly Data: Only 
2010Q2, 2011Q2, 
2013Q2, 2014Q2, 
2015Q2, 2016Q2 are 
available. 
 Annual Data: Only 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015 
financials are 
available. 
 Used Averaging to 
obtain missing data 
including some values 
for income on 
deposits. 
 Only 12 observations 
are “averaged-free” 
18) Ajman Bank 
 
2009-2015 76.89 8.59 29  
Yemen 1) Saba Islamic Bank 
(Not included in 
2010-2014 38.96 5.3 0  No quarterly data 
available, only Annual 
No Data. 
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Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
Reports. 
2) Tadamon International 
Islamic Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
Observations) 
2009-2014 62.49 11.21 0  No quarterly data 
available, only Annual 
Reports. 
3) Islamic Bank of Yemen 
for Finance and 
Investment 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
- - - 0  No data available (site 
under construction). 
Data links available are 
only annual (2010 - 
2014). 
4) Al Kuraimi 
Microfinance Islamic 
Bank 
(Not included in 
Sample due to lack of 
usable Data) 
- - - 0  No data available 
Totals 
27 Countries 120 Banks Arithmetic average of Islamic assets as a percentage of total liabilities and 
equity: 
67.99% 
Arithmetic average of equity as a percentage of 
total liabilities and equity: 
9.74% 
Totals of those included in Sample 
16 Countries 81 Banks Arithmetic average of Islamic assets as a percentage of total liabilities and 
equity: 
69.60% 
Arithmetic average of equity as a percentage of 
total liabilities and equity: 
8.90% 
Table 57: Islamic banks overview showing all banks in 27 countries with details about data collection and share of Islamic assets and equity in total liabilities and equity. 
  
APPENDIX 
251 
Appendix D.1.3. Indices Overview27 
Country All-Stocks Index Islamic Stocks Index 
1 Bahrain Bahrain Bourse All Share Index 
 Is a capitalization-weighted index of all Bahraini public share-
holding companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
 Price index 
 It was launched in 2004. 
 http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/BHSEASI:IND 
 Assumed Net Market Cap (not stated), although on Marketstoday 
Website (Info on Gulf States Stock Markets), it is 30bn BHD, while 
on the Central Bank and Bahrain Bourse Websites it is 8.5bn BHD. 
Thus we assumed the 8.5bn is the Net Market Cap and that 
published by Marketstoday is the Full Market Cap. 
S&P Bahrain Domestic Shariah Index 
 Filtered version of S&P Bahrain Domestic Index (according to 
Factsheet, contains 5 Stocks at 2016Q2)—According to Factsheet on 
Domestic Index (S&P), p. 6 & 22: “S&P Domestic Indices, designed 
primarily for local investors whereby the float-adjusted market 
capitalization only adjusts for major shareholders and does not 
consider foreign investment limits”—Thus assumed contains all 
stocks in that country that pass Shariah compliance. 
 Price Index 
 Constituents are weighted by Net Market Capitalization. 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted 
monthly. 
 Launched Dec 2008 
Alternative: Bahrain Bourse launched a Bahrain Islamic Index in 2015. 
 http://www.bahrainbourse.com/indices?mkey=BIX  
 Contains 7 stocks. 
2 Bangladesh DSEX (Dhaka Stock Exchange Broad Index All-Shares) 
 Includes all shares on the Bangladesh Equity Market 
 Price Index 
 Based on net market capitalization and reflects 97% of the 
total equity market capitalization (criteria is having a net 
market capitalization above 100 million BDT at start of 
inclusion [this may fall to 70 mn and remain in the index, but 
below 70 is deleted]). 
 Base Date 17th Jan 2008 with a base value of 2951.91 
(continuing on the older DSE General Index which had this 
value at said date and goes back to 2001). 
 Additions/Deletions take place quarterly. 
S&P Shariah Index Bangladesh 
 S&P Bangladesh BMI Shariah covers large-mid-and small- cap stocks 
in Bangladesh (seems like all stocks). 
 S&P provides data for Price or Return Index, but only 5 years, while I 
can get more than 5 years if I use the Price Index (used). 
 Constituents are weighted by Net Market Capitalization. 
 Price Index 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted 
monthly. 
 Launched Feb 2009 
Alternative DSES (Dhaka Stock Exchange Shariah) 
 Includes all stocks in the DSEX that pass Shariah compliance. 
 Price Index 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted 
monthly. 
                                                          
27 Indices are analyzed only for those countries included in the sample as per the availability Islamic Bank data (except for India). 
APPENDIX 
252 
 Constituents are weighted by net market capitalization. 
 Could not obtain Market Capitalization for DSES. 
3 Egypt EGX100 
 includes EGX30 and EGX70 
 Largest 100 Companies based on net market capitalization. 
 Price Index 
 http://www.egx.com.eg/english/Indices.aspx 
 No Islamic Index. Announcement exists, but index data is not 
available http://www.idealratings.com/naeem-holding-announces-
nise25-egypt-islamic-real-time-index-by-idealratings.html  
4 India S&P BSE 500 
 Top 500 companies by net market capitalization 
 Captures more than 95% of the net market capitalization on 
the stock exchange. 
 Price Index 
 http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-bse-500    
S&P BSE 500 Shariah 
 Shariah compliant stocks of the top 500 companies by net market 
capitalization. 
 Price Index 
 Currently includes 208 stocks. 
 http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-bse-500-shariah  
5 Indonesia JCI (Jakarta Composite Index) 
 includes all shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
 Based on net market capitalization. 
 Price Index 
 http://www.idx.co.id/en-
us/home/information/forinvestor/stockmarketindices.aspx 
or using Quarterly Reports (Downloaded) 
JII (Jakarta Islamic Index) 
 includes 30 most traded Shariah compliant stocks from the JCI 
 Base Year 1995 
 Net market capitalization 
 Price Index 
 http://www.idx.co.id/en-us/home/datadownload/summary.aspx 
http://www.idx.co.id/en-
us/home/information/forinvestor/stockmarketindices.aspx (market cap) 
 
Alternative ISSI (Indonesia Sharia Stock Index) 
 Includes all stocks in the Indonesia Stock Exchange that pass Shariah 
compliance. 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted semi-
annually. 
 Net market capitalization 
 Launched May 2011 
 http://www.idx.co.id/Home/ProductAndServices/ShariaMarket/tabi
d/155/language/en-US/Default.aspx  
 ISSI covers larger stock base (over 300 stocks) [ISSI Market Cap 
13.04.2015:  3,038.3 trillion, JII Market Cap 13.04.2015:     2,019.9 
trillion] but data only from 2011Q2 
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6 Jordan Amman Stock Exchange Index 
 includes most liquid 100 companies on the Amman Stock 
Exchange based on net market capitalization 
 Price index 
 Base revised to 1000 points in January 2004. 
 No Islamic Index. 
7 Kuwait Kuwait Stock Exchange Index 
 includes all shares on the Kuwait Stock Exchange 
 Price Index, calculated as shown in 
http://www.kuwaitse.com/KSE/Trading.aspx  (right side 
“Price Index”) 
 Market cap obtained from Marketstoday website, which 
from Bahrain was assumed to represent the Full Market Cap. 
It matches the Market Cap obtained from the Kuwait Stock 
Market Report, which probably means the stock market 
reports the Full Market Cap as well. 
S&P Kuwait Domestic Shariah Index 
 filtered version of S&P Kuwait Domestic Index (according to 
Factsheet, contains 24 Stocks at 2015Q1)—According to Factsheet on 
Domestic Index (S&P), Kuwait Domestic was launched 2006, p.6 & 12: 
“S&P Domestic Indices, designed primarily for local investors 
whereby the float-adjusted market capitalization only adjusts for 
major shareholders and does not consider foreign investment 
limits”—Thus assumed contains all stocks in that country that pass 
Shariah compliance. 
 Price Index 
 Constituents are weighted by net market capitalization. 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted 
monthly. 
 Launched Dec 2008 
 
8 Malaysia EMAS All-Shares Index 
 Data available for net and full market capitalization 
 Price Index 
 Comprises the constituents of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 
100 Index (Comprises the constituents of the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI (This tradable index comprises the 30 largest 
companies in the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS index by market 
capitalization.) and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 70 
Index.(Comprises the next 70 companies in the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia EMAS Index by full market capitalization.)) and 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small Cap Index (Comprises those 
eligible companies within the top 98% of the Bursa Malaysia 
Main Market excluding constituents of the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia Top 100 Index.). 
 http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/products-
services/indices/ftse-bursa-malaysia-indices/overview/ 
EMAS Shariah Index 
 Data available for net and full market capitalization 
 The FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS Shariah Index comprises constituents 
of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS index that are Shariah-compliant 
according to the Securities Commission's SAC screening methodology 
and FTSE's screens of free float, liquidity and investment. 
 Price Index 
 The index has been designed to provide investors with a broad 
benchmark for Shariah-compliant investment. 
 http://www.finanzen100.de/index/ftse-bursa-malaysia-emas-
shariah-indexi_H176507070_16693067/chart.html 
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9 Oman Muscat Securities Market (MSM) 30  
 includes 30 shares on the Kuwait Stock Exchange 
 Price Index, calculated as shown in 
https://www.msm.gov.om/ (was full market capitalization 
until 2009, then changed to net market capitalization). We 
use only started from 2009 (Net market capitalization) 
S&P Oman Domestic Shariah Index 
 Filtered version of S&P Oman Domestic Index (according to Factsheet, 
contains 8 Stocks at 2015Q1)—According to Factsheet on Domestic 
Index (S&P), p.6 & 12: “S&P Domestic Indices, designed primarily for 
local investors whereby the float-adjusted market capitalization only 
adjusts for major shareholders and does not consider foreign 
investment limits”—Thus assumed contains all stocks in that country 
that pass Shariah compliance. 
 Price Index 
 Constituents are weighted by net market capitalization. 
 Re-balancing for Shariah compliance constituents is adjusted 
monthly. 
 Launched Dec 2008 
10 Pakistan Karachi All-Shares Index 
 Includes all shares on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
 Price Index 
 Net Market Capitalization 
 http://www.kse.com.pk/index.php (Products & Services 
Tab—Market Indices) 
KSE-Meezan Index (KMI30) 
 Consists of 30 most traded Shariah compliant shares. 
 Net Market Capitalization 
 Price Index 
 Launched 2008 
 Re-balanced Semi-annually 
 Data from 
http://www.scstrade.com/MarketStatistics/MS_HistoricalIndices.as
px only available from 2012Q1 
 
Alternative Dow Jones Islamic Market Pakistan Index 
 Net Market Capitalization 
 Launched 2006 
 Re-balanced Quarterly 
 Data Unavailable 
11 Philippines PHP Dow Jones Philippines Price Index 
 Mid and large-capitalization companies included 
 Price Index 
 Net market capitalization 
 
12 Qatar QE-All Shares Index 
 Covers all listed stocks with share velocity greater than 1%. 
Velocity is the proportion of total shares that have changed 
hands in one year. 
QE Al Rayan Islamic Index 
 Total Return Index 
 Covers all listed stocks with share velocity greater than 5% and 
meeting Shariah Compliance Criteria. 
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 The All Share index measure 'total return', i.e., the series 
measures price and dividend income movement 
 Net Market Capitalization 
 Semi-annual review. 
 Net market capitalization 
13 Sri Lanka All-Shares Price Index 
 Is a net-market capitalization weighted index where the 
weight of any company is taken as the number of ordinary 
shares listed in the market.  
 Price Index 
 This weighting system allows the price movements of larger 
companies to have a greater impact on the index. Such a 
weighting system was adopted on the assumption that the 
general economic situation has a greater influence on larger 
companies than on smaller ones. 
Dow Jones Islamic Market Sri Lanka Index 
 Net Market Capitalization 
 Price Index 
 Launched 2008 
 Re-balanced Quarterly 
14 Syria Damascus Securities Exchange Weighted Index (DWX) 
 Established 2010 
 Covers all stocks listed in the Damascus securities exchange 
 Price Index 
 Net market capitalization 
 No Islamic Index 
15 Thailand FTSE SET All-Share Index 
 includes 97% largest Market Cap 
 Full market capitalization based 
 Price Index 
Alternative SET Index 
 Based on all common stock traded on the SET’s main market. 
Stocks that have been suspended trading for more than 1 
year are excluded. 
 Established 1975 
 Full-Market Capitalization based (Seems so from 2nd page of 
Factsheet: “composite market-capitalization-weighted price 
index which compares the market value of all listed common 
stocks with its market value…” 
 Adjustments are made for constituents or other non-price 
related changes.  
FTSE SET Shariah 
 Based on FTSE SET All-Share index (which is based on 97% of Full-
Market Capitalization in the SET Market). 
 Re-balanced semi annual 
 Full market capitalization 
16 Turkey XUTUM Borsa Istanbul All Shares 
 Consists of All-Shares traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
 Net-Market Capitalization 
Dow Jones Islamic Market Turkey index 
 Re-balanced quarterly 
 Net-Market Capitalization 
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 Price Index  Price Index 
17 UAE Dow Jones UAE Total Stock Market Return Index 
 Net market capitalization sum of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
Markets. 
 Return Index 
Alternative 
Dubai Financial Market General Index 
 Net-Market Capitalization 
 Price Index 
Abu Dhabi General Index 
 Net-Market Capitalization  
 Price Index 
S&P UAE Domestic Shariah Index 
 Net-Market Capitalization 
 Re-balanced Monthly 
 Launched Dec 2008 
 Used Total Return Index 
Table 58: Indices overview across countries not eliminated due to lack of Islamic assets’ data with details about data collection for Islamic indices and All-stock indices. 
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Appendix D.2. Country-Specific Economic Benchmarks 
Country 
CPI 
(Inflation 
Rate) 
Savings 
Deposits 
Rate 
T-Bills Rate 
Transaction 
Costs for T-
Bills 
Transaction 
Costs for 
Stocks 
Bahrain 0.90% 0.31% 0.51% 0.010% 0.28% 
Bangladesh 1.32% 1.36% 0.98% 0.030% 0.03% 
Indonesia 0.79% 0.39% 1.27% 0.004% 0.03% 
Kuwait 0.77% 0.27% 0.25% 0.100% 0.100% 
Malaysia 0.27% 0.83% 0.78% 0.030% 0.030% 
Oman 0.32% 0.63% 0.25% 0.001% 0.001% 
Pakistan 1.01% 0.78% 1.46% 0.003% 0.028% 
Qatar 0.69% 0.64% 0.64% 0.275% 0.275% 
Sri Lanka 1.42% 1.57% 2.15% 0.020% 0.64% 
Thailand 0.02% 0.26% 0.35% 0.001% 0.001% 
Turkey 2.13% 2.64% 2.62% 0.001% 0.25% 
UAE 0.45% 0.12% N/A 0.028% 0.125% 
Egypt 3.33% 1.82% 2.74% 0.012% 0.012% 
Jordan -0.10% 0.16% 0.57% 0.095% 0.740% 
Philippines 0.47% 0.44% 0.39% 0.005% 0.005% 
Syria 10.19% 1.52% 1.52% 0.001% 0.01% 
India 1.47% 0.99% 1.66% 0.250% 0.250% 
Table 59: Country-specific economic benchmarks used to test economic significance.  
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Appendix D.3. ADF—Testing for Stationarity with Deterministic Trend and 4 lags 
Time Series No. of 
Obs. 
ADF  
p-value28 
Conclusion 
Bahrain - All-Stocks 25 0.8827 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bahrain - Islamic Stocks 25 0.5812 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bahrain - Non-Islamic Stocks 25 0.5092 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bahrain - Islamic Assets 25 0.2286 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bahrain - Market Portfolio 25 0.8826 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bangladesh – All-Stocks 24 0.0877 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Bangladesh - Islamic Stocks 24 0.0856 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Bangladesh - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.0517 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Bangladesh - Islamic Assets 24 0.9597 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Bangladesh - Market Portfolio 24 0.0827 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Egypt – All-Stocks 21 0.5978 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Egypt - Islamic Assets 21 0.9936 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Egypt - Market Portfolio 21 0.6036 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Indonesia – All-Stocks 24 0.3442 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Indonesia - Islamic Stocks 24 0.2044 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Indonesia - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.4668 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Indonesia - Islamic Assets 24 0.6502 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Indonesia - Market Portfolio 24 0.3442 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Jordan - All Stocks 24 0.1044 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Jordan - Islamic Assets 24 0.8436 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Jordan - Market Portfolio 24 0.1068 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
                                                          
28 The critical values included in the output are linearly interpolated from the table of values that appears in Fuller (1996), and the MacKinnon approximate p-values use the 
regression surface published in MacKinnon (1994). 
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Kuwait – All-Stocks 24 0.8381 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Kuwait - Islamic Stocks 24 0.6080 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Kuwait - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.8171 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Kuwait - Islamic Assets 24 0.8276 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Kuwait - Market Portfolio 24 0.8359 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Malaysia – All-Stocks 25 0.0536 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Malaysia - Islamic Stocks 25 0.0133 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Malaysia - Non-Islamic Stocks 25 0.1899 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Malaysia - Islamic Assets 25 0.0007 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Malaysia - Market Portfolio 25 0.0526 Unit root can be rejected at 10% level 
Oman – All-Stocks 9 0.9959 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Oman - Islamic Stocks 9 0.9970 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Oman - Non-Islamic Stocks 9 0.9928 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Oman - Islamic Assets 9 0.8949 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Oman - Market Portfolio 9 0.9959 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Pakistan – All-Stocks 24 0.8773 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Pakistan - Islamic Stocks 24 0.6212 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Pakistan - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.8968 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Pakistan - Islamic Assets 24 0.4778 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Pakistan - Market Portfolio 24 0.8776 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Philippines - All Stocks 9 0.7635 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Philippines - Islamic Assets 9 0.5577 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Philippines - Market Portfolio 9 0.7635 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Qatar – All-Stocks 24 0.6462 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Qatar - Islamic Stocks 24 0.4760 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Qatar - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.6349 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Qatar - Islamic Assets 24 1.0000 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Qatar - Market Portfolio 24 0.6458 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
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Sri Lanka – All-Stocks 14 0.7029 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Sri Lanka - Islamic Stocks 14 0.5401 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Sri Lanka - Non-Islamic Stocks 14 0.8381 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Sri Lanka - Islamic Assets 14 0.5578 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Sri Lanka - Market Portfolio 14 0.7039 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Syria - All Stocks 21 0.3993 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Syria - Islamic Assets 21 0.7406 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Syria - Market Portfolio 21 0.4000 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Thailand – All-Stocks 24 0.2322 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Thailand - Islamic Stocks 24 0.2342 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Thailand - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.2650 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Thailand - Islamic Assets 24 0.8193 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Thailand - Market Portfolio 24 0.2320 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Turkey – All-Stocks 24 0.3019 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Turkey - Islamic Stocks 24 0.4492 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Turkey - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.2867 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Turkey - Islamic Assets 24 0.5276 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Turkey - Market Portfolio 24 0.3030 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
UAE – All-Stocks 24 0.8801 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
UAE - Islamic Stocks 24 0.5649 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
UAE - Non-Islamic Stocks 24 0.9269 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
UAE - Islamic Assets 24 0.9909 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
UAE - Market Portfolio 24 0.8789 Unit root cannot be rejected at 10% level 
Table 60: Test for stationarity of all return time series using ADF with linear deterministic trend and significance at 10% 
. 
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Appendix E. Empirical Results 
Appendix E.1. Factor Loadings of the Theoretically Exact Model 
using the Full-Sample 
Double Segmented Markets 
Islamic Investment Account 
Factor Loading 
for 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑠 
Factor Loading 
for 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴  
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 1.0112 0.0112 
Al Salam Bank 1.0092 0.0092 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 1.0059 0.0059 
Ithmaar Bank 0.9886 -0.0114 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.0002 0.0002 
Kuwait Finance House Bahrain 1.0066 0.0066 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank Bangladesh 0.9947 -0.0053 
Al-Arafah Bank 0.9956 -0.0044 
Export Import Bank 1.0067 0.0067 
Social Islami Bank 1.0027 0.0027 
Shahjalal Islami Bank 1.0021 0.0021 
First Security Islami Bank 1.0083 0.0083 
ICB Islamic Bank 0.9905 -0.0095 
Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah 0.9952 -0.0048 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia 1.0084 0.0084 
Syariah Mandiri 0.9949 -0.0051 
Syariah Mega Bank 0.9813 -0.0187 
Syariah Bukopin 1.0010 0.0010 
Bank Jaber Banten* 1.0206 0.0206 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 1.0037 0.0037 
Kuwait International Bank 1.0024 0.0024 
Kuwait Finance House 0.9994 -0.0006 
Boubyan Bank 0.9990 -0.0010 
Warba Bank 0.9952 -0.0048 
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Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 1.0039 0.0039 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 1.0134 0.0134 
Alliance Islamic Bank 1.0045 0.0045 
AmBank 1.0058 0.0058 
Asian Finance Bank 1.0088 0.0088 
Bank Islam Malaysia 1.0029 0.0029 
Bank Muamalat 1.0061 0.0061 
CIMB Islamic 1.0045 0.0045 
HSBC Manah 0.9997 -0.0003 
Hong Leong Islamic 1.0070 0.0070 
Kuwait Finance House 0.9863 -0.0137 
Maybank Islamic 0.9968 -0.0032 
OSBC Al Amin 0.9889 -0.0111 
Public Islamic Bank 0.9941 -0.0059 
RHB Islamic Bank 1.0041 0.0041 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 0.9876 -0.0124 
Oman 
Nizwa Bank 1.0019 0.0019 
Al Izz Islamic Bank 1.0095 0.0095 
Bank Muscat Meethaq 0.9977 -0.0023 
Muzn National Bank of Oman 0.9971 -0.0029 
Maisarah Dhofar Bank 0.9950 -0.0050 
Sohar Bank 1.0075 0.0075 
Hilal Al Ahli Bank 0.9998 -0.0002 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank Pakistan 0.9978 -0.0022 
Bank Islami Pakistan 0.9997 -0.0003 
Burj Bank 0.9979 -0.0021 
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan 1.0160 0.0160 
Meezan Bank 0.9961 -0.0039 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank 1.0007 0.0007 
Qatar Islamic Bank 1.0008 0.0008 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.9971 -0.0029 
Masraf Al Rayan 0.9998 -0.0002 
Sri Lanka 
Amana Bank 1.0000 0.0000 
Thailand 
Islamic Bank of Thailand 1.0000 0.0000 
Turkey 
Asya Bank 1.0094 0.0094 
Al-Baraka Turk 0.9986 -0.0014 
Kuveyt Turk 0.9993 -0.0007 
Turkiye Finans 0.9999 -0.0001 
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UAE 
National Bank of AbuDhabi* 1.0037 0.0037 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* 0.9983 -0.0017 
Dubai Islamic Bank 1.0000 0.0000 
Emirates NBD* 1.0000 0.0000 
Emirates Islamic Bank 0.9996 -0.0004 
Mashreq Al Islami* 1.0011 0.0011 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.9992 -0.0008 
National Bank of RAK* 0.9981 -0.0019 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 0.9960 -0.0040 
Al Hilal Bank 1.0134 0.0134 
Ajman Bank 1.0007 0.0007 
Single Segmented Markets 
Islamic Investment Account 
Factor Loading for 
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑆  
Factor Loading 
for 𝑅𝑀𝐼𝐴  
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic Bank 1.0091 0.0091 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 0.9999 -0.0001 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 0.9994 -0.0006 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 0.9925 -0.0075 
Jordan Islamic Bank 1.0024 0.0024 
Philippines 
Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank* 1.0000 0.0000 
Syria 
Al Baraka Bank Syria 0.9911 -0.0089 
Syria International Islamic Bank 1.0035 0.0035 
Table 61: Factor loadings of the theoretically correct model for each Islamic investment account using the full-
sample. 
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Appendix E.2. Time-Series Plots of Islamic Investment Accounts’ Returns and Comparison to LIBOR/Country-Specific 
T-Bills 
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Figure 43 a-g: Bahrain Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 44 a-h: Bangladesh Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 45 a-d: Egypt Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 46 a-g: Indonesia Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
   
Figure 47 a-c: Jordan Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates 
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Figure 48 a-f: Kuwait Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates.  
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Figure 49 a-q: Malaysia Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 50 a-h: Oman Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 51 a-e: Pakistan Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
 
  
Figure 52: Philippines Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates (points outside the graphic are due to scaling down to maintain visibility of 
majority of points). 
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Figure 53 a-e: Qatar Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 54: Sri Lanka Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
   
Figure 55 a-c: Syria Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. Note that no data for T-Bills rates for Syria was available. No data for Syrian 
government finances have been available since 2010. 
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Figure 56: Thailand Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 57 a-e: Turkey Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. 
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Figure 58 a-l: UAE Islamic investment accounts’ returns and comparison to LIBOR/country-specific T-Bills rates. Note that no data for T-Bills rates for UAE was available. UAE had not issued 
any T-Bills until time of data collection. 
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Appendix E.3. Full-Sample Valuation using All Three Ranges 
 
Figure 59: Bahrain long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 60: Bahrain short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 61: Bangladesh long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 62: Bangladesh short-term Islamic 
investment accounts’ valuation with 
ranges. 
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Figure 63: Egypt long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 64: Egypt short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 65: Indonesia long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 66: Indonesia short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Figure 67: Jordan long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 68: Jordan short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 69: Kuwait long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 70: Kuwait short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Figure 71: Malaysia long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 72: Malaysia short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 73: Oman long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 74: Oman short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Figure 75: Pakistan long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 76: Pakistan short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 77: Philippines long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 78: Philippines short-term Islamic 
investment accounts’ valuation with 
ranges. 
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Figure 79: Qatar long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 80: Qatar short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 81: Sri Lanka long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 82: Sri Lanka short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Figure 83: Syria long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 84: Syria short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 85: Thailand long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 86: Thailand short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Figure 87: Turkey long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 88: Turkey short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 89: UAE long-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
 
Figure 90: UAE short-term Islamic investment 
accounts’ valuation with ranges. 
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Appendix E.4. Full-Sample and Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes with 5% Range 
Appendix E.4.1. Full-Sample Valuation using 5% Range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 91: Bahrain : Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 92: Bangladesh: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 93: Egypt: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 94: Indonesia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 95: Jordan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 96: Kuwait: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 97: Malaysia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 98: Oman: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term (green 
 undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 99: Pakistan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 100: Philippines: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 101: Qatar: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 102: Sri Lanka: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 103: Syria: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 104: Thailand: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 105: Turkey: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 106: UAE: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term (green 
 undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
  
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
Asya Bank Al-Baraka Turk Kuveyt Turk Turkiye Finans
Required Expected Returns Empirical Returns
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0.35%
0.40%
0.45%
Required Expected Returns Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
297 
Appendix E.4.2. Full-Sample Valuation using 5% Range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 107: Bahrain: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 108: Bangladesh: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 109: Egypt: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 110: Indonesia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 111: Jordan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 112: Kuwait: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 113: Malaysia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 114: Oman: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Figure 115: Pakistan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 116: Philippines: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 117: Qatar: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 118: Sri Lanka: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
1.10%
1.20%
1.30%
1.40%
1.50%
1.60%
Al Baraka Bank
Pakistan
Bank Islami
Pakistan
Burj Bank Dubai Islamic Bank
Pakistan
Meezan Bank
Required Expected Returns Empirical Average Returns
-3.12%
-3.11%
-3.10%
Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank*
Required Expected Returns Empirical Average Returns
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0.35%
0.40%
Barwa Bank Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar International
Islamic Bank
Masraf Al Rayan
Required Expected Returns Empirical Average Returns
1.20%
1.30%
1.40%
1.50%
Amana Bank
Required Expected Returns Empirical Average Returns
APPENDIX 
300 
 
Figure 119: Syria: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term (green 
 undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 120: Thailand: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 121: Turkey: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
 
Figure 122: UAE: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [5%]. 
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Appendix E.4.3. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes using 5% Range (Short-Term Valuation)29 
Figure 123a - Figure 123f: Bahrain rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 123a: Al Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 123b: Al Salam Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 123c: Bahrain Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 123d: Ithmaar Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
                                                          
29 Note that in the figures, the secondary axis (for Change in Volume) has no visible horizontal “0”Line so as not to mix it up with that of the primary axis. 
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Figure 123e: Khaleeji Commercial rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 123f: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
  
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
2013Q4 2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
2013Q4 2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
303 
Figure 124a - Figure 124g: Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 124a: Islamic Bank Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 124b: Al-Arafah Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 124c: Export Import Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 124d: Social Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 124e: Shahjalal Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 124f: First Security Islami rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 124g: ICB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 125a - Figure 125c: Egypt rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 125a: Faisal Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 125b: Al-Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 125c: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 126a - Figure 126f: Indonesia rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 126a: BRI Syariah rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 126b: Bank Muamalat Indonesia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 126c: Syariah Mandiri rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 126d: Syariah Mega Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 126e: Syariah Bukopin rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 126f: Bank Jaber Banten* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 127a - Figure 127b: Jordan rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 127a: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 127b: Jordan Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 128a - Figure 128e: Kuwait rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 128a: Ahli United Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 128b: Kuwait International Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 128c: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 128d: Boubyan Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 128e: Warba Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 129a - Figure 129p: Malaysia rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 129a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 129e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 129i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 129m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 129p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 130a - Figure 130e: Pakistan rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 130a: Al Baraka Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 130b: Bank Islami Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 130c: Burj Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 130d: Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
2.00%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-40%
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
316 
 
Figure 130f: Meezan Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 131a - Figure 131d: Qatar rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 131a: Barwa Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 131b: Qatar Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 131c: Qatar International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 131d: Masraf Al-Rayan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 132a - Figure 132b: Syria rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 132a: Al Baraka Bank Syria rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 132b: Syria International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
Figure 133: Thailand rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 133: Islamic Bank of Thailand rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 134a - Figure 134d: Turkey rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 134a: Asya Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 134b: Al-Baraka Bank Turkey rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 134c: Kuveyt Turk rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 134d: Turkiye Finans rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 135a - Figure 135k: UAE rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 135a: National Bank of Abu Dhabi* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135b: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135c: Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135d: Emirates NBD* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 135e: Emirates Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135f: Mashreq Al-Islami* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135g: Sharjah Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135h: National Bank of RAK* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 135i: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135j: Al Hilal Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 135k: Ajman Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Appendix E.4.4. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes using 5% Range (Long-Term Valuation) 
Figure 136a - Figure 136f: Bahrain rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 136a: Al Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 136b: Al Salam Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 136c: Bahrain Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 136d: Ithmaar Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 136e: Khaleeji Commercial rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 136f: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 137a - Figure 137g: Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 137a: Islamic Bank Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 137b: Al-Arafah Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 137c: Export Import Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 137d: Social Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 137e: Shahjalal Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 137f: First Security Islami rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 137g: ICB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 138a - Figure 138c: Egypt rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 138a: Faisal Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 138b:Al-Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 138c: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 139a - Figure 139f: Indonesia rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 139a: BRI Syariah rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 139b: Bank Muamalat Indonesia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 139c: Syariah Mandiri rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 139d: Syariah Mega Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 139e: Syariah Bukopin rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 139f: Bank Jaber Banten* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 140a - Figure 140b: Jordan rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 140a: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 140b: Jordan Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 141a - Figure 141e: Kuwait rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 141a: Ahli United Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 141b: Kuwait International Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 141c: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 141d: Boubyan Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 141e: Warba Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 142a - Figure 142p: Malaysia rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 142a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 142e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 142i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 142m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 142p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 143a - Figure 143e: Pakistan rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 143a: Al Baraka Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 143b: Bank Islami Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 143c: Burj Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 143d: Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 143e: Meezan Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 144a - Figure 144d: Qatar rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 144a: Barwa Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 144b: Qatar Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 144c: Qatar International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 144d: Masraf Al-Rayan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 145a - Figure 145b: Syria rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 145a: Al Baraka Bank Syria rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 145b: Syria International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
Figure 146: Thailand rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 146: Islamic Bank of Thailand rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 147a - Figure 147d: Turkey rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 147a: Asya Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 147b: Al-Baraka Bank Turkey rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 147c: Kuveyt Turk rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 147d: Turkiye Finans rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 148a - Figure 148k: UAE rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 148a: National Bank of Abu Dhabi* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148b: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148c: Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148d: Emirates NBD* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 148e: Emirates Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148f: Mashreq Al-Islami* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148g: Sharjah Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148h: National Bank of RAK* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 148i: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148j: Al Hilal Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 148k: Ajman Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Appendix E.4.5. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes for Malaysia Private Investors using 5% Range (Short- and Long-Term 
Valuation) 
Appendix E.4.5.1. Short-Term 
Figure 149a - Figure 149p: Malaysia Private Investors rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 149a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 149e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 149i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 149m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 149p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Appendix E.4.5.2. Long-Term 
Figure 150a - Figure 150p: Malaysia Private Investors rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 150a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 150e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 150i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 150m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 150p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private 
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Appendix E.4.6. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes for Malaysia Financial Institutions using 5% Range (Short- and Long-Term 
Valuation) 
Appendix E.4.6.1. Short-Term 
Figure 151a - Figure 151p: Malaysia Financial Institutions rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 151a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 151e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 151i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
356 
 
Figure 151m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 151p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
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Appendix E.4.6.2. Long-Term 
Figure 152a - Figure 152p: Malaysia Financial Institutions rolling estimation with volume using 5% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 152a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 152e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 152i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 152m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 152p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Appendix E.4.7. Summary of Correct Volume Changes with 5% Range 
This table shows in how many quarters the change in volume for a specific Islamic 
investment account matched the investment recommendation (Volume change positive 
when undervalued or volume change negative when overvalued) in the short-and long-
term valuation. 
Using 5% Range Short-Term Long-Term 
Total 
Quarters 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Correct Volume 
Changes when: 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 
6 1 7 0 11 64% 64% 
Al Salam Bank 2 0 0 2 11 18% 18% 
Bahrain Islamic 
Bank 
2 5 0 6 11 64% 55% 
Ithmaar Bank 2 2 5 0 11 36% 45% 
Khaleeji 
Commercial Bank 
3 2 0 2 11 45% 18% 
Kuwait Finance 
House Bahrain 
2 2 0 5 11 36% 45% 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank 
Bangladesh 
0 7 0 7 10 70% 70% 
Al-Arafah Bank 5 3 2 0 10 80% 20% 
Export Import Bank 2 1 4 0 10 30% 40% 
Social Islami Bank 1 7 1 2 10 80% 30% 
Shahjalal Islami 
Bank 
0 3 0 0 10 30% 0% 
First Security Islami 
Bank 
2 0 2 0 10 20% 20% 
ICB Islamic Bank 0 6 0 6 10 60% 60% 
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic Bank 2 1 0 5 7 43% 71% 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 
2 0 0 0 5 40% 0% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
4 0 0 1 7 57% 14% 
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Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah 5 0 8 0 10 50% 80% 
Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia 
5 0 5 0 10 50% 50% 
Syariah Mandiri 0 4 0 4 10 40% 40% 
Syariah Mega Bank 2 0 3 1 10 20% 40% 
Syariah Bukopin 8 0 8 0 10 80% 80% 
Bank Jaber Banten* 6 0 7 0 10 60% 70% 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai 
Islamic Bank 
9 0 10 0 10 90% 100% 
Jordan Islamic Bank 1 0 0 2 10 10% 20% 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 2 4 0 4 10 60% 40% 
Kuwait 
International Bank 
5 0 0 5 10 50% 50% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
3 2 6 0 10 50% 60% 
Boubyan Bank 0 0 0 0 10 0% 0% 
Warba Bank 2 1 0 2 10 30% 20% 
Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
3 1 5 0 14 29% 36% 
Al Rajhi Bank 
Malaysia 
6 0 4 0 14 43% 29% 
Alliance Islamic 
Bank 
3 1 1 0 14 29% 7% 
AmBank 7 0 8 0 14 50% 57% 
Asian Finance Bank 5 1 7 0 14 43% 50% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 0 3 0 5 14 21% 36% 
Bank Muamalat 3 0 5 0 14 21% 36% 
CIMB Islamic 0 1 3 0 14 7% 21% 
HSBC Amanah 0 2 0 4 14 14% 29% 
Hong Leong Islamic 6 0 5 0 14 43% 36% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
3 0 3 0 13 23% 23% 
Maybank Islamic 0 0 0 1 14 0% 7% 
OSBC Al Amin 3 1 0 1 14 29% 7% 
Public Islamic Bank 3 0 1 0 14 21% 7% 
RHB Islamic Bank 9 1 10 0 14 71% 71% 
Standard Chartered 
Saadiq 
1 2 6 2 13 23% 62% 
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Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank 
Pakistan 
2 2 2 0 10 40% 20% 
Bank Islami 
Pakistan 
2 0 0 1 10 20% 10% 
Burj Bank 2 2 2 2 10 40% 40% 
Dubai Islamic Bank 
Pakistan 
1 2 2 2 10 30% 40% 
Meezan Bank 0 0 2 0 10 0% 20% 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank 4 0 4 1 10 40% 50% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 7 0 5 0 10 70% 50% 
Qatar International 
Islamic Bank 
5 0 4 0 10 50% 40% 
Masraf Al Rayan 0 4 4 0 8 50% 50% 
Syria 
Al Baraka Bank 
Syria 
3 0 5 0 7 43% 71% 
Syria International 
Islamic Bank 
2 1 0 2 7 43% 29% 
Thailand 
Islamic Bank of 
Thailand 
0 3 1 0 10 30% 10% 
Turkey 
Asya Bank 0 6 0 7 7 86% 100% 
Al-Baraka Turk 6 0 6 0 10 60% 60% 
Kuveyt Turk 1 0 0 3 10 10% 30% 
Turkiye Finans 10 0 10 0 10 100% 100% 
UAE 
National Bank of 
AbuDhabi* 
3 3 0 2 8 75% 25% 
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank* 
2 3 3 3 10 50% 60% 
Dubai Islamic Bank 3 0 5 0 10 30% 50% 
Emirates NBD* 3 2 0 3 10 50% 30% 
Emirates Islamic 
Bank 
4 1 0 2 10 50% 20% 
Mashreq Al Islami* 3 1 1 3 10 40% 40% 
Sharjah Islamic 
Bank 
8 0 8 0 10 80% 80% 
National Bank of 
RAK* 
6 2 7 0 10 80% 70% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
2 0 1 0 10 20% 10% 
Al Hilal Bank 7 1 8 2 10 80% 100% 
Ajman Bank 7 0 7 0 8 88% 88% 
Table 62: Volume changes following correct investment recommendations in short- and long-term using the 
5% range. Bold shows 100% emphasized. 
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Using 5% Range Short-Term Long-Term 
Total 
Quarter
s 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Correct Volume 
Changes when: 
Under-
valued 
Over-
value
d 
Under
-
valued 
Over-
value
d 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
Malaysia Private Investors 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
1 0 5 0 14 7% 36% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 3 0 4 0 14 21% 29% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 4 1 2 0 14 36% 14% 
AmBank 5 0 7 0 14 36% 50% 
Asian Finance Bank 3 1 4 0 14 29% 29% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 0 3 0 4 14 21% 29% 
Bank Muamalat 3 0 8 0 14 21% 57% 
CIMB Islamic 1 0 3 0 14 7% 21% 
HSBC Amanah 0 6 0 5 14 43% 36% 
Hong Leong Islamic 6 0 6 0 14 43% 43% 
Kuwait Finance House 2 0 2 0 13 15% 15% 
Maybank Islamic 0 0 0 1 14 0% 7% 
OSBC Al Amin 5 0 0 0 14 36% 0% 
Public Islamic Bank 3 0 1 0 14 21% 7% 
RHB Islamic Bank 10 0 12 0 14 71% 86% 
Standard Chartered 
Saadiq 
1 1 4 1 13 15% 38% 
Malaysia Financial Institutions 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
1 3 7 1 14 29% 57% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 1 1 5 1 14 14% 43% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 0 1 7 0 14 7% 50% 
AmBank 1 0 7 1 14 7% 57% 
Asian Finance Bank 3 3 8 1 14 43% 64% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 5 0 4 3 14 36% 50% 
Bank Muamalat 5 3 3 5 14 57% 57% 
CIMB Islamic 0 6 1 2 14 43% 21% 
HSBC Amanah 0 5 7 2 14 36% 64% 
Hong Leong Islamic 1 4 3 1 14 36% 29% 
Kuwait Finance House 1 1 7 1 13 15% 62% 
Maybank Islamic 0 1 2 2 14 7% 29% 
OSBC Al Amin 0 3 6 2 14 21% 57% 
Public Islamic Bank 1 1 4 3 14 14% 50% 
RHB Islamic Bank 1 3 7 1 14 29% 57% 
Standard Chartered 
Saadiq 
0 2 6 1 13 15% 54% 
Table 63: Volume changes following correct investment recommendations in short- and long-term using the 
5% range. 
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Appendix E.5. Full-Sample and Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes with 10% Range 
Appendix E.5.1. Full-Sample Valuation using 10% Range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 153: Bahrain : Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 154: Bangladesh: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample 
short-term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly 
valued “hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) 
[10%]. 
 
Figure 155: Egypt: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 156: Indonesia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 157: Jordan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 158: Kuwait: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 159: Malaysia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 160: Oman: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 161: Pakistan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 162: Philippines: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample 
short-term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly 
valued “hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) 
[10%]. 
 
Figure 163: Qatar: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 164: Sri Lanka: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 165: Syria: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 166: Thailand: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 167: Turkey: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 168: UAE: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample short-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Appendix E.5.2. Full-Sample Valuation using 10% Range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 169: Bahrain: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 170: Bangladesh: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample 
long-term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly 
valued “hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) 
[10%]. 
 
Figure 171: Egypt: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 172: Indonesia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 173: Jordan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 174: Kuwait: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 175: Malaysia: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 176: Oman: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 177: Pakistan: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 178: Philippines: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample 
long-term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly 
valued “hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) 
[10%]. 
 
Figure 179: Qatar: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 180: Sri Lanka: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Figure 181: Syria: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 182: Thailand: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-
term (green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued 
“hold recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 183: Turkey: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
 
Figure 184: UAE: Valuation for Islamic investment accounts using the full-sample long-term 
(green  undervalued “buy recommendation”, yellow  correctly valued “hold 
recommendation”, and red  overvalued “sell recommendation”) [10%]. 
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Appendix E.5.3. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes using 10% Range (Short-Term Valuation)30 
Figure 185a - Figure 185f: Bahrain rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 185a: Al Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 185b: Al Salam Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 185c: Bahrain Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 185d: Ithmaar Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
                                                          
30 Note that in the figures, the secondary axis (for Change in Volume) has no visible horizontal “0”Line so as not to mix it up with that of the primary axis. 
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Figure 185e: Khaleeji Commercial rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 185f: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 186a - Figure 186g: Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 186a: Islamic Bank Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 186b: Al-Arafah Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 186c: Export Import Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 186d: Social Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 186e: Shahjalal Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 186f: First Security Islami rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 186g: ICB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 187a - Figure 187c: Egypt rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 187a: Faisal Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 187b: Al-Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 187c: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 188a - Figure 188f: Indonesia rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 188a: BRI Syariah rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 188b: Bank Muamalat Indonesia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 188c: Syariah Mandiri rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 188d: Syariah Mega Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 188e: Syariah Bukopin rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 188f: Bank Jaber Banten* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 189a - Figure 189b: Jordan rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 189a: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 189b: Jordan Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 190a - Figure 190e: Kuwait rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 190a: Ahli United Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 190b: Kuwait International Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 190c: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 190d: Boubyan Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 190e: Warba Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 191a - Figure 191p: Malaysia rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 191a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 191e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
(05) Asian Finance Bank Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.90%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
0.90%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
385 
 
Figure 191i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 191m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 191p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 192a - Figure 192e: Pakistan rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 192a: Al Baraka Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 192b: Bank Islami Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 192c: Burj Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 192d: Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 192e: Meezan Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 193a - Figure 193d: Qatar rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 193a: Barwa Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 193b: Qatar Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 193c: Qatar International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 193d: Masraf Al-Rayan rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 194: Thailand rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 194: Islamic Bank of Thailand rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 195a - Figure 195k: Syria rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 195a: Al Baraka Bank Syria rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 195b: Syria International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 196a - Figure 196d: Turkey rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 196a: Asya Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 196b: Al-Baraka Bank Turkey rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 196c: Kuveyt Turk rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 196d: Turkiye Finans rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
  
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
2.00%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
2.00%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns (Short-Term) Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
392 
Figure 197a - Figure 197k: UAE rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 197a: National Bank of Abu Dhabi* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197b: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197c: Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197d: Emirates NBD* rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 197e: Emirates Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197f: Mashreq Al-Islami* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197g: Sharjah Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197h: National Bank of RAK* Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Figure 197i: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197j: Al Hilal Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
 
Figure 197k: Ajman Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term). 
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Appendix E.5.4. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes using 10% Range (Long-Term Valuation) 
Figure 198a - Figure 198f: Bahrain rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 198a: Al Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 198b: Al Salam Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 198c: Bahrain Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 198d: Ithmaar Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 198e: Khaleeji Commercial rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 198f: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 199a - Figure 199g: Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 199a: Islamic Bank Bangladesh rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 199b: Al-Arafah Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 199c: Export Import Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 199d: Social Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 199e: Shahjalal Islami Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 199f: First Security Islami rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 199g: ICB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 200a - Figure 200c: Egypt rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 200a: Faisal Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 200b: Al-Baraka Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 200c: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 201a - Figure 201f: Indonesia rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 201a: BRI Syariah rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 201b: Bank Muamalat Indonesia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 201c: Syariah Mandiri rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 201d: Syariah Mega Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 201e: Syariah Bukopin rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 201f: Bank Jaber Banten* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 202a - Figure 202b: Jordan rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 202a: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 202b: Jordan Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns Average Empirical Returns
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
C
h
an
ge
 in
 V
o
lu
m
e
R
et
u
rn
s
Islamic Investment Accounts (Change in Volume) Required Expected Returns Average Empirical Returns
APPENDIX 
403 
Figure 203a - Figure 203e: Kuwait rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 203a: Ahli United Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 203b: Kuwait International Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 203c: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 203d: Boubyan Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 203f: Warba Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 204a - Figure 204p: Malaysia rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 204a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 204e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 204i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 204m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 204p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 205a - Figure 205e: Pakistan rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 205a: Al Baraka Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 205b: Bank Islami Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 205c: Burj Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 205d: Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 205e: Meezan Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 206a - Figure 206e: Qatar rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 206a: Barwa Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 206b: Qatar Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 206c: Qatar International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 206d: Masraf Al-Rayan rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 207a - Figure 207b: Syria rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 207a: Al Baraka Bank Syria rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 207b: Syria International Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
Figure 208: Thailand rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 208: Islamic Bank of Thailand rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 209a - Figure 209d: Turkey rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 209a: Asya Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 209b: Al-Baraka Bank Turkey rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 209c: Kuveyt Turk rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 209d: Turkiye Finans rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 210a - Figure 210k: UAE rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 210a: National Bank of Abu Dhabi* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210b: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210c: Dubai Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210d: Emirates NBD* rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 210e: Emirates Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210f: Mashreq Al-Islami* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210g: Sharjah Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210h: National Bank of RAK* Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Figure 210i: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210j: Al Hilal Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
 
Figure 210k: Ajman Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term). 
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Appendix E.5.5. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes for Malaysia Private Investors using 10% Range (Short- and Long-Term 
Valuation) 
Appendix E.5.5.1. Short-Term 
Figure 211a - Figure 211p: Malaysia Private Investors rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 211a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 211e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 211i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Figure 211m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 211p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Private. 
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Appendix E.5.5.2. Long-Term 
Figure 212a - Figure 212p: Malaysia Private Investors rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 212a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 212e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 212i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Figure 212m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
 
Figure 212p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Private. 
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Appendix E.5.6. Rolling Estimation Valuation and Volume Changes for Malaysia Financial Institutions using 10% Range (Short- and Long-Term 
Valuation) 
Appendix E.5.6.1. Short-Term 
Figure 213a - Figure 213p: Malaysia Financial Institutions rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Short-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 213a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 213e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)I—Institutions. 
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Figure 213i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 213m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 213p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (short-term)—Institutions 
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Appendix E.5.6.2. Long-Term 
Figure 214a - Figure 214p: Malaysia Financial Institutions rolling estimation with volume using 10% range (Long-Term Valuation) 
 
Figure 214a: Affin Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214c: Alliance Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214d: AmBank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 214e: Asian Finance Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214f: Bank Islam Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214h: CIMB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 214i: HSBC Amanah rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214j: Hong Leong Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214k: Kuwait Finance House rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214l: MayBank Islamic rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Figure 214m: OSBC Al-Amin rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214n: Public Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214o: RHB Islamic Bank rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
 
Figure 214p: Standard Chartered Saadiq rolling estimation with volume (long-term)—Institutions. 
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Appendix E.5.7. Summary of Volume Changes with 10% Range 
This table shows in how many quarters the change in volume for a specific Islamic 
investment account matched the investment recommendation (Volume change positive 
when undervalued or volume change negative when overvalued) in the short-and long-
term valuation. 
Using 10% Range Short-Term Long-Term 
Total 
Quarters 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Correct Volume 
Changes when: 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 
6 2 7 0 11 73% 64% 
Al Salam Bank 1 2 0 2 11 27% 18% 
Bahrain Islamic 
Bank 
2 5 0 6 11 64% 55% 
Ithmaar Bank 2 2 4 0 11 36% 36% 
Khaleeji 
Commercial Bank 
3 2 0 2 11 45% 18% 
Kuwait Finance 
House Bahrain 
1 2 0 5 11 27% 45% 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank 
Bangladesh 
0 7 0 6 10 70% 60% 
Al-Arafah Bank 3 3 1 0 10 60% 10% 
Export Import 
Bank 
2 1 3 0 10 30% 30% 
Social Islami Bank 1 6 2 1 10 70% 30% 
Shahjalal Islami 
Bank 
0 3 0 0 10 30% 0% 
First Security 
Islami Bank 
1 0 2 0 10 10% 20% 
ICB Islamic Bank 0 6 0 6 10 60% 60% 
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic 
Bank 
2 1 0 2 7 43% 29% 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 
1 0 0 0 5 20% 0% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
3 0 0 1 7 43% 14% 
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Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah 5 0 8 0 10 50% 80% 
Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia 
4 0 3 0 10 40% 30% 
Syariah Mandiri 0 4 0 4 10 40% 40% 
Syariah Mega 
Bank 
2 0 2 1 10 20% 30% 
Syariah Bukopin 8 0 7 0 10 80% 70% 
Bank Jaber 
Banten* 
6 0 7 0 10 60% 70% 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai 
Islamic Bank 
8 0 10 0 10 80% 100% 
Jordan Islamic 
Bank 
0 1 0 2 10 10% 20% 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 1 2 0 4 10 30% 40% 
Kuwait 
International 
Bank 
5 0 0 5 10 50% 50% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
3 1 6 0 10 40% 60% 
Boubyan Bank 0 0 0 0 10 0% 0% 
Warba Bank 2 1 0 1 10 30% 10% 
  
APPENDIX 
435 
Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
2 1 1 0 14 21% 7% 
Al Rajhi Bank 
Malaysia 
5 0 3 0 14 36% 21% 
Alliance Islamic 
Bank 
2 0 0 0 14 14% 0% 
AmBank 6 0 8 0 14 43% 57% 
Asian Finance 
Bank 
6 1 7 0 14 50% 50% 
Bank Islam 
Malaysia 
0 2 0 5 14 14% 36% 
Bank Muamalat 2 0 1 0 14 14% 7% 
CIMB Islamic 0 0 1 0 14 0% 7% 
HSBC Amanah 0 2 0 4 14 14% 29% 
Hong Leong 
Islamic 
4 0 0 0 14 29% 0% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
3 0 3 0 13 23% 23% 
Maybank Islamic 0 0 0 0 14 0% 0% 
OSBC Al Amin 1 0 0 0 14 7% 0% 
Public Islamic 
Bank 
2 0 1 0 14 14% 7% 
RHB Islamic Bank 8 1 10 0 14 64% 71% 
Standard 
Chartered Saadiq 
0 2 4 1 13 15% 38% 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank 
Pakistan 
2 2 2 0 10 40% 20% 
Bank Islami 
Pakistan 
1 0 0 1 10 10% 10% 
Burj Bank 2 2 0 1 10 40% 10% 
Dubai Islamic 
Bank Pakistan 
1 2 1 2 10 30% 30% 
Meezan Bank 0 0 0 0 10 0% 0% 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank 3 0 3 0 10 30% 30% 
Qatar Islamic 
Bank 
7 0 2 0 10 70% 20% 
Qatar 
International 
Islamic Bank 
5 0 4 0 10 50% 40% 
Masraf Al Rayan 0 4 0 4 8 50% 50% 
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Syria 
Al Baraka Bank 
Syria 
3 0 6 0 7 43% 86% 
Syria 
International 
Islamic Bank 
2 1 0 2 7 43% 29% 
Thailand 
Islamic Bank of 
Thailand 
0 1 0 0 10 10% 0% 
Turkey 
Asya Bank 0 5 0 7 7 71% 100% 
Al-Baraka Turk 4 0 5 0 10 40% 50% 
Kuveyt Turk 1 0 0 3 10 10% 30% 
Turkiye Finans 10 0 10 0 10 100% 100% 
UAE 
National Bank of 
AbuDhabi* 
2 2 0 2 8 50% 25% 
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial 
Bank* 
2 3 2 2 10 50% 40% 
Dubai Islamic 
Bank 
3 0 5 0 10 30% 50% 
Emirates NBD* 0 3 0 4 10 30% 40% 
Emirates Islamic 
Bank 
0 1 0 2 10 10% 20% 
Mashreq Al 
Islami* 
3 1 1 3 10 40% 40% 
Sharjah Islamic 
Bank 
8 0 8 0 10 80% 80% 
National Bank of 
RAK* 
6 2 7 0 10 80% 70% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
0 0 1 0 10 0% 10% 
Al Hilal Bank 7 2 8 2 10 90% 100% 
Ajman Bank 7 0 7 0 8 88% 88% 
Table 64: Volume changes following correct investment recommendations in short- and long-term using the 
10%. Bold shows 100% emphasized. 
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Using 10% Range Short-Term Long-Term 
Total 
Quarters 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Correct Volume 
Changes when: 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Under-
valued 
Over-
valued 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
Malaysia Private Investors 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
1 0 1 0 14 7% 7% 
Al Rajhi Bank 
Malaysia 
2 0 3 0 14 14% 21% 
Alliance Islamic 
Bank 
3 0 0 0 14 21% 0% 
AmBank 5 0 8 0 14 36% 57% 
Asian Finance 
Bank 
3 0 5 0 14 21% 36% 
Bank Islam 
Malaysia 
0 3 0 4 14 21% 29% 
Bank Muamalat 2 0 1 0 14 14% 7% 
CIMB Islamic 0 0 1 0 14 0% 7% 
HSBC Amanah 0 6 0 7 14 43% 50% 
Hong Leong 
Islamic 
3 0 0 0 14 21% 0% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
2 0 1 0 13 15% 8% 
Maybank Islamic 0 0 0 1 14 0% 7% 
OSBC Al Amin 3 0 0 0 14 21% 0% 
Public Islamic 
Bank 
2 0 0 0 14 14% 0% 
RHB Islamic Bank 9 0 12 0 14 64% 86% 
Standard 
Chartered Saadiq 
0 1 4 1 13 8% 38% 
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Malaysia Financial Institutions 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
1 2 7 1 14 21% 57% 
Al Rajhi Bank 
Malaysia 
1 1 5 0 14 14% 36% 
Alliance Islamic 
Bank 
0 1 6 0 14 7% 43% 
AmBank 1 0 7 1 14 7% 57% 
Asian Finance 
Bank 
3 3 8 1 14 43% 64% 
Bank Islam 
Malaysia 
5 0 4 3 14 36% 50% 
Bank Muamalat 5 3 3 5 14 57% 57% 
CIMB Islamic 0 3 1 2 14 21% 21% 
HSBC Amanah 0 5 7 2 14 36% 64% 
Hong Leong 
Islamic 
1 4 3 1 14 36% 29% 
Kuwait Finance 
House 
1 1 7 1 13 15% 62% 
Maybank Islamic 0 1 2 2 14 7% 29% 
OSBC Al Amin 0 3 6 2 14 21% 57% 
Public Islamic 
Bank 
0 0 4 3 14 0% 50% 
RHB Islamic Bank 1 4 7 1 14 36% 57% 
Standard 
Chartered Saadiq 
0 3 6 1 13 23% 54% 
Table 65: Volume changes following correct investment recommendations in short- and long-term using the 
5% range. 
 
APPENDIX 
439 
Appendix E.6. Returns and Volume Changes measured against Riskless Benchmarks 
Appendix E.6.1. Returns and Volume Changes using T-Bills and LIBOR 
Figure 215a - Figure 215f: Bahrain Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 215a: Al Baraka Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 215b: Al Salam Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 215c: Bahrain Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 215d: Ithmaar Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 215e: Khaleeji Commercial volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 215f: Kuwait Finance House volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 216a - Figure 216g: Bangladesh Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 216a: Islamic Bank Bangladesh volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 216b: Al-Arafah Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 216c: Export Import Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 216d: Social Islami Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 216e: Shahjalal Islami Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 216f: First Security Islami volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 216g: ICB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 217a - Figure 217c: Egypt Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 217a: Faisal Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks.  
Figure 217b: Al-Baraka Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 217c: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 218a - Figure 218f: Indonesia Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 218a: BRI Syariah volume analysis with riskless benchmarks.  
Figure 218b: Bank Muamalat Indonesia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 218c: Syariah Mandiri volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 218d: Syariah Mega Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 218e: Syariah Bukopin volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 218f: Bank Jaber Banten* Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 219a - Figure 219b: Jordan Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 219a: Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 219b: Jordan Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 220a - Figure 220e: Kuwait Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 220a: Ahli United Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 220b: Kuwait International Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 220c: Kuwait Finance House volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 220d: Boubyan Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 220e: Warba Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 221a - Figure 221p: Malaysia Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 221a: Affin Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks.  
Figure 221b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221c: Alliance Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221d: AmBank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 221e: Asian Finance Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221f: Bank Islam Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221h: CIMB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 221i: HSBC Amanah volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221j: Hong Leong Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221k: Kuwait Finance House volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221l: MayBank Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 221m: OSBC Al-Amin volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221n: Public Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 221o: RHB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks.  
Figure 221p: Standard Chartered Saadiq volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 222a - Figure 222g: Oman Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks  
 
Figure 222a: Nizwa Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 222b: Al Izz Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 222c: Bank Muscat Meethaq volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 222d: Muzn National Bank of Oman volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 222e: Maisarah Dhofar Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 222f: Sohar Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 222g: Hilal Al Ahli Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 223a - Figure 223e: Pakistan Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 223a: Al Baraka Bank Pakistan volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 223b: Bank Islami Pakistan volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 223c: Burj Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 223d: Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 223e: Meezan Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 224: Philippines Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 224: Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank* volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 225a - Figure 225d: Qatar Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
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Figure 225a: Barwa Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 225b: Qatar Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 225c: Qatar International Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 225d: Masraf Al-Rayan volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 226: Sri Lanka Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 226: Amana Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 227a - Figure 227b: Syria Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 227a: Al Baraka Bank Syria volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 227b: Syria International Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 228: Thailand Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 228:  Islamic Bank of Thailand volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 229a - Figure 229d: Turkey Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 229a: Asya Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 229b: Al-Baraka Bank Turkey volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 229c: Kuveyt Turk volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 229d: Turkiye Finans volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 230a - Figure 230k: UAE Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 230a: National Bank of Abu Dhabi* volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230b: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230c: Dubai Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230d: Emirates NBD* volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 230e: Emirates Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230f: Mashreq Al-Islami* Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230g: Sharjah Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230h: National Bank of RAK* Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 230i: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230j: Al Hilal Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
 
Figure 230k: Ajman Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks. 
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Figure 231a - Figure 231p: Malaysia Private Investors Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 231a: Affin Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231c: Alliance Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231d: AmBank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
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Figure 231e: Asian Finance Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231f: Bank Islam Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231h: CIMB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
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Figure 231i: HSBC Amanah volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231j: Hong Leong Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231k: Kuwait Finance House volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231l: MayBank Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
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Figure 231m: OSBC Al-Amin volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231n: Public Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231o: RHB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
 
Figure 231p: Standard Chartered Saadiq volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Private. 
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Figure 232a - Figure 232p: Malaysia Financial Institutions Returns and Volumes using Riskless Benchmarks 
 
Figure 232a: Affin Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232b: Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232c: Alliance Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232d: AmBank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
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Figure 232e: Asian Finance Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232f: Bank Islam Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232g: Bank Muamalat Malaysia volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232h: CIMB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
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Figure 232i: HSBC Amanah volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232j: Hong Leong Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232k: Kuwait Finance House volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232l: MayBank Islamic volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
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Figure 232m: OSBC Al-Amin volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232n: Public Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232o: RHB Islamic Bank volume analysis with riskless benchmarks—Institutions. 
 
Figure 232p: Standard Chartered Saadiq volume analysis with riskless benchmarks-—Institutions. 
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Appendix E.6.2. Summary of Volume Changes using Riskless Benchmarks with 
5% Range 
Using 5% Range Percentage Accuracy 
Correct Volume Changes when: T-Bills LIBOR 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 66% 66% 
Al Salam Bank 66% 62% 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 45% 55% 
Ithmaar Bank 34% 31% 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 69% 72% 
Kuwait Finance House Bahrain 55% 59% 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank Bangladesh 48% 48% 
Al-Arafah Bank 32% 43% 
Export Import Bank 38% 38% 
Social Islami Bank 33% 44% 
Shahjalal Islami Bank 31% 31% 
First Security Islami Bank 42% 42% 
ICB Islamic Bank 35% 65% 
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic Bank 38% 69% 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 6% 83% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 20% 76% 
Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah 79% 79% 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia 39% 68% 
Syariah Mandiri 29% 79% 
Syariah Mega Bank 25% 50% 
Syariah Bukopin 82% 79% 
Bank Jaber Banten* 64% 76% 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 64% 100% 
Jordan Islamic Bank 32% 86% 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 54% 67% 
Kuwait International Bank 54% 57% 
Kuwait Finance House 79% 82% 
Boubyan Bank 24% 96% 
Warba Bank 56% 78% 
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Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 25% 62% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 42% 69% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 23% 75% 
AmBank 13% 69% 
Asian Finance Bank 19% 56% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 29% 69% 
Bank Muamalat 42% 59% 
CIMB Islamic 26% 56% 
HSBC Amanah 23% 71% 
Hong Leong Islamic 16% 72% 
Kuwait Finance House 32% 52% 
Maybank Islamic 23% 88% 
OSBC Al Amin 29% 66% 
Public Islamic Bank 28% 73% 
RHB Islamic Bank 19% 63% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 32% 55% 
Oman 
Nizwa Bank 54% 69% 
Al Izz Islamic Bank 36% 55% 
Bank Muscat Meethaq 85% 85% 
Muzn National Bank of Oman 23% 77% 
Maisarah Dhofar Bank 75% 92% 
Sohar Bank 75% 92% 
Hilal Al Ahli Bank 77% 85% 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank Pakistan 36% 61% 
Bank Islami Pakistan 11% 82% 
Burj Bank 21% 64% 
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan 15% 85% 
Meezan Bank 7% 93% 
Philippines 
Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank* 38% 38% 
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Qatar 
Barwa Bank 64% 68% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 64% 79% 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 59% 82% 
Masraf Al Rayan 64% 57% 
Sri Lanka 
Amana Bank 6% 100% 
Syria 
Al Baraka Bank Syria N/A 93% 
Syria International Islamic Bank N/A 64% 
Thailand 
Islamic Bank of Thailand 43% 61% 
Turkey 
Asya Bank 36% 54% 
Al-Baraka Turk 18% 86% 
Kuveyt Turk 18% 82% 
Turkiye Finans 4% 96% 
UAE 
National Bank of AbuDhabi* N/A 44% 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* N/A 53% 
Dubai Islamic Bank N/A 64% 
Emirates NBD* N/A 57% 
Emirates Islamic Bank N/A 68% 
Mashreq Al Islami* N/A 57% 
Sharjah Islamic Bank N/A 82% 
National Bank of RAK* N/A 77% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank N/A 82% 
Al Hilal Bank N/A 85% 
Ajman Bank N/A 82% 
Table 66: Using riskless benchmarks for volume changes following correct investment recommendations 
using the 5% range. 
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Using 5% Range Percentage Accuracy 
Correct Volume Changes when T-Bills LIBOR 
Malaysia Private Investors 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 30% 48% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 50% 48% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 19% 78% 
AmBank 19% 59% 
Asian Finance Bank 32% 50% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 29% 69% 
Bank Muamalat 42% 59% 
CIMB Islamic 19% 69% 
HSBC Amanah 37% 58% 
Hong Leong Islamic 19% 75% 
Kuwait Finance House 43% 38% 
Maybank Islamic 29% 81% 
OSBC Al Amin 29% 69% 
Public Islamic Bank 21% 87% 
RHB Islamic Bank 13% 78% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 32% 48% 
Malaysia Financial Institutions 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 35% 57% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 27% 48% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 13% 53% 
AmBank 32% 50% 
Asian Finance Bank 42% 56% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 35% 47% 
Bank Muamalat 42% 50% 
CIMB Islamic 23% 44% 
HSBC Amanah 30% 61% 
Hong Leong Islamic 26% 44% 
Kuwait Finance House 29% 59% 
Maybank Islamic 29% 59% 
OSBC Al Amin 21% 59% 
Public Islamic Bank 14% 40% 
RHB Islamic Bank 32% 63% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 29% 45% 
Table 67: Using riskless benchmarks for volume changes following correct investment recommendations 
using the 5% range. 
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Appendix E.6.3. Summary of Volume Changes using Riskless Benchmarks with 
10% Range 
Using 10% Range Percentage Accuracy 
Correct Volume Changes when: T-Bills LIBOR 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 66% 66% 
Al Salam Bank 66% 62% 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 45% 55% 
Ithmaar Bank 34% 31% 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 69% 72% 
Kuwait Finance House Bahrain 55% 59% 
Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank Bangladesh 41% 48% 
Al-Arafah Bank 32% 43% 
Export Import Bank 38% 38% 
Social Islami Bank 33% 44% 
Shahjalal Islami Bank 31% 31% 
First Security Islami Bank 42% 42% 
ICB Islamic Bank 35% 65% 
Egypt 
Faisal Islamic Bank 31% 69% 
Al Baraka Islamic Bank 6% 83% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 20% 76% 
Indonesia 
Bank BRI Syariah 68% 79% 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia 21% 68% 
Syariah Mandiri 18% 79% 
Syariah Mega Bank 14% 50% 
Syariah Bukopin 82% 79% 
Bank Jaber Banten* 64% 76% 
Jordan 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 52% 100% 
Jordan Islamic Bank 32% 86% 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 46% 67% 
Kuwait International Bank 46% 57% 
Kuwait Finance House 75% 82% 
Boubyan Bank 20% 96% 
Warba Bank 50% 78% 
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Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 5% 62% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 25% 69% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 22% 75% 
AmBank 9% 69% 
Asian Finance Bank 13% 56% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 28% 69% 
Bank Muamalat 41% 59% 
CIMB Islamic 19% 56% 
HSBC Amanah 19% 71% 
Hong Leong Islamic 13% 72% 
Kuwait Finance House 14% 52% 
Maybank Islamic 16% 88% 
OSBC Al Amin 21% 66% 
Public Islamic Bank 20% 73% 
RHB Islamic Bank 16% 63% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 24% 55% 
Oman 
Nizwa Bank 46% 69% 
Al Izz Islamic Bank 36% 55% 
Bank Muscat Meethaq 85% 85% 
Muzn National Bank of Oman 15% 77% 
Maisarah Dhofar Bank 75% 92% 
Sohar Bank 75% 92% 
Hilal Al Ahli Bank 77% 85% 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank Pakistan 29% 61% 
Bank Islami Pakistan 11% 82% 
Burj Bank 11% 64% 
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan 15% 85% 
Meezan Bank 7% 93% 
Philippines 
Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank* 31% 38% 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank 59% 68% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 59% 79% 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 55% 82% 
Masraf Al Rayan 59% 57% 
Sri Lanka 
Amana Bank 6% 100% 
Syria 
Al Baraka Bank Syria N/A 93% 
Syria International Islamic Bank N/A 64% 
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Thailand 
Islamic Bank of Thailand 39% 61% 
Turkey 
Asya Bank 36% 54% 
Al-Baraka Turk 11% 86% 
Kuveyt Turk 18% 82% 
Turkiye Finans 4% 96% 
UAE 
National Bank of AbuDhabi* N/A 44% 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank* N/A 47% 
Dubai Islamic Bank N/A 64% 
Emirates NBD* N/A 57% 
Emirates Islamic Bank N/A 68% 
Mashreq Al Islami* N/A 57% 
Sharjah Islamic Bank N/A 82% 
National Bank of RAK* N/A 77% 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank N/A 82% 
Al Hilal Bank N/A 85% 
Ajman Bank N/A 82% 
Table 68: Using riskless benchmarks for volume changes following correct investment recommendations 
using the 10% range. 
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Using 10% Range Percentage Accuracy 
Correct Volume Changes when T-Bills LIBOR 
Malaysia Private Investors 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 14% 48% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 26% 48% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 19% 78% 
AmBank 16% 59% 
Asian Finance Bank 9% 50% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 28% 69% 
Bank Muamalat 41% 59% 
CIMB Islamic 16% 69% 
HSBC Amanah 32% 58% 
Hong Leong Islamic 16% 75% 
Kuwait Finance House 17% 38% 
Maybank Islamic 22% 81% 
OSBC Al Amin 17% 69% 
Public Islamic Bank 17% 87% 
RHB Islamic Bank 9% 78% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 21% 48% 
Malaysia Financial Institutions 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 24% 57% 
Al Rajhi Bank Malaysia 26% 48% 
Alliance Islamic Bank 6% 53% 
AmBank 28% 50% 
Asian Finance Bank 38% 56% 
Bank Islam Malaysia 34% 47% 
Bank Muamalat 44% 50% 
CIMB Islamic 19% 44% 
HSBC Amanah 29% 61% 
Hong Leong Islamic 16% 44% 
Kuwait Finance House 24% 59% 
Maybank Islamic 31% 59% 
OSBC Al Amin 24% 59% 
Public Islamic Bank 13% 40% 
RHB Islamic Bank 22% 63% 
Standard Chartered Saadiq 21% 45% 
Table 69: Using riskless benchmarks for volume changes following correct investment recommendations 
using the 10% range.  
